

Peace ala JK: Poso is Calm, Ambon is Peacefull

by Abdul Hamid

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Peace A La JK

POSO IS CALM, AMBON IS PEACEFUL

Translated By Tim Scott



This book is published merely to prevent any omissions; omissions that remind us such as there was a time in our country when violence infiltrated deeply and erased our hopes and obliterated our wishes. There was a time when a number of people claimed violence in the name of God and buried their feelings of love and compassion. May this book be a beacon to prevent any omissions of this unfortunate period.

HAMID AWALUDIN



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PEACE A LA JK

POSO IS CALM, AMBON IS PEACEFUL

BY **HAMID AWALUDIN**

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Peace a la JK

Poso is Calm, Ambon is Peaceful

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GEOGRAPHIC SETTING

Poso is located in Sulawesi, that strange looking four-limbed island roughly at the center of the Indonesian archipelago, at the bottom of Tomini Bay which sits between the first or uppermost limb in Central Sulawesi and the second limb. At the end this first limb is located Menado and at the end of the lowermost limb is Makassar or as it was temporarily known Ujung Pandang.

Sulawesi has major natural resources ranging from gold, nickel, natural gas, exotic timbers and of course spices, principally nutmeg, cloves and mace plus camphor and pearls.

Makassar, was certainly known in Tang times (7th Century) in China, and when the Portuguese arrived off Makassar in 1511 they found a bustling cosmopolitan trading center inhabited by Chinese, Arabs, Thais and Malay traders. It was probably the world's first free port. There are reports of spice imports into Europe in Roman times via India and

the Red Sea from Indonesia, no doubt from Makassar. Probably there has been Arab contact with Indonesia for the last two millennia well before the advent of Islam in Indonesia.

Makassar is home to the Buginese, who are Indonesia's famed seafarer-traders, who until this day range across the archipelago in their phinisi small sailing ships (often misnamed Bugis schooners) plying cargos of cement, foodstuff and sawn timber. They certainly sailed to northern Australia in the 17th Century where they fished for trepang or sea slugs - bêche de mer for export to restaurants in China. Today dotted along this antipodean coastline there are mighty tamarind trees which the Bugis planted probably over 500 years ago and later harvested for their cuisine in Marege, which the Bugis called the northern coast of Australia.

Ambon is located about half-way between Sulawesi and Indonesian Papua and sits under the island of Seram. Again Ambon and the surrounding Maluku provinces are famous centers for spices - mainly cloves and nutmeg such as from Banda Naira to the south of Ambon. Also, there are a number of as yet undeveloped minerals deposits like the nickel mine at Weda Bay in Halmahera in North Maluku and oil was produced in Seram for a number of years.

Again Ambon was occupied by first the Portuguese after the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, after Columbus's discovery of the New World - America, where Spain and Portugal divided the Christian world into two hemispheres of influence. The Spice Islands, Ambon and Banda Naira to the south-east, were in theory Portuguese, lying west of the Spanish Philippines.

Later the Dutch ousted the Portuguese and remained Indonesia's colonial masters for over three hundred years.

Ambon city is located on a ria - a sunken valley which provides a deep and safe anchorage. Because of this steep sided topography, residential land is at a premium and as a result Ambon has probably one of the highest population densities in the whole of Indonesia.

Both these places Poso and Ambon are important trade centers in modern Indonesia. With Poso located roughly in the center of Sulawesi an internecine conflict there could readily spread and infect the whole of Sulawesi from Manado to Makassar. Similarly, in Ambon, the internecine conflict could spread throughout the province into North Maluku and possibly into Papua. An additional factor for concern was the high population density of Ambon city where the smallest disturbance could inflict ¹⁰ormous casualties and damage. Consequently, decisive action was required. It was H. Mhd. Jusuf Kalla, Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, who was the catalyst for immediate action and the impetus to seek peace in both Poso and Ambon.

Tim Scott
Bogor, October 2012

INTRODUCTION

I have been in Moscow for the past 12 months. The night I left Indonesia I launched my book, "Peace in Aceh". Since then close friends, and others whom I know less well, have asked me to write about another peace process in which I was involved - Ambon and Poso. Not for one moment did I take them seriously. Besides I was too busy and in any case I did not know where to start writing, particularly as both conflicts happened some years back. I feared that with such a lapse of time my memory would be somewhat clouded.

Several times in the past I have discussed this with an old friend of mine, Dr Imam Prasodjo, a sociologist at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, who was very active with peace-making matters. He seriously urged me to write about the Ambon-Poso peace process in the same fashion as I had written about Aceh.¹

¹ "Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement(GAM) in Helsinki" by Hamid Awaludin, published by CSIS 2009; ISBN 978-979-1295-11-6

By chance I happened to be in Jakarta and was casually searching through my books to take on my posting to Moscow. Behind a stack of books, I found a number of documents and personal notes related to the peace discussions in Poso and Ambon. My heart leapt and immediately I wanted to write about both the Poso and Ambon peace processes.

These notes I brought to Moscow and sorted them out. Later I contacted a number of the key players whom I knew had a deep knowledge of both conflicts being directly involved. Obviously their response was very positive. From my notes I clarified many points and after that I had the confidence to proceed. So this book which is in your hands now is the result of my clarification and sorting out of these personal notes.

Then I put together an outline for this book. I typed it on the very same laptop computer I typed the text for "Peace in Aceh". This laptop was a gift from our Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla in 2005 when I was finalizing the Aceh peace talks.

I am fully aware that this book is very subjective as I continually use "I" - the first person, me.

They are essentially personal notes taken throughout the Poso-Ambon peace talks. I do not deny that there will certainly be many persons and parties who were involved but outside my scope of knowledge, purview, earshot and experience. Obviously, because of this, I am unable to record their names.

Please excuse my subjectivity on this point. This feeling still persisted with me until I started to write this book. Fortunately, a colleague of mine, Prof. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, once told me that any book one writes is guaranteed to be subjective. Those who

object may write their objections. What is certain that the Poso-Ambon peace process as elucidated in this book is entirely my own personal version.

This book is merely intended to prevent any omissions; omissions that would remind us there was a time in our nation where violence surged from underneath and obliterated our hopes and dashed our desires. There was an occasion when a number of people claimed their violence was on behalf of God burying any feelings of compassion or humanity.

In writing this book, I am greatly indebted to Mr Tomy Lebang who was always willing to research data for me. It should be noted that Mr Lebang has already written a book on the Ambon peace process. Mr Sigit Budyanto, my secretary, greatly assisted with this book. Not knowing midnight nor dawn, Mr Sigit with great dedication helped me bring this book to publication. Thank you very much! I also wish to express my thanks to my publishers of the Indonesian version, Grasindo.

My deepest thanks also to Mr Fuad Hasan Masyhur, a personal friend, for his contribution in bringing this book to the readers.

To my beloved wife, Marcelya and my two children Virginia Rose Washington and Abraham Lincoln Washington I give my boundless thanks for their understanding as I paid them little fatherly attention while writing this book. Virginia, who is now seven years old, every time she spotted me typing always exclaimed "Dad is writing another book, yes? When I replied yes, she already knew I needed to concentrate and voluntarily left me alone.

Sometime ago I visited the oldest art gallery in Moscow, The State Tretyakov Gallery, which is located in the heart of Moscow. In one room hanging was a painting by Vassily Vereschagin entitled "The Apotheosis of War". This artist shows clearly the banal and futile outcome of war - a barren landscape, a destroyed city in the background and a stack of human skulls each with a hideous and macabre tortured expression and the only winners being the carrion crow pecking clean the corpses. Vereschagin dedicated this painting "to all conquerors, past, present and to come." He was probably the first painter to be classified as a pacifist.

Touchingly, Vereschagin ridicules war and violence saying it never gives birth to victory. War and violence only give birth to abject suffering and sorrow.

In my opinion of this painting mirrors that of Vereschagin to much the same extent: In war neither the victor nor the defeated clearly understands that human life is cruelly and wantonly destroyed. So do not think for one second about declaring war. Seek peace!

At once I recalled a comment by Jusuf Kalla when we were working to resolve the Poso-Ambon conflict: "Whosoever is involved in this conflict, whether Muslim or Christian, neither of them will ever enter heaven as they claim they will, but both will almost certainly enter hell."

Moscow, 22 June 2009

Hamid Awaludin

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

This is the second book I have translated for Dr Hamid Awaludin. The first being: "Peace in Aceh" which was published in 2009.

I am always reminded when translating of H.T. Loewe-Porter's Translator's Note in the preface to Thomas Mann's "Buddenbrooks" where he wrote: "The translation of a book which is a triumph of style in its own language, is always a piece of effrontery.... Besides the author has recorded much dialect. The difficulty is insuperable. Dialect cannot be translated." Bahasa Indonesia Indonesian seems to invite dialect which provides a certain intimacy and also invites numerous abbreviations, which is almost another language in itself.

Supposedly, Bahasa Indonesia is an easy language but it requires a deep and extensive understanding of context, culture and history. Bahasa is even easier orally as the speaker gets immediate feed-back on the listener's comprehension; and if there is a flicker of

doubt a quick interrogation clarifies. With the written word there is no such luxury!

This translation was probably a lot easier than the first as Pak Hamid had returned from his ambassadorial posting in Moscow and was he was thus far more accessible despite Jakarta's traffic. This enabled me to sort out misunderstanding of meanings promptly rather than rely on email exchanges between Jakarta and Moscow.

His style of writing in this book is a little less literary than the first which in some ways makes it easier to translate but it also makes it easier to make errors because of the speed at which one translates. Many a time in reviewing my first pass at this translation, upon reflection I had it wrong. Quite wrong!

I have used footnotes extensively to clarify both personalities mentioned in the text and history some of which will be common knowledge to the average reader familiar with Indonesian political history.

As with his previous work on Aceh, Pak Hamid's personal warmth radiates through especially his care for the younger generation in Poso and Ambon. His and Jusuf Kalla's ecumenical approach to these two serious community conflicts is exemplary. Kalla's approach to conflict resolution is redolent of the world's grand chess masters: His game is won almost before it has started and the board set up; and certainly it is won after the first move by either side in the conflict. Every move is thoughtfully planned and even every emotion is accurately forecast almost to the half day.

In a number of cases, Kalla's resolute ability to upend prevailing wrong-headed thinking in both Poso and Ambon is highly commendable. His logic is invincible. Quickly he pointed out in no uncertain terms access to heaven was not granted to those who murdered those of other religions. Such murderers in fact in any religion were surely destined to hell! It is a pity this innate ability of Kalla's has not been deployed in more recent community conflicts in Indonesia.

Tim Scott
Bogor
October 2012

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PROLOGUE

POSO

Poso is a tiny spot on the landscape of the Indonesian archipelago located in the province of Central Sulawesi: A black dot in the heart of Sulawesi. Its position is exactly one degree south of the equator which cuts Indonesia in half but that is only the beginning.

Certainly Poso has a long history of development as an agricultural area but it recently became a place of great attention. However, not many Indonesian school children are able to point to it on a map.

Poso is a regency of 24,000 square kilometers with a population of 132,000 and became a hot topic of conversation both domestically and internationally. Several months after Indonesia entered a new political chapter of reformation with the toppling of the New Order², Poso became a flash point for a bloody internecine conflict and a link in a chain of

² This refers to the resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998 following widespread public unrest.

ethnic and religious conflicts across Indonesia. These various conflicts besmirched Indonesia reputation for tolerance after the murky days of the New Order.

As usual, this conflict was initially only a small spark which then flared up and spread engulfing everyone and everything. This spark ignited one particular morning, Friday, 25th December 1998. It was also the middle of Ramadhan, the holy fasting month for Muslims. Meanwhile, Christmas celebrations several hours later started for the Christian community there in Poso. Churches and houses in and around Poso were brightened with Christmas trees and colorful candles.

But in the suburb of Sayo, in Poso township, a minor quarrel occurred. A youth, Akhmad Riduan, 21 years old, was sound asleep in the Darussalam Mosque when he was attacked by three youths. One of these three was Roy Basalemba. Akhmad fought them off while yelling for help. People living around the mosque were in the middle of breaking their fast jumped out of their homes and poured into the mosque attempting to catch the three assailants.

The news of Roy's and his two accomplices' assault on Akhmad, who were Christians, spread. After Friday midday prayers, angry groups gathered at various locations around Poso township. One group stoned Toko Lima, the main liquor shop in Poso, which was thought to be a hiding place of Roy's and his two associates. Other angry groups fanned out through the township searching billiard halls, massage parlours, restaurants and hotels.

The whole of Poso was in tumult created by various mobs. Muslim religious groups were on the

alert and even Christians groups were too. Various issues spread fanning the coals of violence. Physical clashes could not be prevented. The news spread beyond Poso causing outsiders to be drawn into the town and join and support their respective groups.

Fortunately, religious leaders quickly realized the impending dangers of the situation. The head of the Poso Indonesian Ulama's Council,³ K. H. Abdul Salam Tahir along with another Muslim community leader Yahya Mangun were seen meeting together with several Christian clergy. They embraced one another and together tried calm the enraged mob. Through the mediation of various leaders, including government officials and local community representatives, agreement was reached to stop the opposing groups attacking one another.

However another group leader Herman Parimo broke this agreement bringing his mob into attack mode. A large incident happened on the night of 17th December 1998 when at least 81 houses were damaged.

Later Herman was arrested in Makassar, South Sulawesi. He was sentenced to 14 years jail but later died in the Makassar prison from illness.

The name Herman Parimo, quoted in a number of press reports, indicated the strength of local politics rather than religion in the Poso conflict. Herman Parimo was an active Christian leader in the Gerakan Pejuang Sulawesi Tengah,⁴ where he contested Damsik Ladjalani, a Muslim leader, in the Poso regency elections. Damsik was supported by Arif Patangga's

³ Ulama is a senior Muslim religious scholar or teacher

⁴ The Central Sulawesi Freedom Fighter Force

group. Patangga was the incumbent regent whose term was up. Neither Parimo nor Damisk succeeded. Because of the conflict the elections were held on 30th October 1999 when the Poso DPRD⁵ elected Adul Muin Puadan as Regent, a person not involved in this conflict.

Following the arrest of Herman Parimo, the situation in Poso calmed down; but after a couple of months, the Poso community dubbed the situation ATM - Safe but Squeezed.⁶ Many were reluctant to fraternize far from their own group's territory.

On 16th April 2000, disturbances erupted again with a quarrel between two groups of youths at the Poso Terminal. The masses were still haunted by the violence of several months back, and reformed to start a new conflict.

Thousands were involved this time. Hundreds of homes, including places of worship, were torched. Security units, from police and army units, were powerless. A number died splattered with blood. Various rumours were circulated further fuelling the glowing coals.

The disturbances only died down after several days but then erupted again. A month later on 24th May 2000, the third eruption occurred. The name of 'The Butcher', Fabianus Tibo came to the fore. Tibo lead a gang who slaughtered a number of people even as far as Tentena.⁷ The 'Poso Disturbances Volume III', as the press called it, claimed the most number of lives. 147 bodies were found by evacuation teams,

⁵ Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah- The local provincial parliament

⁶ Aman Tapi Mencekam a play on the abbreviation for automatic teller machine (ATM) meaning "safe but pressured".

⁷ Tentena is about 50 kilometers to the south of Poso, on Lake Poso.

most being discovered at the Walisongo *Pesantren*⁸ near Sintuwulembah headed by Ustaz Shalahuddin. Here some 73 were butchered inside the pesantren complex.

Meanwhile Poso was splattered with blood. Bomb explosions and gunfire became daily events. Later on 22nd September 2006 Fabianus Tibo and two of his henchmen were executed following their prosecution.

Outside elements were also involved at Poso. On 19th July 2001, *Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah WaLJamah*,⁹ a Muslim group based in Jakarta, announced their presence in Poso. Laskar Jihad sent many volunteers for social welfare, medical assistance, advocacy, and missionary work as well as defending local Muslim groups.

At the same time Christian groups strengthened themselves, consolidating and a number sought international support. So, worldwide Poso became known as a place of religious conflict. This spread in the same bloody fashion to the neighboring regency to the east of Morowali. In the five major disturbances in the period 1998 to 2000, the local government recorded 246 deaths, 3,522 houses destroyed and 14 places of worship destroyed. Refugees amounted to nearly 90,000 people. A number of peacemaking efforts were attempted but none succeeded in reducing the conflict. Firm government security measures in the area failed too.

⁸ Pesantren is a Muslim religious school places great emphasis on Koranic studies.

⁹ Known usually by the shortened form Laskar Jihad (or abbreviation LJ) which is a small radical Muslim group.

Through the mass media and through the internet, news about the Poso violence spread world-wide. No longer was Poso, a place where peace united various national ethnic groups and religions, where 60 per cent were Muslims inhabiting the valleys and 25 per cent Christian who generally resided in the hills. Poso and surrounds became a verandah of gory butchery, and an illusory roadway to heaven for those perpetrators of violence using the name of religion.

Poso is located in the heart of Sulawesi and is a transit point for the endless road networks throughout Sulawesi; and also it was the battlefield for these inter religious factions. Religious conflicts anywhere in the world never been resolved quickly.

Luckily, in Jakarta there was a government minister who came from Sulawesi who was greatly distressed by this Poso conflict, who sidelined his distress and acted, going to the heart of the matter. He was Jusuf Kalla, Coordinating Minister for Peoples' Welfare who later quietly worked in these dangerous conditions in Poso. With a number of close associates, he approached the two quarrelling sides and successfully brought them to a small village in South Sulawesi-Malino in the regency of Gowa.

In this cool tourist spot on 20th December 2001 a peace declaration was agreed upon and signed by the two sides. Jusuf Kalla successfully brought together these two enemies who for years had been at one another's throats, sat them together in the same room to bury their revengefulness forever. Afterwards, they hugged one another, wept copiously and swore to live together in peace forever. Today, Poso is in peace!

Ambon

Ambon is now a city of a thousand memorials: After the troubles, the rubble of the thousands of homes, shops, places of worship throughout the city were memorials to the conflict which lasted 10 years here. Above these shards and rubble, the citizens of Ambon now see their lives as orderly and peaceful.

This town is not as eerie as it was when there was endless gunfire. The residential area of the city of Ambon is still divided into two - the area around the harbor is Muslim while the higher ground is Christian. but the bridge between the two areas is blocked.

Sure, the people of both these conflict communities can now visit one another. The Kuda Mati area was the most eerie of all and is now frequented by Muslims. Similarly, Jalan Sultan Baabullah in front of the Al-Fatah Mosque no longer stops Christian from passing by.

The Hotel Ambon Manise is located on the boundary between the Red Area (Christian) and the White Area (Muslim) on Jalan Pantai Mardika, Desa Batu Merah, Kecamatan Sirimau is one point of reconciliation when this three star hotel received guests from both sides in 2003 when the conflict here started to cool down. Every morning then, the roadway in front of the hotel amongst the rubble of shops became a market for the basic daily essentials for every sector of Ambon society. Here a red and white signboard stated "*Transaksi Zona Bakubae*" - Transaction Zone of Bakubae.

The Ambonese were weary of hostilities and the ever increasing number of deaths It is estimated that the number of deaths in the Maluku violence

amounted to over 6,000. According to the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence¹⁰ there were 8,000 deaths and 330,000 refugees. As many as 25,378 buildings were damaged and burnt including 91 mosques and 138 churches.

The trigger for this Ambon conflict was a brawl between some youths at the Ambon Terminal during *Lebaran*¹¹ 19th January 1999. This minor dispute grew rapidly and spread into a riot with religious overtones. Then, Ambon with a population of 130,000 and since then almost the whole of the province of Maluku was dragged into this cesspit of endless conflict.

There were several opportunities for peace, but endless revenge never allowed Ambon to ¹⁶ quiet. Furthermore, later various civil missions arrived in town. As an example, about 3,000 members of the *Laskar Jihad* arrived in Ambon and environs resulting in the conflict spreading wider and deeper.

The presence of five battalions (about 3,800 men) security officers from both the Indonesian Army¹² and the Police were unable to pacify the situation. In the end a number of the security forces themselves became a part of the Ambon conflict. They appeared disciplined in uniform, but outside normal duty hours they were assisting civil¹⁵ s fight; and there were some who actually deserted their units. So that on 29th June ²⁰⁰⁰, the *then commander of the Pattimura Military Command Brig. Gen. I Made Yasa* ordered the withdrawal of all troops to headquarters for a head count. In Ambon City there were rumours of

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¹⁰ Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KONTRAS)

¹¹ ⁴ Lebaran or Idul Fitri is the celebrations at the end of the Muslim month of fast, Ramadhan

¹² ⁸ Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)-The Indonesian National Army

unauthorized troops wandering about the city under no command. Subsequently, gossip spread about soldiers deserting.

On 21st June 2000, the Police Mobile Brigade armory in the Tantui Barracks in Ambon was looted by a mob thereby gaining more weapons for their conflict. According to Maluku Police assessments as many as 1,800 weapons and 800,000 rounds of ammunitions were stolen.

A civil emergency throughout the province was declared by the government a week after this armory looting. The Governor of Maluku, at the time, Saleh Latuconsina was appointed as Head of the Civil Emergency with full authority to take whatever steps required to end this conflict.

Since that declaration Ambon was never really peaceful. Here and there gunfire and bomb explosions continued to be heard.

It is true, as experts say, that peace making can only start from within. That is exactly what happened at Malino peace talks when they were conceived in early 2002 three year¹⁰ after the Ambon conflict erupted. The peace broker between the conflicting parties was again **M. Jusuf Kalla, Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare**.

On 26th January 2002, Jusuf Kalla met with both side separately at the Governor of Maluku's official residence in the Mangga Dua area of Ambon. This was the first meeting which the government attended between about 150 leaders from both groups in a heated atmosphere but with a clear determination to seek peace.

In the final meeting it was mutually agreed to meet jointly outside of Ambon. "All peace discussions must take place outside the conflict area. Cost does not matter. At the most Rp 400,000,000¹³. Compare that with the cost of a three story shop-house full of goods burnt to the ground," said Jusuf Kalla.

Finally, the Ambon Peace Accords were signed in that cool town of Malino, a small village in the hills of the Gowa Regency some 75 kilometers to the south of Makassar. At last here both the Muslim and Christian leaders of Ambon shook hands. The eleven points of the Malino Accord were read out and all the delegates returned to Ambon. "Previously we arrived here separately on different flights, now let us return home together on the same flight", urged Sister Briggita Renyaan, one of the meeting's delegates.

Gen. (Rtd.) ⁵ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)¹⁴, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, who attended the signing ceremony, praised the Accord.

After the Malino meeting slowly the remaining smoldering coals of conflict were extinguished. There were still the occasional flare-up here and there, but the citizens of Ambon celebrated their hopes of a future peaceful life. Wrecked homes which were starting to be overgrown and covered with moss and lichens became a monument and stern reminder never again to engage in communal conflict.

By the end of 2002, the atmosphere in Ambon had changed with reduced numbers of armed civilians who had exacerbated the Maluku conflict there. Kebun

¹³ At the time approximately US\$40,000.

¹⁴ Gen (Rtd) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is now Indonesia's President for his second term. He is usually referred to as SBY.

Cengkeh, the place where the Laskar Jihad had been placed on a war alert, was abandoned after they demobilized on 14th October 2002 leaving Maluku. At the same time, the Red Cross Gang, a Christian youth group and a member of the Front for the Sovereignty of Maluku,¹⁵ had been greatly weakened following the arrest of their leader Alex Manupatty in April 2002.

Now it was time to return Ambon to the way it had been before Ambon torn apart by this war amongst brothers. Now the youth of Ambon could then relax humming again their popular folk song "Ambon Manise".

¹⁵ Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM)

CHAPTER 1

WHEN VIOLENCE SPEAKS

"In peace time, children bury their fathers; in war fathers bury their children" (King Croesus)

There was a time, in Poso and Ambon, when even At that time fear of death was no longer mentioned because there was only a hair's breadth between life and death. This was a time when Poso and Ambon were violent battlegrounds where human life had no value whatsoever. Also the bonds of brotherhood were ruptured and tenuous. Screams of pain and anguish were muffled. Mass violence then in both Poso and Ambon stifled pain and was totally immune to fear.

In those times in Poso and Ambon the crack of firearms almost became a song of entertainment. Guns could be aimed and shoot anyone. Arrows, swords, sickles, and bamboo spears sent many into the hereafter without the opportunity to ask why or what. In Poso and Ambon in those times there was a

(1)

clear demarcation between "us" as friends and "them" as enemies. A synonym for the word "them" became death: that was certain!

Between 1999 and 2002 we witnessed in both Poso and Ambon the words "love and affection" were totally buried under the desire for mutual annihilation. In those years in those two places, the words solidarity and harmony were shelved in a museum which was closed to any visitors. Again, we witnessed women becoming widows, children becoming orphans, all caused by mindless violence. There was not a person there who could envisage their future because it was masked by mutual lust for death.

On occasions we witnessed persons having their throats cut in the midst of a crowd. Often we saw persons set alight for no apparent reason without any feeling guilt and no one was brave enough to come forward and volunteer to save this person from a flaming death. There were no rules for life and there was no way of knowing how you would meet your maker: For certain would not be natural!

We observed ¹⁴ day by day, week by week, month by month and year by year everyone felt tyrannized and declared they had a monopoly to use violence against those whom they tyrannized. Ironically, this was done under a conviction based upon religious morals and learning. Even the Almighty seemed reluctant to be involved in ending this violence. In short, in Poso and Ambon, violence had become a means to an end where the perpetrators were not able to envisage the outcome of their violence.

When the violence in Poso and Ambon spread, both mosques and churches were smashed to smithereens

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and what remained became only monuments of wreckage to barbarity. Homes, markets, schools and whatever became rubble or ashes. The perpetrators never thought that the violence would pulverize the future, bury the dreams of their children and gouge their own faces. Their axes of violence and their spears of anger which they wielded were covered with blood and lust and were difficult to clean even with time.

For three years of this violence in Poso and Ambon left deep wounds wounds and scars. Three years of spying on one another left their lives filled with mutual suspicion and stratagems for revenge. Three years of enormous anxiety was held within. Their hopes and dreams were interred with the corpses of the victims of this violence. What remained, if one was lucky enough to survive, was prayer for safety.

Fortunately, the coals of revenge started to put to one side. The past was full of rage and amok. The attempt to set this aside with a middle-way was to sit together and talk, to be able to reconnect together again these matters of the past, prior to this war to a time of calm and fortune.

Goenawan Mohamad,¹⁶ poetically described this peace: "It is probably the greatest news in our world at the start of this millennium. This is a story which makes the heart swell with pride and touches the heart. It is about men who quietly built a bridge between two warring fortresses who in the past wanted to kill one another and in the end they put aside their guns."¹⁷

¹⁶ Goenawan Mohamad is one of Indonesia's most senior and respected journalists and Editor of the weekly *Tempo* Magazine.

¹⁷ *Tempo* Magazine, 12 March 2002: Catatan Pinggir

Both parties, which in the past had been at one another's throats came to the coolness of Malino. Away from the hurly-burly of violence to declare clearly and firmly: To live in peace!

In the end, they hugged one another, looked into one another's tearful eyes, full of emotion and regret.

Later I recalled a saying of King Croesus of Lydia 2,500 years ago: "Peace, not war, knows the importance of tomorrow".

This peace was made by Jusuf Kalla (JK) which immediately opened the curtains of tomorrow for a better and brighter future for Poso and Ambon. ♦

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CHAPTER II

Poso

KALLA BECOMES THE PEACE BROKER IN POSO

Often I am asked by various people of various and Kalla became the peace broker in the Poso-Ambon conflict. Wasn't this out of order considering the issue was really a security matter? At that time JK was the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. What was the link between JK's involvement and Poso and Ambon?

This question is almost the same I once asked JK. His reply was always the same: "Peace making is a humanitarian act. One cannot compartmentalize work from obligations. What matters is that peace making is the responsibility of everyone. Preventing someone's demise is an obligation of one's faith." That is how JK invariably replied to my series of questions from the beginning until today.

Later I came to know the full background of JK's involvement in Poso after reading his private notes. From this perspective, JK was involved, apart from

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the moral reason as mention above, but also because of the nature of his ministerial portfolio - Minister for People's Welfare.

JK's personal notes were entitled "The Poso Conflict" Here JK wrote that the conflict started in 1998 and in the following three years it claimed hundreds of lives and destroyed thousands of homes including hundreds of mosques and churches which were torched. Because of this approximately 90,000 refugees or about 30 percent of the population of the Poso regency fled. The local economy was in trouble, creating new poverty in the midst of the fertile clove and chocolate plantations. Material losses amounted to trillions of rupiah¹⁸. It was an enormous human disaster. May God forgive us!

Continuing, JK's notes commented, from a local political problem and youth conflict, it transformed into a widespread religious conflict. Almost everyone in the regency was involved because it seemed as though religion could not be neutral. Both Muslim and Christian felt oppressed which meant both felt they had lost. Who was oppressing them? And who was winning? Only vengeance on both sides was the victor!

Because of this, the perpetrators of these conflicts, every one of them, had stepped outside the lessons of their respective religions. Both sides believed they were only defending themselves from attack. Thus, both sides asked for help from both inside Indonesia and outside of Indonesia.

The Police and the Army had endeavoured to stop the conflict but the conflict mutated into guerilla war over a very extensive area which was difficult to

¹⁸ A trillion rupiah was equivalent to approximately US\$100 million.

end. There were several reconciliations but all failed. Following a new outbreak in early November 2001 the Indonesian Government increased the Police and Army numbers in the area.

Ultimately, the people of Poso had only three choices: First, the conflict would continue as a guerilla war with continued burnings, victims and suffering on both sides. Second, the Police and Army would act firmly and decisively. And third, a peace resolution between the parties could be achieved by sitting down together and discussing the problem and then implementing the results of these discussions. Then the refugees could return home and the government would assist in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, housing and places of worship.

Basically, the above choices depended upon the attitudes of their respective leadership because most of the populace was now exhausted from fear and suffering. However if the third choice was adopted, then the government would facilitate and manage it.

This concept and these personal notes of JK, I think, demonstrated his desire to end this conflict in Poso and also again inspired him in the Ambon conflict. From the ²⁹ personal notes the connecting thread between Poso and Ambon became clear with JK's role as **Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare as the** numbers **of** refugees swelled. Obviously, refugees fell within JK's portfolio.

Convinced of this thinking and concept JK wrote to the Governors of South Sulawesi and Central Sulawesi on 10 December 2001 with a letter referenced B-111/Menko/Kesra/XII/2001. This letter proposed the brief concept and a timetable for discussions between

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the quarrelling parties. JK invited these two governors for their comments and revisions on his concept and proposed timetable.

Three days later JK sent a letter ¹¹ to the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Gen (rtd) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono referenced B-116/Menko/Kesra/XII/2001 requesting the Coordinating Minister send a senior civil servant to attend the Malino peace talks as an observer. On the same day JK also sent a letter to the national Chief of Police referenced B-118/Menko/Kesra/XII/2001 advising that on 18th December 2001 the peace talks in Malino would start. As well, JK requested a report on the current status in Poso and submitted his requirements for police security at the proposed meeting.

With this correspondence initiated to resolve the Poso conflict, and later the Ambon conflict, JK did not do it on his own. He involved a number of government departments in his overall initiative. Also, he was fully aware of a comprehensive imperative of a synergy to resolve this great problem.

Really JK's knowledge about the Poso and Ambon had been compiled well prior to him becoming Coordinat²⁴ Minister for People's Welfare. After he was dismissed as Minister for Trade by President Abdurrahman Wahid (commonly known as Gus Dur) in 2000, from his business office in Makassar he followed the developments in eastern Indonesia. Everything was investigated and carefully analyzed.

JK's thirst for information about what was really occurring there was quenched by Hussein Abdullah, a field reporter for RCTI - Indonesia's first privately owned television station. Hussein comfortably moved

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between these two conflicts. Often JK contacted Hussein when he was actually in the field. Each time he came to Makassar, Hussein dutifully called at JK's office summarizing and mapping out all the incidents including who was involved.

From these briefings JK's knowledge of the anatomy of the conflict in Poso and Ambon was very comprehensive and occurred well before he became Coordinating Minister in 2001. Consequently it was not surprising that after he was sworn in as Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare he was able to move quickly and unhampered; and in a short time JK was able to develop the required therapy and solution to both these Poso and Ambon conflicts.

In reality, JK's correspondence with the various government departments and instrumentalities was only an accumulation of his earlier initiatives. Even before this correspondence, JK was operating at grass level collecting and assembling information from Poso, Morowali and Tentena on what had really happened over the past three years. Farid Husein, an experienced field operator was JK's right-hand man, travelling widely to collect data required by JK. The result was that the names of the key persons and perpetrators were already in JK's hands before he even started to act.

Apart from Husein Abdullah and Farid Husein who provided important information for JK, JK had a wider network of friends and business associates throughout the conflict area who provided substantial information about the causes of the conflict and who were the key players in their areas. Largely this was due to JK having built the Trans Sulawesi Highway and having

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the Toyota agency for this part of Indonesia. JK even obtained information from Agus Dwikarna, one of the principals of *Laskar Jundullah*¹⁹ on structure, activities and leaders in the conflict from both the Muslim and Christian communities. Agus's information tallied with that of other sources including the Police and from the Wirabuana Army Command²⁰.

Some years later this resulted in me flying to Manila, at JK's instruction, when Agus was captured by the Philippine authorities to meet with Agus as mark of JK's appreciation for his help.

Information from numerous sources was collected and analyzed. JK personally decided which information was reliable and what would be retained. Usually JK determined accuracy by applying incisive logic.

Once JK had determined what information he would retain and file he would communicate with those directly or indirectly affected. Afterwards he would develop an argued scenario with a recommendation to resolve the problem. On completion of this stage, only then would JK make contact with the relevant government departments involved.

On an occasion I asked JK how come he could assess all of this information. He replied "For me it is normal to quickly calculate and make decisions. I am a businessman constrained by time and space. To make a profit, I must decide quickly what goods I need and when I should buy. If I am late, the price could have gone up and I have lost the opportunity to make a profit," JK replied giving an example.

¹¹ ¹²
¹⁹ *Laskar Jundullah*, literally the Army of God, was the military wing of the *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI)* The Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law.

²⁰ This is the regional military command based in Makassar.

Apart from all of the above, what was interesting for me to reflect upon was, apart from JK's determination to settle these two conflicts, was the accuracy of his planning. For example, he was able to predict substantive issues raised by both sides including their level of emotion. Both the staging and timing of the talks occurred just as he planned. There was no deviation from his plan.

Out of the blue one day I asked JK, "Pak",²¹ when resolving the Poso and Ambon conflicts, everything you planned from the very start, including your predictions on both substance and attitudes, did not deviate one bit. Do you have some sort of mystical power to see into the future?" I asked.

"Do you mean, I am a soothsayer?" he countered.

"Not at all, Pak. I meant how come you can plan something which at the same time is realized with no deviation?" I continued.

"Oh like that, I use my instincts and logic. This is derived from my daily experiences. There is no mystery to this. What is imperative is that we must be sincere, unpretentious, and impartial. That is my way, Hamid. The matter of accuracy between planning and outcome is because I have done it many times. You have seen I always have a notebook and pen at hand; everything I note," explained JK.

This concept and dialogue outline for the Poso talks at Malino was made just a week before they started. So who was behind these Poso peace talks. These notes were made by one Haji Muhammad Jusuf Kalla.

²¹ *Pak is short for Bapak* which is a term of affection and respect; literally father.

Concept

1 10/12/01

Meeting
Between

Leadership of the Muslim Community
and the Christian Community in Central Sulawesi

Theme: Peace between the Communities

Date: 18-12 December 2001

Location: Malino, South Sulawesi

Participants:

Muslim:	Head of MUI ²² Central Sulawesi	6 2 persons
	Head of MUI Poso	2 persons
	Group Leaderships/Factions:	
	Hisbullah	2 persons
	Ahlussunah Waljamaah	2 persons
	Jundullah	2 persons
	Majlis Dzikir	2 persons
	Jamaah Tablig	2 persons
	Total	14 persons
Christian:	Head of the South Sulawesi Christian Church	2 persons
	Head of the Catholic Church	2 persons
	Group Leadership	
	Bats	23 persons
	Tigers	2 persons
	Butterflies	2 persons
	Ansimar	2 persons
	Crisis Centre	2 persons
	Total	14 persons

²² *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* - The Indonesian Ulama Council

Note: All delegates must possess full authority and responsibility

Mediators:

Chairmain: Coordinating Minister

Members: Governor of South East Sulawesi and 1 Official (Muslim)
 Chief of Police of South Sulawesi

Governor of South Sulawesi and 1 Official (Christian)
 Military Commander of Area VII/Wirabuana
 Total 7 persons

Observers: Deputy ⁴Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare
 Deputy Minister for Home Affairs
²Deputy Minister for Religion
 Deputy Chief of National Police
 Deputy Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces
 Deputy Head of Majelis Ulama Indonesia
 Head of Church Council of Indonesia
 Total 7 persons

Facilitator ²⁸Governor of South Sulawesi

Costs Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare and Baknornas PBP²³

Security Chief of ⁴South Sulawesi Police

Meeting Closed

PROGRAM

Day	Date	Time	Program	Location
Tuesday	18 November 2001		Delegates arrive in Makassar	Muslim: Sahid Hotel Christian: Golden Hotel
		2000 hrs	Internal Meeting between Mediator /Observers	Governor's Office

²³ Badan Kordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penangan Pengungsi- The National Council for Disaster Relief and Refugees

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Wednesday	19 November 2001	0700 hrs	Depart for Malino	
		1000 hrs-1200 hrs	Meeting between Mediator/Observers and Muslim Groups	To be arranged by local government
		1400hrs - 1600hrs	Meeting between Mediator/Observers and Christian Groups	To be arranged by local government
Thursday	20 December 2001	0800hrs-	Plenary Meeting between Muslim and Christian Groups with Mediator and Observers	To be arranged by local government
Friday	21 December 2001		-Reserve Time -Closure	

MEETING AGENDA

1. Security:

- Cease physical conflicts
- Turn in all weaponry
- Posts/Patrols with agencies
- Withdrawal of Leadership and Groups from outside of the region

2. Social/Economic

- Return of refugees -Infrastructure and Housing Rehabilitation
- Social and Unity Rehabilitation

3. Legal:

- Sanctions against Violations
- Implementation of Legal Process

4. Social Political:

- Resolution of Social/Political Problems

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PREPARATION REQUIREMENTS

Documentation etc.

- Conflict Data from Police
- Conflict Data and photos from each side of the conflict for both Muslim and Christian communities

Action:

Chief of Police

Governor of South East Sulawesi

- Imam Prasojo's film of the disturbances

- Guarantees from Chief of Police to ensure security and immunity of the meetings

- Hotel Arrangements in Makassar and Malino

Government of South Sulawesi

- Logistics and Transport

- Meeting Equipment

 - Meeting Room Microphone

 - Slide Projector

 - Film Projector

 - Notice Board showing Delegates' Names etc.

 - Documentation

Administration Equipment:

- Computer

- Tape Recorder etc.

- Secretarial Team

KALLA UPENDS LOGIC

The conflict was sparked by the pretext of SARA in both Ambon and Poso. Both sides felt they were licensed to kill one another indiscriminately. For three

²⁴ SARA is ¹³ an acronym for *Suku, Agama, Ras, Aliran i.e. Ethnicity Religion, Race, and Sect.*

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years the conflict continued with neither respite nor finality nor any hint of hope. As victims continued to fall on both sides, the government and other instrumentalities did nothing other than standby and observe the conflict. As a result the hostilities just heated up even more.

Several initiatives were attempted but collapsed. The flames of the conflict just could not be extinguished. Jusuf Kalla had no need for seminars to discover the root causes. He did not want to waste time meeting with this leader or that leader to exchange views and exchange tactics.

In the middle of the night he ³ asked me to come to his residence.

He said "Hamid, this conflict is a problem of heaven and hell. It is imperative we stop it along these lines. We have to turn their way of thinking upside down, Hamid."

"What do you mean, Pak?" I enquired.

"Christians believe if they kill a Muslim they will go to heaven. It is the same with Muslims if they kill a Christian they will go to heaven. This is wrong-headed thinking Hamid. I have to turn their logic upside down so that both sides will actually go to hell, all of them, every one of them. Both religions prohibit murder." said Kalla.

It was an enormous problem. The problem was that the Muslims saw the conflict as a jihad - a holy war while the Christians saw it a crusade. Their convictions made it difficult to find closure as both were motivated by the idea of entering heaven. It was certain this war would be unending, observed Kalla.

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Kalla's logic was applied. The result was fantastic! Here as usual Kalla used logic. On one occasion in Ambon, just before evening prayers Kalla met with one of the groups in the conflict. Forcefully, Kalla admonished them saying, "The lot of you will become residents of hell. Show me in the Bible where it says murder will get you into heaven. Show me!" The gathering became deathly quiet after their leader had initially delivered some fiery words.

"Not one of you will have the right to enter heaven. You will not even be able to sight the pearly gates. People enter heaven because they are good to others and help one another. You lot murder, then believe you will go to heaven. God will be very far from you all."

After evening prayers Kalla met with a group of Muslims. He said to them, "I will come straight to the point with you, all of you. I am extremely offended by Muslims. How can you claim that by killing humans you will enter heaven. Where is the chapter and the verse in the Koran and also the *Hadith* - the Sayings of the Prophet - which states murdering will get you to heaven? Show it to me now," Kalla demanded. A hubbub erupted with hands shooting up to ask questions. Seeing this Kalla raised his voice. "You wish to show me the chapter and verse", asked Kalla.

"Sorry, Mr Minister, we wish to give an opinion," said one of the representatives of this Muslim group.

"No! I only want to invite you to speak on the chapter and verse in the Koran or the *Hadith*. I do not want to waste time on a debate on the meaning of words, repeating this or that. I do not want to hear

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who started this. What I want to hear is how we can end all of this!" said Kalla.

"So that you all understand, I am ashamed to be identified as a Muslim who sanctifies murder to gain entrance to heaven. None of you will ever enter heaven by doing this. You all know what you destroy is your own children and grandchildren by this mutual murdering. Their future places in school have been burnt - by you. No longer will Ambonese kids be in the front because of your actions. Remember history will damn you because of this misery which you have inflicted upon them. For sure you will enter hell," exclaimed Kalla.

The audience was mesmerized, stunned and the noise abated and quiet reigned; not a soul spoke. They just looked at one another. Nothing happened. Not a sound. They all sat transfixed and looked ahead at Kalla. Sitting to the right of Kalla I felt somewhat uncomfortable. It felt as though the sun's burning rays were focused on me. Fortunately at that point I had my head down taking notes of the meeting.

After midnight, sitting by myself in Ambon on the verandah of the Governor's residence, when Kalla dropped by my room smiling to himself.

"My heaven/hell theory is correct, eh 'Mid²⁵? In short, we have to stress that nobody goes to heaven for murdering. All go to hell," explained Kalla.

"Your theory, Pak is correct, except I almost did not believe your presentation. Initially, they were thunderously noisy but all of sudden they went very quiet. It was almost as though they had vanished; as

²⁵ 'Mid is an abbreviation for Hamid. Indonesians love abbreviations. It is almost another language form.

though the room had been vacated - nobody there.

You were really angry? What is the technique you used then? Pak I have heard of the name for this technique to cool things down. Did you use this?" I asked Kalla. "You are always like this, 'Mid. I wasn't angry at all but just spoke forcefully. For sure there is a fine line between anger and speaking firmly. If angry, the voice is loud but irrational. If you are firm, you speak forcefully but logically and rationally. Yes, my voice was in fact loud but my argument logical," replied Kalla.

"Pak, we are just hypothesizing. What if someone was able to produce to you a verse from the Koran or the Bible which condoned those murdering one another and were still able to enter heaven? What would have you said then?" I asked provocatively.

"Impossible. I would not have done this if I did not have a comprehensive command of my subject. You must have seen me reading everything and enquiring everywhere on this subject. How is possible I would believe in my ability to counter them if I was concerned about my knowledge and sources of information. No way would I have let myself go into a free fall," countered Kalla. "Earlier you mentioned this technique of cooling. What is that?" Kalla enquired.

"It is a traditional technique. They say certain people have to ability to pacify suddenly other persons using this cooling technique so that they are unable to oppose them. In the meeting, they were fiery, and all of a sudden you raised your voice and they went quiet. Consequently, I thought you had used that technique," I replied feeling rather pleased with myself.

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"Come on, Hamid. The technique I used was simply that of sincerity and truth. There was no nonsense or hocus-pocus," he replied. "Remember Hamid, in our life there are three moral lessons we must uphold. First, sincerity; second, patience; third, thankfulness. Sincerity is the reflection of a pure heart and honesty do to something without seeking revenge or advantage. If you do something without sincerity, you will be suspect by others and in the end become jealous. Patience is the best way to train yourself to understand others and accept the facts. If you do not condition yourself to be patient, you will never have the ability to live tolerating others. And thankfulness, is the acceptance of what you are given. Thankfulness, usually, will not make you greedy and want to take another's rights or property. I am like this because, Hamid, I am the founder and patron of a number of Muslim foundations. So I have a good moral knowledge. And remember, it is not just about speech making but about putting it into practice," stated Kalla.

On this subject of entrance to heaven, Kalla had more to add to his thesis. According to him, the conflict in both Poso and Ambon had used this precept of entrance to heaven. As a result, many from both sides used this a short cut to heaven. Many of them were aware they had bloodied hands from the crimes and sins they had committed. Here was a simple way out to expunge their sins and at the same time gain entry to heaven. So they used it to the full.

Kalla also explained, particularly in the case of Ambon, many came from Jakarta, seeking this short cut means of entrance to heaven. Ironically, Kalla

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noted, there was no effort by any of the religious leaders from either side to counter this argument.

With this inverted logic, this leadership of both opposing sides were no longer confident enough to challenge Kalla on theological grounds. Quickly the debate and argument changed to the background causes. Even after raising the issue of government policy which did to some extent inflame the situation making it harder to extinguish.

Kalla's argument spread wide. Various group meetings and with leaders, initiated by Kalla, all had the same theme "not heaven, but hell."

In one small meeting in Ambon with a leader of one of the Muslim factions directly involved in the conflict I accompanied Kalla. As per usual the Kiai²⁶ appeared as he would greet his laity in a sarong and white pici²⁷ and spoke in measured sentences to Kalla. "Pak you are right about the matter of heaven and hell. To be to the point, we really do not know the source of this in this conflict. My knowledge convinces me we can all become residents of heaven if we can resolve this conflict, Pak Jusuf," said the Kiai.

"That is true, Pak Kiai. Heaven is there for people who love one another and who bring peace. Not the other way around! Apart from that it is sad for all Ambonese. There is no longer any hopes for the future of the children of Ambon," replied Kalla.

"Basically, we are ready to make peace. Furthermore, the government now has stepped in.

²⁶ *Kiai* is a title for a respected senior teacher of Islam.

²⁷ *Pici* is the traditional Indonesian/Malay head dress, usually it of black velvet but for those who have performed the pilgrimage to Mecca-the haj-it a white knitted skull cap.

We will support your initiative fully, Pak Jusuf," responded the Kiai.

The Reverend Santo was one of the leaders of the Christian community who participated in the Poso peace talks in Malino, said to me firmly that "The overall approach from the start must be logical just like Pak Jusuf. Just keep it simple and all will make common sense. We are embarrassed that we are involved in this conflict without knowing the actual causes and then suddenly in the middle of it appears the issue of entry to heaven. My argument is very simple, and for certain we can solve this together Pak Hamid," in the middle of one of the many peace meetings.

After that meeting, Kalla ribbed me, " 'Mid, it is true my theory about heaven. As long as they think clearly and quietly, they will accept my reasoning. So perhaps I should become a preacher. A remember my strong Nahdliyin background²⁸. Therefore the religious argument is entirely mine. And don't forget I am the patron of several large mosques and Islamic foundations. So there is some justification for me speaking on matters of religious morality," said Kalla.

Acceptance of Kalla's ideas about heaven and hell resonated well with the public. At least there was no negative comment or opposition from the press. What did occur in many discussions was Kalla's accuracy identifying the roots of the problem with a clear and practical cure.

This matter of heaven and hell always became the opening remarks for Kalla in any address in both the

²⁸ Nahdliyin is a part of Nahdatul Ulama, the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesian and probably the world. It is known for its moderate stance on most issues particularly religious violence,

Poso and Ambon peace talks in Malino. Kalla was fully aware that confusion about heaven was the root cause in the escalation of the conflict in both places. To counter it, their thinking had to be upended so that all understood for murder they would actually end up in hell, not heaven.

When the heaven and hell agenda was taken to the villages, the late Nurcholish Madjid²⁹ asked to meet with me at his office. He asked me to convey to Kalla his admiration of Kalla for making such an open argument.

"This issue is very sensitive, Hamid. It requires extra bravery to be open in proposing it. Furthermore, Pak Ucup³⁰ is a minister. Substantively he is so correct. So if you need any additional references to strengthen Pak Jusuf's argument on the matter of heaven and hell, Hamid, just come here. I will dig them out for you. Most importantly convey my congratulations to Pak Jusuf for his bravery and for his directness to the public," said Pak Nur.

Apart from the heaven and hell agenda, in both Poso and Ambon, both sides continually demanded that law and justice be upheld as a pre-condition for any talks. They demanded criminal investigation and prosecution of certain groups and persons who had tyrannized them before they would discuss the peace process.

"How is it possible that we who want peace if those who tyrannized us are not arrested beforehand. They are the ones who started it. They must be brought to

²⁹ Nurcholish Madjid was an exemplary moderate Muslim thinker and teacher who died in 2005.

³⁰ *Ucup* is an affectionate abbreviation of Jusuf.

justice before any peace talks," claimed one from a party to the dispute.

"Peace talks can occur, but they must be brought to justice first. How is it possible that we want peace when those who terrorized us have not yet been brought to court. Peace is meaningless if they are still on the run. So they must be brought to court, and only then can we talk about peace," another continued.

In short, both sides of the Poso Ambon conflict demanded due legal process first before any peace talks. Strange? But it was not so for JK. Again he turned their logic upside down. To these disputing parties, he said, "How can we uphold the law if the police are unable to function properly? How can we process someone legally when we have no prosecutors? How can we do this if our judges are not at their benches?"

None were able to reply to these short questions. Later JK said "Upholding the law is a straight forward and formal process. It will never occur in a conflict of this scale. Without this, justice is not upheld but becomes a new form of tyranny. Like that, 'Mid? You are a lawyer?" pointed out JK to me.

To the fighting parties, JK explained that now there were no judges prepared to live in Poso or even Ambon. They had to look after their own personal safety. If someone was arrested, justice would be difficult and they would be held under threat and intimidation. The courts had been burnt to the ground; so had the police prosecutors' offices had been flattened. Where could due legal process start?

Because of this their logic had to be inverted. Peace first and only then would we discuss upholding

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the law and justice. Not the other way around! Peace could only be maintained if law was upheld; not upholding law preceding peace.

JK's logic was not rejected. The peace making process continued. Those parties who initially rejected peace talks first, agreed to come to Malino, to set and discuss: PEACE.

Resolving the matter of what came first, peace then legal process or upholding the law then peace talks: Both communities again demanded there be a total surrender of all weapons before Malino. They hoped that the government would disarm either side beforehand. "How can we talk peace when weapons are spread all over the place and are not confiscated. It possible that while we are discussing peace these weapons could be used to kill or wound us. So there is no purpose to meeting," was the line of thinking adopted.

What was JK's reaction to this? Simple he said. Once again he turned their thinking upside down. "A M-16 or a bazooka is harmless if they are held by peaceable men. A small piece of bamboo can become a dangerous weapon if the one who possesses it is angry or is consumed with revenge," stated JK.

Then the surrender of the weapons became our next problem to face. These weapons were only used as tools during a war. If there was no war without any official surrender process, the weapons would by themselves disappear. Or there would be those who had no need to use them. What was the purpose of a weapon if there were no enemies? It was also a problem to store them. Further the law prohibited a person from storing a weapon. Sharp weapons were

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also prohibited, stressed JK. The combatants became quiet and went to Malino to make peace.

There was additional problem. There were those who considered JK had been too hasty and forceful in his approach. "We need time and preparation for these peace talks. We need a couple of months. If pressured like this, our future peace will be in vain," said one of the parties.

JK shook his head. He was ready for this one. "You are total confused. For sure parties who want to wage war need time for preparations. Peace does not demand any preparations whatsoever. Your thinking is upside down. Think! If you meet someone and straight away greet him with Assalamualaikum.³¹ It is a greeting of peace. There is no preparation to say this, is there? However if you are challenged to a fight by a neighbor you assess beforehand the likely gain versus damage, or think about your own fighting abilities. Basically, we must immediately meet to make peace. No preparations are necessary at all. We have for some time planned this initiative. It is not in any way hasty," argued JK.

"Hamid, we cannot allow them to waste time. Another gust will like this will capsize us. It is now or never! You must seize this opportunity," ordered JK to me and Farid Husein.

For a person like JK, time was ever important. His stressing time was extraordinary. In the end, both sides submitted to the timetable scheduled by JK. Poso and Ambon only became peaceful because of JK's determination.

³¹ Arabic for peace be with you. A standard form of greeting in Muslim Indonesia.

ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT

The fires of conflict in Ambon were still burning. Gunfire and bomb explosions were still heard. Tension still reigned. On 25th January 2002, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (SBY) and his delegation plus several senior Indonesian Army officers visited the village of Wayame in the Regency of Baguala in Ambon. With the Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare JK, they held direct discussions with two groups consisting of 10 Muslims and 10 Christians on how to coordinate and spread this idea of a road-map to peace.

The following day Saturday 26 January 2002, very early, both Coordinating Ministers met with the head of the Maluku Provincial Parliament, Mrs. Ety Sahuburua and a number of members of the local parliament. All of them wished to open up a road to peace in Ambon.

After talking with the local parliament leadership, at 9.00 a.m. both Coordinating Ministers and their respective delegations met at the Governor's residence with a Muslim group headed by K.H. Wahab Abubakar Palpoke, Head of the Maluku Muslim Leaders Council, H. Idris Tutley, Head of the Maluku Muhamadiyah, Abdul Karim Rahayaan, Head of the Maluku Nahadathul Ulama, and Muhammad Attamimi, Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar. About 25 persons attended this meeting.

The second meeting of the two Coordinating Ministers, with the national Chief of Police and a number of senior Army staff officers with the two fighting communities was tense. Both communities came to the meeting purely to fire all their rage at

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the government. Everyone of them felt they had the right wield their axes of anger. Both the content and presentation was heavily loaded with emotion. What stuck out was that both sides accused one another and claimed they had been terrorized by the other and both let loose much of their anger at the government.

This meeting between the disputing parties was sensational like it had an agenda to run amok on purpose. Many allegations were aimed at the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security as well as the Chief of Police. When Da'i Bachtiar, the Police Chief lowered his head to make some notes, one of the attendees yelled demanding the Chief of Police pay attention while he spoke.

Fortunately, Da'i responded with praiseworthy maturity and composure. He smiled at his interlocutor and came to attention to listen to his tirade. The expression on his face did not change a bit.

There was another incident with the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (SBY). One member of one of the communities, after rambling on all over the place with an angry red face let loose with: "Bapak Bapak³² from Jakarta, who sit in front of us, are all generals. Why is it only now that the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security has the courage to come to Ambon. Before today you came twice, but only to the airport. Is this because you are now accompanied by the Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare?" he asked emotionally.

Without changing his expression, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security with extraordinary maturity and patience. He was not drawn into this

³² Plural in Bahasa is formed by repetition

debate. While smiling, he nodded towards the speaker, and when it was his turn to respond he never really answered him and never threatened his attacker.

Witnessing this, Lt Gen Syafri Syamsuddin who was sitting beside me and directly behind the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security clenched his fist. He was upset and angry listening to this from this attendee. He whispered to me slowly "Pak Hamid, when confronting Ambonese, it requires extra patience. Ambonese when speaking usually speak loudly."

Afterwards, the attendees shook hands with both the Coordinating ⁴Ministers, the Chief of Police and all the other members of the delegation from Jakarta. The tension seemed to abate quickly. These delegates, who had earlier been explosively angry, now one by one approached the delegation members smiling. It seemed as though there was no residual anger. Perhaps, all the anger they had been retaining was now out in the open and explicit. Even their posture seemed relaxed.

This was JK's careful preparation at work. He quickly suggested a follow-up meeting the next night asking that each community send no more than ten delegates. "For sure they will readily speak when invited for they have already freely expressed their anger. I am convinced both sides at this next meeting will tone it down with less rhetoric as they had got it off their chests now," said JK to Farid Hussein who was already busied with preparations for the next meeting.

LET US MEET THEM

Meanwhile the conflict continued. Death statistics from both sides and from the government had doubled.

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There were already signs appearing that both the Police and the army were taking sides and were as well fighting each other. "This is the problem of a conflict with religious undertones. Our government is unable to guarantee impartiality. If this continues, this conflict will find no end point," explained JK.

This, in the middle of an open field day in the Tentena District, Poso Regency, a well know Christian area, a number of senior officials including JK sat listening to speeches. Speakers took it in turns. Every one of these speakers was angry and wild about their opponents. One of them was angry with the government and accused outside sources.

Seeing the meeting was overheating, JK immediately grabbed the microphone and started to speak.

"Hey! Who said that? Come up to the front. Don't stand in the crowd and then disappear. Come up!" challenged JK.

"I am here with friends from Jakarta as a representative of our government to settle this conflict. We come here to ask you, all of you, to stop the fighting. But you still want to go on fighting. So I offer you all a choice. First you can fight on to the last drop of blood. There will be none of you left. I will give you guns and bullets, and I will do the same for both sides. Second, you can face government troops and in a flash the government will drop special forces here to fight you both. I am convinced you will not have a hope against well trained professional troops. The third choice, you stop fighting, and sit down to talk peace. It is up to you," stressed JK.

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The thunderous atmosphere of the meeting cleared; not a soul moved. This very same offer was also made to those in Ambon.

"Hamid, I do not want our government to be insulted nor abused. The government is compelled to take firm steps. What does it mean if public servants say things like this? We have to counter it. Further, we are going there with the intent to make peace. I don't care about the risks," replied JK.

JK's challenge in this meeting had a common thread in his thinking in other matters. Muslims felt they were terrorized by Christians and vice versa. JK challenged, "Really who is terrorizing who and who is terrorized by whom?" he asked. "Come on! Prove it all? You terrorize yourselves and mutually terrorize one another. There is no one who is terrorized but you mutually terrorize one another," said JK. "The government can also terrorize you," he added pointedly.

This concept of mutual terrorizing was further developed by JK wherever he went. Intentionally, he publically pushed his idea so that the disputing sides would not feel they had ammunition to attack the other side they thought was terrorizing them.

"I am amazed by them. They all claim they have been terrorized but not one will admit to terrorizing the other. This does not stand up to inspection. If they are terrorized for certain someone is doing it, yes?" said JK.

JK's three challenges at Tentena were again presented in Ambon to both sides. That night both sides sent their delegates to meet with JK at the Governor of Maluku's residence. "Basically, the

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government will not permit you to fight any further because the government also is a loser if it continues. Consequently our government offers three choices. The government will arm both sides so you can finish one another off. The other option, you face government troops who will for sure defeat you all. And last, end the conflict totally, surrender your weapons and sit down and talk peace," said JK.

One of the audience put his hand up to speak. "Minister, Sir. Why does the government urge the community to fight one another and kill one another?" he asked.

"So, you don't want me to urge you to fight one another?" asked JK.

"Yes. I am utterly amazed that we have a government like that," replied the questioner from the floor. "

Here! If you do not want the government to encourage you to fight one another, then you must stop fighting. I can only urge you to fight on if you won't stop. The aim of the government is to get you to stop fighting," replied JK.

"Pak Minister, it is difficult to win an argument with you. You are too smart. I never expected an answer like that," claimed Saleh Latuconsina, the Governor of Maluku after the meeting finished.

When this meeting was over, the three of us - JK, Farid Hussein and myself chatted on the verandah of the Governor's residence. JK said to me, " 'Mid, just then I was a bit forceful. I wanted to show that the government was not afraid of anyone who committed violence. I must parry all and any attacks aimed at

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the government. I am not like Gus Dur³³ who believed that the government should not intervene in Poso and Ambon conflicts because the communities had their own traditional mechanisms for dealing with disputes. The proof is that they are still fighting three years later and they have not been able to resolve the conflict amongst themselves. The government must use their force of authority in the public interest," said JK.

"Further," he continued, "if this conflict continues the government will have outlay substantial funds to renovate all infrastructure which is in total chaos. The government will also lose if the economy further stagnates because of this war. And also we have not yet addressed the problem of the flood of refugees. Our image in the outside world is that we are a nation which enjoys violence. This will further damage us. At worse, investors and tourists won't want to come here again. Hamid we have got to make peace happen here," added JK.

"I have always said the government must be prepared to fight groups wherever they are if they do not seek peace," JK continued. "Determination is not meaningless, 'Mid. I intend to request that our government does not give way to anyone who disturbs the peace in our nation. And at the same time I intend to stimulate the morale of the security apparatus in both the army and the police."

"Are there problems with esprit de corps within the police and army?" I enquired.

33 Gus Dur is the nickname for K. H. Wahid Abdurrahman, then President of Indonesia.

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"Sure. They are now right in the spotlight because they have been unable to resolve this conflict. What is more disturbing is there are various rumours circulating that the army is selling weapons and ammunition to both sides. We have to move firmly and quickly change this image so that it becomes necessary that the Police and the Army are ready to face off with anyone who is disturbing peace. That was the intent of my forceful attitude," stressed JK.

Rumours about the Army and the Police in the Poso and Ambon came to the fore when the mayor of Ambon, a number of the provincial and local Ambon City parliaments, assessed that the Commander of the Military Area XVI Pattimura, Brig. Gen. Mustopo and the provincial chief of Police Inspector General Farouk Mohammad did not obey the Provincial Governor Latuconsina as the Civil Emergency Authority. "When Governor Latuconsina ordered both of them do something nothing happened," explained the Chairman of the City Parliament, Lucky Wattimena.

Later Lucky suggested that this disobedience of these two senior security officials was one of the causes of the continuation of the conflict. Latuconsina's orders were never directly executed. Both of them always had an excuse: they could not do it without consultation with Jakarta with the army commander and the national chief of Police. "Then people wanted to know who really was the Civil Emergency Authority," explained Lucky.

Meanwhile one member of the Ambon City Parliament, Lufti Sanaki stated that the Maluku conflict slid from a communal conflict to a conflict between the Army and the Police. Sanaki proposed

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that the Maluku Police be called the 'Red Police' - assisting the disputing factions and the 'White Police' - who were clean upholding their position as officers of the law. Because of this the provincial chief of Police was required to stop this and correct this. Even Roby Saimina, an Ambon City Parliament member put it more forcefully. He proposed it was best if all Police who were 'contaminated' be sent outside the province. "The reason: It is not often you have Police behind a conflict." Said Saimina. This was said after they had met with the head of the national parliament Akbar Tanjung (Tempo Magazine, 18 January 2002).

Regarding this matter of the Police being involved in the Ambon con the national chief of Police Da'i Bachtiar suggested to Parliamentary Commission 134 that there were already signs of polarization along religious lines within the police ranks in Maluku. "Before they would parade together, now no longer," said Bachtiar.

Continuing, Bachtiar said another reason for this polarization was the destruction of the police barracks at Tantui in Ambon. This caused many Police lodging there to flee to private homes in accordance with their respective religion. There was enormous pressure in the conflict areas on communities to defend themselves. "Like it or not, saving a family became a humanitarian act," explained Bachtiar. Really, when members worked at headquarters those of different religions were one - united. But the effect of living in their respective communities prevented them from doing anything."

34 Commission for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Information

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However, Bachtiar rejected the idea to move personnel out of the province because of this polarization. He also rejected that they could not do anything to erase this polarization. Individual officers had already been transferred out of the province. (Tempo Magazine, 30 January 2002) Against this, once again I tried to provoke JK with this question: "Pak, what about the rumour that the current military commander in Maluku favours one of the sides in the dispute?" I asked.

"Whatever the facts, we have to fight this story, Hamid. If stories like this continue to circulate, and will be added to by others for their self-interest. It will be extremely dangerous as the opponents of the army commander and chief of police wish to corner both the army and the police. And that is what they want!" added JK.

"Once again Hamid, this story or rumour, true or not, what is critical is the attitude of the national police chief Da'i Bachtiar and the army commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, which was clear and firm. They are impartial and made no offers to any who wished to agitate. This is the command line which must be adhered to by their subordinates," he again stressed.

"Pak, what is your assessment of Governor Latuconsina," I asked fishing a bit.

"This governor has never ever enjoyed his job. He is fighting two groups and it is impossible he favours either of them. Even his bedroom is pock marked with bullet holes traumatizing his family. His partiality is to whom? You have seen yourself how he gets often cornered by the Muslim groups and the

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same goes for the Christians. Fortunately, I notice he is patient," added JK.

"Pak, supposing the military commander is partial, what do we do?" I urged.

"Hey, you are starting with a supposition; so I suggest to you that he is impartial?" replied JK. "As I said earlier, our job is to fend off ideas like that. This is a dangerous game and issues, Hamid. Their corps in Jakarta for sure have a monitoring system on every officer in the field here. Endriartono is very firm about the army's position and reputation. We have to stick to that," said JK seriously.

"Mid, now, we shall concentrate on the two opposing forces. We will fight them and force them to the peace table. Your job is to help me when at the peace table so they both understand they both must forget the past and agree to start a better life. Thus, in brief, all of these upcoming talks will point to a far, far better future for their children. You must continue to deliver this because their parents for certain want their children to have a bright future," ordered JK.

Since that three-way chat on the verandah late at night, I never questioned rumours about partiality of the chief of Police or the army commander in Maluku.

MYSTICISM OF WAR VS KALLA'S LOGIC

The horizontal conflict between the two sides because of SARA in Poso reached a peak. Many were killed and wounded certainly on both sides.

Stories of the supernatural or mysticism now spread which did nothing to cool the situation, in fact it had the direct opposite effect. These tales of mysticism

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only fanned the flames of the conflict because story after story were full of various provocations.

This was explained by a TVRI reporter Hussein Abdullah who regularly traversed Poso during the conflict. Habib Saleh al Habsyi, was the main figure in the mysticism story from the Muslim side. While, Lateko and Tibo were the main players from the Christian side.

It happened that Poso was deathly quiet. Anyone beside us could just vanish without a trace or just be silently murdered. At that time the majority of the Muslim community had fled, abandoning Poso for fear that there would be a Christian attack.

The Muslims were terrified of the Black Bat gang, a Christian group. They were called this because they wore only black clothing. They were lead by Tibo, Lateka and Domingus who had become legendary for their attacks. "Just hearing the names of Tibo or Lateka made your knees tremble," exclaimed Hussein Abdullah.

Stories about the travels of Lateka and Tibo continued and all had a suggestion of mysticism about them. For example, when Tibo wanted to attack, he was always accompanied by a statuesque woman just behind him. This woman would be beside him while he it appeared she was lip reading mantras while shaking a basket. Then, those whom he was attacking saw Tibo's troops numbered in the thousands like ants in a line. On seeing this, a sea of people surging attack, his enemies were terrified.

In reality, continued Husein Abdullah, Tibo's troops probably only numbered tens of men but his enemies envisaged a sea of people. These were the

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kind of stories that caused the Muslims to flee the town of Poso.

In the middle of these contagious stories about the Black Bat troops, Habib Saleh al Habsyi, head of the religious school Kayamana in Poso with about forty of his students resisted such an attack. Amongst the Muslim community he was a living legend and symbol of opposition.

The Poso Muslim refugee community were concerned for the fate of Habib Saleh and his students staying on at the school as they did not want to leave. Then, during midday prayers, someone yelled, "Lateka and his men are coming. We must be ready!" Hearing this alert, Habib Saleh loudly said "God is Great!" He then asked his students to be calm and recite passages from the Koran seeking God's protection. Later I was told that the passage that was read together from the Koran by Habib Saleh and his students was ratibul haddad 35.

Lateka and his men were spotted from afar. Lateka was celebrating a victory in another earlier clash but it appeared as though they were headed towards the school. Habib Saleh asked his students to still and concentrate, pray and surrender all to God. e calm

When Lateka set foot in the school yard, Habib Saleh went out to greet his uninvited and unwelcome guest. There was a war of words between them. In this confrontation Lateka tried to draw his sword. Where upon Habib Saleh whacked him with a rotan cane.

¹
35 The Ratibul Haddad or Ratib al-Haddad is a Zikr (an additional voluntary invocation) to be recited every night after Magrib or Salât al-'isha. It is a collection of Surahs and verses from the Holy Qur'an Kareem as well as the Kalimaat (declarations of belief), Tasbeehaat (praise of Allah Ta'ala) and Duas (invocations) which the beloved Prophet Muhammad Mustafa Sallallahu alaihi as Sallam recommended in his blessed sayings or Hadith Shareef.

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It was an unlucky day for Lateka. When the cane hit him, he fell smack to the ground and never got up again to this day. He was dead.

Seeing their leader dead, his men scattered. Habib Saleh re-entered the school, announced his victory and asked not to do anything to the corpse. Later, he then instructed his students to endeavour to return his corpse to his family.

Since then the story of Habib Saleh striking Lateka with a magic cane, Habib Salleh's popularity soared. Immediately he became a symbol of opposition and strength. Added to this he was the ultimate symbol of the supernatural. The news of this miracle spread fast across the valleys and lakes of Poso. So a new spirit of opposition flared up.

After the Poso peace talks Habib Saleh met me in Jakarta. Here he gave me several readings from the Koran to remember and a piece of cane which he claimed was a part of the cane he used during the Poso conflict on Lateka. Looking at the length and strength of this piece of cane it was hard to think it could kill a man especially a feared and tough man like Lateka.

When I told JK about this he joked, "We had better broadcast this Hamid so that no one tries to hurt you. But now you can whip someone who does and they will drop dead immediately just like Lateka. So you, Hamid, will be better than Habib Saleh because he gave you the cane and the recitations together. You have practiced these recitations? I was not given the cane and the readings of Habib Saleh. Obviously you are superior to me in these matters, yes? In the future if you want to see me you must be searched to make

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sure you do not have this cane on your person," said JK teasingly.

Confronting both sides with two terrifying and powerful accounts of magic, in the middle of the night in Malino JK called me. "Hamid, this story of Lateka and Habib Saleh has been circulating for as long as the war has been on. In every war, wherever it occurs, each side must have the ways and means to execute it as well as possessing the weapons to attack and defend. You should consider this story as simply one of the ways and means used by both sides to attack and defend themselves," stressed JK.

"Hamid remember the war in Poso was essentially a traditional war- meaning there were no modern weapons used. Consequently, the ways and means they used were traditional. All the stories you have heard, including the one of Habib Saleh, could have actually occurred and the fact remains that Lateka died at the hand of Habib Saleh," continued JK.

"For me, we shall use common logic. It is very unlikely that this story happened before the war started. Yes? It now occurs because of the war. Therefore all of this is simply ways and means used by both sides since the war started. That is human. People do have the innate ability to adapt situations. These stories going around are certainly being used by their followers as psychological warfare. You have to look at it that way, Hamid," said JK.

"Our mission, Hamid, is to end this war and normalize life in Poso. Our aim is to stop these killings, to stop the burning of schools, mosques and churches. No more markets burnt to the ground. No more refugees. The local economy must be re-started and

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local government must be able to govern. You have to deal with this, Hamid. On the matter of believing these mystical stories, this is a private matter for each side. In short, you must understand the aspirations of both sides after which you can prepare a peace declaration. I hand all of this over to you, Hamid: the drafting of a peace declaration," stressed JK.

Although driven by an insatiable desire for knowledge, in our discussions JK did not pursue the issue of the mystical stories about Lateka and Habib Saleh. On one occasion I was cheeky enough to tease him: "It seems as though your powers are far superior to those of the Black Bats and Habib Saleh? You never seem to be drawn into discussion about this. I mean your powers are obviously vastly superior than theirs," I asked JK.

"Hamid, I would like to stress to you the matter of these powers in an individual personal matter. Your task, take good note again, is to negotiate with each of these quarrelling parties, then prepare a declaration of peace. Whether or not I have superior or lesser powers than them is a matter for you alone to decide. Importantly, it is claimed as our powers increase so there is no need whatsoever to announce them publically. See that is the power I have! Ha! Ha!" said JK laughing.

"You also have superior powers, Hamid. The power of the written word. You are an expert, I have observed. Thus your powers are greater than Lateka or Habib Saleh. And as you have superior powers, then for certain you will defeat them both," explained JK.

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"Wow, it seems as though I am really great in your eyes, Bapak? What is the way to defeat them?" I asked.

"Very easy. You have to convince them there is absolutely no point in fighting anymore. In your own way you have to change their way of thinking that peace is far far better than fighting. The main thing is to convince them: both parties to meet, discuss and agree to peace in Malino," stated JK.

"But Lateka is already dead, Pak. How can you convince a dead man?" I snapped.

"Yes, that is so. Lateka's fighting spirit still remains with his followers, including some of those who are now here in Malino. So convince them to discuss and make peace. If you can do this you will have demonstrated that you have far superior powers than either of them. Their legend is only oral from mouth to mouth. Your legend will be in the future a statue or monument," said JK jokingly.

"Pak, can we discuss this hypothetically. What are we going to do at the peace table when amongst them are those who believe these tales of mysticism. How are we going to play this and seek an acceptable solution?" I asked JK.

"Hamid, this is easily responded to. As I said a while ago, the problem of these stories in circulation as simply a traditional tool used by both sides for attack and to defend themselves. Usually, those who really have such powers never mention it in public. Consequently, I am sure, no one will be brave enough to bring it up," clarified JK.

"And another matter which you must be aware of is that the core of the problem is not about ways and

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means but is about how we end the conflict. Once this conflict has ended automatically these stories will stop. In short, concentrate only how to get them to sit together, to discuss and seek peace, explained JK. Seeing that JK was not at all enthusiastic about continuing my taunt about these stories, I came to the conclusion that JK was not interested in these stories of mysticism. He appeared to be more focused on pacifying the conflict parties than hearing these stories about them.

For me, a valuable lesson I learned from these stories which had a whiff of mysticism about them was the method of dealing with them logically and not to discuss whether they were true or not. These stories were just a means for both sides to defend themselves in a conflict situation. They could be considered as a powerful weapon or a soft weapon in terms of using the media to terrify the enemy.

Facing mystical issues in any conflict, must be approached with calculated rationalism and hard logic. Even in modern war, stories about legends of an individual do exist for certain; and even more so in a traditional war.

DO NOT BEHAVE LIKE THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

What is the link between the Dutch colonial government in making the peace in Poso and Ambon.? On 13 December 2001, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, sent a letter to the national Chief of Police regarding guarantees for security. In this letter he explained that between the dates 18th to 21st December peace talks between the

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parties to the Poso conflict would be continuing in Malino.

To this end, JK asked the Police chief to grant immunity to all attendees at the peace table. Explicitly JK asked that there be no checking, no investigations or any arrests of any of the attendees starting from the time they left their homes until they returned home so that this reconciliation meeting could proceed in a cool and calm atmosphere in order to achieve the jointly hoped for aims.

Later, JK told me that he intentionally wrote that letter so that none of the Poso attendees involved in the conflict could come to Malino without any fear whatsoever that they might be investigated or arrested.

It was a mature and tactical calculation. The problem was, according to JK, a series of incidents in the past. Independence fighters were arrested by the Dutch colonial government when invited to peace talks. This was cruel and cowardly, stressed JK.

On the matter of the colonial government, I once discussed this particular subject with JK. "Bapak, it looked as though you were pretty serious about this guarantee for the attendees not to be investigated or arrested during the talks, yes?"

"For sure. This meeting centered around trust. How could we invite people to discuss if we could not provide a guarantee that nothing would happen to them," replied JK. "I really admired General Jusuf ³⁶. After years of fighting against Kahar's 37 troops, Jusuf

³⁶ General M. Andi Jusuf, (1928-2004) a distinguished Indonesian Army officer of Maksassar descent, who rose to be commander in chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and Minister of Defence

³⁷ Lt Col Kahar Muzakkar, leader of the Darul Islam/TII rebellion in Sulawesi in the late 1950s.

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finally met directly with Kahar. A peace program was presented to Kahar along with persuasion to end his fighting the government. Kahar rejected the peace offer and continued fighting. That time Jusuf like a gallant knight invited Kahar to return for further peace talks giving him three days to respond. After three days, the Indonesian army renewed the fight against Kahar," JK related to me.

"All of Jusuf's staff officers regretted his decision. Why did he not just arrest him then and there asked one of his officers. This made work twice as hard with even greater risk. The enemy is in your hand and you let him go, exploded another. So what was General Jusuf's reaction, Hamid?" asked JK.

"Here General Jusuf answered them with short punchy sentence. Don't be so cowardly like the colonial government. The colonial government only arrested their enemies when they were unable to defeat them in battle. If I had arrested Kahar then and there for the rest of my life I would have been branded a coward having a colonial attitude. Even so, in an institutional sense, the army would not judge me as a gallant knight," said JK recalling what General Jusuf had told him.

"Why hasn't this ever been publicized, Pak?" I asked JK.

"General Jusuf was not an open person. I heard all of this from him directly. And this was after I had questioned him repeatedly," replied JK. "So I had to have this guarantee from the Chief of Police that all of the delegates to the Poso peace talks in Malino would be granted immunity during the talks. After that there would be the due process of law - another problem.

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You have to learn, Hamid, how to be a noble knight and not be like a colonial official," stressed JK.

This principle of being a knight was very effective in resolving the Poso conflict. When I was tasked by JK to chair a small meeting of Muslim and Christian leaders in Malino, I was surprised to hear confirmation of this from one of the Muslim leaders.

"Pak Hamid, frankly I wish to say if we had not have had Minister Kalla's guarantee that we would not be checked or arrested, we would have not come here at all. So as you know, Pak Hamid, we do not trust government officials anymore to resolve this conflict," stated one of their leaders.

"Yes, view it the same way. Fortunately, Pak Kalla guaranteed our security here. We can just be arbitrarily arrested by the authorities and it is announced that we have been arrested by a relation from our own Muslim community. We want to discuss this because there is a sincerity plus this guarantee from Pak Kalla. I would just like to make this point," responded one of the Christian delegates.

The matter of principle and attitude of being a knight of JK's also appeared when we were seeking peace in Aceh in 2005. In the agreement between the Indonesian Government and GAM - the Free Aceh Movement 38 - it is stated that no later than two weeks after the signing of the peace accord, the Indonesian Government would release all GAM detainees. As the deadline approached, that is the third week of August 2005, early one morning JK rings me. "Mid, how is it going with the GAM detainees that you want to

38 GAM- Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - Free Aceh Force

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release? Please treat them with the dignity of free men full of self respect," ordered JK.

It was clear that JK paid great attention to these GAM activists who were imprisoned in various prisons and detention centers across Indonesia for criminal offences. As a direct result of the peace talks with GAM, all GAM activists were released as they were granted an amnesty by the Indonesia Government. At the time, there were some 2,700 GAM were cooped up behind prison walls. About 500 of them were held across Java.

"Hamid, you must release them exactly 15 days after the signing of the MOU. That was promised and agreed. This means you must release them on 30th August 2005 because you signed the MOU on 15th August. Repatriate them not just to Banda Aceh, the capital, but to their home individual villages. And remember do not take them in a Hercules³⁹ but on commercial flights. Before they were taken to Java on a Hercules hand-cuffed and manacled. That is not to happen again, Hamid. And also, make sure they have some pocket money so they can bring some gifts home. We must behave like knights, fulfilling our promises and commitments. Not like the colonialists," ordered JK.

Regarding the matter of not assuming a colonial attitude, I also witnessed the way JK treated Jafar Umar Thalib in meetings to resolve the Ambon conflict. As a key leader in the conflict, Jafar Umar Thalib was the senior leader of Laskar Jihad Soldiers of the Holy War - whose presence and influence had spread

³⁹ A military aircraft.

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widely. It was known he was the most feared leader for his troops would fight to their death in Ambon.

As one of the direct results of the Ambon peace agreement, all of Jafar Umar Thalib's men had to be withdrawn from Ambon. There was a problem with Jafar Umar Thalib and the government because Jafar continued to demand from the government and from the Christian groups that there would be no longer an further attacks in Ambon. In brief, Jafar wanted to remain in Ambon with his troops.

Hearing this, JK immediately required Jafar within a certain time frame withdraw his troops. "Remember this is a matter of commitment and it must be carried out. You have no choice except withdraw. That was your promise to me," JK told Jafar.

There being no other way, Jafar withdrew his troops. Later JK met his side of the bargain by paying for the withdrawal of Jafar's men. "Yes, I was the one who asked you to withdraw your troops and also was I prepared for the idea. Both sides must meet their commitments consistently. I am compelled to it because I am not a colonial," stated JK.

The same approach was displayed by JK when some people bravely cross-examined JK during the peace making process in both the Poso conflict and the Ambon conflict. He was fearless, not wanting to budge from his plan. Don't back away from the plan, change timings a bit, but do not budge.

On one occasion, JK was facing one of the groups in the Ambon conflict where he was urged to review the Malino plan and meeting timetable. "Minister, sir, if we have to urge you like this, we may boycott the

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meeting and will not be responsible for any of this," said a member of one of the delegations.

Quickly JK replied, "Please boycott the talks but get your troops ready tonight. We will fight immediately. This boycott is an irresponsible reply. Don't fool with me, yes? You sell, I buy. It is not necessary for you to join the peace talks if you do not want to but would you please write that you do not want peace. Come on get some paper and write this down like a man. We want to have all the proof of your decision in black and white," demanded JK.

The atmosphere was tense and there was not the slightest sound. JK continued, "Because you do not want to write your name and objection, I presume you now want to join the peace talks? If you are really brave enough not to attend, then you are obliged to sign so that everyone will know about your bravery. If we are principled then we should not be afraid to sign under our stated attitude," explained JK.

MALINO DECLARATION FOR POSO

During the early evening prayers the cold was creeping into our bones. All the delegates had arrived in Malino when JK called me, "Hamid, show your skills at drafting a peace statement which will be agreed to by both sides. Basically, I want to see how terrific you are. What is absolutely important is a statement that both sides agree to end this conflict," ordered JK.

Several hours later, I had written the draft statement after discussing it with a number of the parties from both sides. Feeling pretty proud of my

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efforts I went to JK with four pages of draft. One page contained the introduction.

Any hopes of praise from JK were smartly shot down. Having read the first sentence JK shook his head. "Hamid, what you have written is a novel with some poetry. All I want is one page only with no more than ten points. You are a lawyer. Make your sentences clear and not open to misinterpretation. Now take some notes carefully. In this draft there must be a clear statement from both parties. Plus an outline of the people's suffering throughout the conflict. In substance, both sides wish to end the conflict, uphold the law and reject involvement of outside or foreign parties. Poso is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia, and all people have the right to reside there, regulations about their civil rights and the matter of refugees. Basically, display your skill," said JK. This time I did not seek JK's concurrence. "Pak, isn't it necessary to discuss this first with the parties to the conflict, then make the draft?" I said. "Your logic is upside down, Saudara⁴⁰. We must make a draft first for discussion with them. This draft is our sales pitch to them. Later this draft will become an outline for discussion so that they do not drift all over the place. That's my way of thinking," replied JK.

"So arrange all the points I just mentioned. After that follow the developments in the meeting and group meetings. If there are additions, just add them into the draft. If there are deletions, delete them. But believe me, Hamid, all the points I mentioned just then are the nucleus for a peace agreement. I would

40 Saudara is an Indonesian term for a male person with whom the speaker is not well acquainted but acknowledges a close relationship.

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take a bet that they will not move from there. It may well happen that your draft in the end will be signed unchanged," JK added. "Pak Ucup how much do you want to bet? I don't have that sort of money for bets. Further, we are not meant to bet", I interrupted.

"Bets do not always have to use money, Hamid.

Basically we shall see while you put in those points

I just mentioned. God willing, both sides will agree," responded JK. "Well, Minister your order will be implemented properly," I replied teasingly.

"That is the way it will happen, my crew member.

You must always be ready to accept orders," continued JK.

All of JK's instructions I managed to sort out that night. Then I prioritized them based upon level of urgency. Most important of all, not more than one page and no more than ten points and if there was less I had the freedom to improvise.

By far the hardest sentence to compose was the first, the introduction. It could not be wordy, but it had to reflect attitudes and conditions while the conflict continued. Once I had composed this the rest fell into place fairly quickly.

While I was contemplating the draft peace agreement in the middle of the night, Farid Husein dropped by and asked me to come to see JK. "Hamid, you are not freezing to death tonight without a jacket? asked JK.

"I did not bring a jacket, Pak Ucup," I replied.

41 Islam prohibits gambling.

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"Here is my jacket, you wear it. Take it from my room," invited JK.

"Oh your jacket does not have a brand so it probably does not keep the cold out," I said joking. "Hamid, there is no connection between brand and keeping the cold out. You are a victim of the brand frenzy. My jacket is thick enough even if does not have a brand. What's your choice - the brand or the flu," continued JK.

"OK! Pak I will accept it because I am really freezing," I replied thankfully.

"Remember, it is one page; and you have an outline on how to implement the points of agreement for them later? Don't make just general statements but you have an outline on what you want to happen afterwards," said JK. "Like this, Hamid, find the right words to make a statement for all the points that is clear for both sides which they will agree to. But do not use the word 'statement' just because it is generally used," ordered JK. "How if we use the word declaration, Pak?" I suggested.

"Yes, that would be good," responded JK. "Testing me are you, Pak?" I said somewhat abruptly. "Not yet, Saudara'. Your work has not even started let alone finished," replied JK.

The following is the document entitled "The Malino Declaration for Poso"

With the blessings of God Almighty, we representing the Muslim and Christian communities of Poso along with other groups, after experiencing and being aware of

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the conflict and dispute which has continued for the last three years in the Regencies of Poso and Morowali, which inflicted continual suffering and misery for the people, thus with open hearts and clear mind we agree to the following:

- End all forms of conflict and fighting.
- Obey all forms of legal enforcement and support legal sanctions against whomsoever.
- Require national agencies act firmly and justly to maintain security.
- To create an atmosphere of peace avoiding a civil emergency and intervention of foreign parties.
- Stop slander and untruthfulness about all parties and uphold mutual respect and mutual benefit for one another in order to create harmony living together.
- Poso is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia, therefore, each citizen has a right to reside there, coming and going peacefully and freely and to respect local customs.
- All rights and properties have to be returned to their legal owners as it was prior to the conflict and fighting.
- Return all refugees to their place of origin.
- With the government thoroughly rehabilitate economic infrastructure
- Perform all religious obligations with mutual respect and observe all agreed regulations both in law, government regulations or any other regulations.

This declaration of agreement is made will full sincerity and good intention in order to implement it.

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The realization of the declaration will the following agenda and plan:

Security and Upholding Law Commission

(Attachment 1)

Economic and Social Commission (Attachment 2)

The review of this agenda and plan will be executed by the National Review Team and Working Group which will be formed locally.

Signed in Malino

20 December 2001

Ending the conflict and fighting was the main point of this declaration in Poso. Consequently, ending the conflict and the fighting was made the first point in this peace declaration. The matter of upholding the law was intentionally placed second as both sides had focused sharply on this point. Both of them suspected that the other had been granted some sort of legal immunity. This was linked to the third point where it is required for national agencies to act firmly and justly to maintain security. Furthermore, this matter of excessive suspicion prevailed on both sides. Not only were they concerned about upholding the law and justice from national agencies, but were fearful if this condition was not present.

There were some who questioned the urgency of including point 6. This point was included to satisfy both sides as both sides had accused one another and suspected one another of having foreign or outside support. And both sides demanded that these foreign parties be prevented from entering Poso.

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The way out was to declare that Poso was a free area for whom soever wished to come, just like any other part in the unitary Republic of Indonesia; except visitors must respect local customs.

The draft was completed that night. Next morning early JK asked me to join him for breakfast, enquiring whether the draft had kept me up all night. On reading my draft, JK was very satisfied but offered no praise.

"Your job now is to follow up these all meetings and note down all what you hear and see. Pass this draft around to all parties. You will see in the coming plenary session I will convince them all that this one sheet of paper will change the nightmarish atmosphere of Poso, their future fortunes and children's futures," stated JK convincingly.

These ten points of agreement of mine remained unchanged. Convincingly, JK had both parties agree to accept these ten points contained in the draft. When the plenary session finished on the last day, JK closed the session by reading the declaration and then asked "Can you all agree?" Loudly and unanimously, 25 representatives of the Muslim communities and 25 representatives of the Christian communities, 7 mediators and 24 observers, shouted "Agreed!"

Bang went JK's chairman's gavel and so ended the history of violence in Poso on 20 December 2001. Children joyously welcomed their future in an atmosphere of peace and comradeship. JK had made it become fact. Poso was now at peace.

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CHAPTER III

AMBON

JK in Ambon

Following our success of solving the conflict in Fo Poso, three weeks' later JK now felt we could address and resolve the Ambon conflict which had claimed a great numbers of lives. By December 2001 there were over 5,000 dead and 330,755 refugees or 55,571 families. These statistics prompted JK desire to solve this Ambon conflict immediately.

It was wondered whether the success of extinguishing the coals of conflict in Poso using the Malino Declaration several weeks before could be applied to the coals of conflict in Ambon. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Gen (rtd) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), said in his offices "At least, Malino can be used as a comparative model, but it does not have to be the same as conditions differ." (Koran Tempo, 12 January 2002)

Except, the Maluku Police Chief at the time, Inspector General Farouk Muhammad Saleh and the

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Pattimura Military Commander of Military Area XVI Brigadier Mustopo were somewhat cynical that the Poso model could be used in the Ambon conflict. "We cannot fully accept that the Poso model can be applied in Maluku because there are vastly different problems," said Faroek. According to this Police Chief, there were several different factors in this horizontal conflict in Maluku, for example duration. The conflict in Maluku had been going on for three years which significantly changed people's attitudes and actions. The conflict in Ambon continued but did not always involve widespread disturbances. There were individual acts of terrorism, bomb throwing and mortars, stated Faroek. (Koran Tempo, 12 January 2002)

The Police Chief of South Sulawesi, Inspector General Firman Gani, a former Maluku Police Chief held the same opinion as Faroek, that the process used in Poso would be more difficult to apply in Ambon. For Firman, the level of the Ambon conflict was strongly influenced by duration over three years. Other factors would slow the process such as the involvement of security authorities and from international non-government organizations. (Koran Tempo, 18 January 2002)

This grim outlook was dismissed by the Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina who acknowledged that although there were differences between Poso and Ambon, the Poso model could be duplicated. What had happened in Poso was a test case. Until now Poso was successful why not Ambon, queried Saleh.

The first step to be taken, continued Saleh, was to stop this violent conflict in Maluku. If both quarreling sides in the conflict stopped, we can move forward.

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If not we will still only be going around in circles, stressed Saleh. (Koran Tempo, 12 January 2002).

In the midst of this polemic between pessimism and optimism, JK on 31 December 2001, held a press interview in his office with Kompas.

Here JK explained he had formed a small team to start immediately to tackle the Ambon conflict. JK acknowledged that the Maluku situation was overloaded with all the elements of SARA⁴³. Both sides in the dispute sought deep revenge. Both sides were always deeply suspicious of one another. Both sides were continually spying on one another.

But JK was highly optimistic in his expectations of clearing this thick atmosphere of revengefulness. "I am convinced that these flames of enmity are in fact are dying down and becoming weaker; and they are all very weary of continually having to be on the alert. They are really weary of their suffering and of endless fighting. Clearly, our brothers and sisters want to live normal lives," JK told Kompas.

JK's line of thinking was supported by a number of factors. "The proof is only now, I and my contacts hear that a number of groups have linked together meeting to explain their great hopes that the conflict here in Maluku ends immediately. The people of Ambon yearn for a peaceful, prosperous and orderly life. Frankly, I felt a little odds with myself learning that their hopes were so high," explained JK.

To implement his noble mission, JK started with great optimism. "No matter how large the problems

42 Kompas is a respected Indonesian language national newspaper which focuses on social and environmental issues.

43 SARA is an abbreviation for Suku, Agama, Ras dan Aliran-tribe, religion, race and descent.

are we shall always be optimistic about achieving our aims, God willing, and certainly there will be gaps where we can come in to sort these problems out," said JK. "Apart from that, we cannot see Ambon's problems purely from the aspect of the differences between the two fighting sides. We must start from similarities. If we start from differences, our aims will become confused, said JK firmly. A number people who tried to influence JK pointing out the differences and highlighting pessimism. "I rejected the lot! Resolution of the Ambon conflict can only be tackled with optimism and drawing only upon similarities of all parties involved in the conflict," explained JK.

In this end of year interview with Kompas, JK began to explain his well developed plans. Here he announced his team had started work and were already in the field. "We have started collecting information, listening to all their complaints, and taking note of their hopes and wishes. We shall resolve this Ambon conflict in a month from now. We will be very thankful if we can do it in three weeks," stressed JK.

JK's preparations and plans were supported by urgings from the Ambon communities to resolve the conflict immediately. In mid-January 2002 for example, the Mayor of Ambon City M.J. Papilaya along with the Chairman of the Regional Council (DPD44) Lucky Wattimurri called on JK in his Jakarta office urging him to resolve the Ambon crisis quickly.

Accompanying them were a number of Ambonese and Maluku community leaders. After briefing JK, Papilaya proposed that he and the Ambonese community place before JK their high

44 Dewan Perwakilan Daerah

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expectations to resolve this conflict in the province completely, comprehensively and concretely. "We fully support your initiatives, Minister for Peoples Welfare (JK). Whatever the central government wishes, conveyed by you as Minister, as a total concept to resolve the conflict, will be impartial. The people of Ambon are weary with the current situation and yearn for peace, calm, and unity," said Papilaya.

While the Jakarta public debated what was the appropriate method to use to resolve the conflict in Ambon, JK was already in the field working trying to clear a pathway through these warring parties to peace. Farid Husein, one of JK's staff was a reliable hand in the field, had been back and forth between Jakarta and Ambon beforehand seeking out information and meeting with various fighting groups. There was only one aim to invite them to meet.

Farid Husein was highly trusted by JK as a field operator and by everyone. As a professional doctor, he applied his bed-side manner mixing comfortably with all sides in this conflict. He was able to communicate easily with anyone, and ready found ways to meet anyone. In brief, the road map and the anatomy of the conflict was already in Farid's hands well before the peace talks were announced. Because of Farid's knowledge, JK was able to design carefully his strategy and opening moves like a skilled chess game.

Detailed field information was transmitted to JK. Then an accurate strategy could be planned, complete with ways and the means of execution. The preparations, in short, were ready. JK with the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security,

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Yudhoyono, after their first meeting with the parties to the conflict on 26 January 2002 felt their efforts had not been in vain. JK had convinced both sides to come to Makassar in three days time to initiate informal talks.

It was a fantastic result. Both communities came to Makassar. The Muslim group led by K. H. Wahab Palpoke stayed at the Hotel Kenari north of the harbour while the Christian group stayed at Losari Beach Hotel some two kilometers away south of the harbour.

JK with his team, Farid Husein and myself already had started separate talks. The pre-Makassar talks commenced on 30th January 2002 at 1620 hours local time in the Tanah Beru Room of the Losari Beach Hotel. Fifteen members of the Christian group held talks with JK and his team. Following this, JK and team held talks with the Muslim group at 1930 hours at the Hotel Kenari nearby.

A breakthrough was starting to form over aspirations. Both communities agreed fully that the conflict must end forthwith and the legal issues which were associated with the conflict could be dealt with later. They all fully agreed to continue the peace talks in Makassar in the coming days to discuss the problems of security, social, economic and legal matters.

Welcoming the pre-Malino talks, Chairman of the United Family of Maluku 45 H.M. Saleh Putuhena stated his group were very optimistic about the meeting and felt that it would bear fruit. Furthermore both sides had already started to agree on points of

45 Kerukunan Keluarga Maluku

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agreement after meeting with JK in Ambon. All had agreed to end the conflict and later seek legal redress, claimed Saleh Putuhena, who was also the Rector of the State Islamic Institute of Alauddin⁴ in Makassar.

Also an optimistic outlook was shown by the Ambonese Christian group from Makassar by their leader Rev. Daniel Sopamena. These meetings showed that the peace process had started even though it was not possible for each delegation to represent all groups in their respective communities; but it reflected a desire to initiate the Ambon peace process. What was most important in this process that both sides were prepared to sit together at the same table to talk peace, said Rev. Daniel.

From this pre-meeting in Makassar JK's enthusiasm for resolving the conflict was heightened. His black plastic brief case, which he always brought with him, was now jammed packed with documents regarding Ambon and some cassettes of Ambonese songs. He continually told me that I must start listening to these cassettes of their songs so that my soul would unite with Ambon prior to the formal talks.

"Only by your thoughts and through your heart will you unite with Ambon, Hamid," JK encouraged. "Without your heart and thoughts, it is not possible understand the thinking and the hearts of Ambonese and by yourself you will never be able to resolve the Ambon conflict," JK went on.

Was this an order to listen to these Ambonese songs and read all the material on Ambon and then only then would I be qualified to join the discussions? Clearly this was not the case. JK gave me a series of

46 Institut Agama Islam Negeri Alauddin

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instructions such as: I had to contact a number of people directly or indirectly involved in this peace initiative. I was required to follow JK everywhere and note all that happened. One person whom I had to repeatedly meet and maintain contact was Major General Syafri Syamsuddin". "He knows an enormous amount about maps and the anatomy of this Ambon conflict. Keep in touch with him regularly, Hamid," instructed JK.

Apart from communicating with religious and community leaders on both sides, JK never forbade me to stop my background contacts which I set up on my own initiative. All of these all communications was beneficial in resolving the conflict. At the same time Farid Husein was told to communicate actively with his field contacts in Ambon.

On one occasion in Ambon City, when JK was chairing a meeting, my eyes caught a headline in one of the local newspapers. While bending over to read it, the paper rustled as I folded it. JK snapped at me loudly and sharply, "Try to concentrate a bit! This is serious stuff that we are discussing because it involves people's lives."

Following the meeting, JK summonsed me and cautioned me not to do anything, even read a newspaper. Apart from the ethical problem, the Ambon problem had to be taken seriously. There was to be no interruptions to our concentration.

47 Major General Syafri Syamsuddin, was born in Makassar, served in KOPASSUS, Indonesia's special forces, later served as Secretary General of the Dept of Defence and later in 2010 was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence.

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"I am sorry Pak, the paper I was reading was related to this Ambon conflict while we were in the meeting," I said feebly trying to defend myself.

"Hamid, the matters may have been the same but our friends are different. The newspaper you were just reading may not have been the same context as we were discussing. The principle is, meeting, yes meeting but no other activities," countered JK. Because this was almost a fatwa - a religious instruction - coming from JK, our captain of peace and I was just an ordinary crew member. Thus this fatwa must be observed - full stop!

The results of several meetings in Ambon and then the pre-meeting in Makassar and the incoming flow of information made JK confident. On 5 February he was so confident that even made a draft meeting program for Malino for the next round of Ambon talks, complete with invitees, times and dates and agenda subjects. Although the format and schedule derived from the first Malino talks it was similarly organized including the following diagrams. Items which fell behind on the Malino timetable which was initially planned for 11th and 12th February 2002 was changed to 17th and 18th February 2002. This delay of one week was agreed upon by both sides for greater preparation after returning from the Makassar meeting on 1st February 2002. This is the draft that JK made himself:

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Meeting Plan for the Maluku Muslim and Christian Communities.

Title: MALUKU MEETING
Subject: COMMUNITY PEACE
Date: 11-12 Februari 2002
Place: Malino, Sulawesi Selatan

Purpose: -To end the conflict
-To create peace
-To rehabilitate the social environment

Basis: Joint Directive from the ⁴Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security and Coordinating Minister of Peoples Welfare

Attendees: Leaders of the Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku
Leaders of all parties to the conflict

Muslim:

• Head of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MU) ⁴⁸	⁶ 2 persons
• Forum Chairs	2 persons
• Faction and Group Leaders	31 persons
Total	35 persons

Christian:

• Head of Maluku Protestant	2 persons
• Head of Catholic Church	2 persons
• Factions and Group Leaders	31 persons
Total	35 persons

Note: Each delegate must have full authority and responsibility from their group

Mediator

Chair: Coordinating Minister for Peoples Welfare
Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security

Members: 1. Governor of Maluku

⁴⁸ Majelis Ulama Indonesia - Indonesian Ulamas Council

2. Chairman of Provincial Parliament (DPRD) Maluku
3. Deputy Governor of Maluku
4. Governor of South Sulawesi
5. Military Commander Patimura
6. Chief of Police Maluku
7. Mayor of Ambon

Total: 8 persons

- Duties:
- Arrange and lead the meeting
 - Direct discussions
 - Take joint decisions and manage the meeting to achieve peace.

Observers:

1. Representative from the Jakarta Parliament (DPR)
2. Deputy Coordinating Minister for Politics
3. Deputy Minister for Home Affairs
4. Deputy Minister for Social Affairs
5. Deputy Minister for Religion
6. Deputy Minister for Kimpraswil"
7. Deputy Minister for National Education 8. Deputy Chief of National Police.
9. Deputy Commander of the Indonesian Army (TNI)
10. Deputy Wantannas 11. Chairman of MUI - Central
12. Chairman of PGIS - Central
13. Chairman of the Office of Church Guardians (KWIS)

Total: 13 persons

- Duties:
- Evaluate the overall process
 - Provide guidance to mediators in their role
 - Join discussions in the meeting with consent of the mediator
 - Implement meeting outcome for peace

- 49 Kimpraswil- Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah - Village and Regional Infrastructure
- 50 Dewan Keamanan Nasional - National Security Council
- 51 Persekutan Gereja-gereja Indonesia -Indonesian Churches Federation
- 52 Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia -Indonesian Church Trustees Conference

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Facilitator : Governor of South Sulawesi
Finances : Office of Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare.
Security : Chief of Police of South Sulawesi

Meeting Classification: Closed

Jakarta, 5 February 2002
Coordinating Minister for
Peoples Welfare

M. Jusuf Kalla

MEETING PROGRAM

Day/Date	Time	Program	Location
Day 1 Sunday 10-02-2002		Delegates arrive in Makassar	
	20.00-until finished		Islam: Kenari Hotel Christian: Losari Beach Hotel
			Mediator/ Observers Sedona Hotel
		Internal Meeting between Mediators and Observers	Governors Offices
Day 2 Monday 11-02-2002	07.00	Depart for Malino	
	10.00-12.00	Meeting between Mediators/Observers with Muslim Group	Hotel Celebes Malino
	14.00-16.00	Meeting between Mediators/Observers with Christian Group	Hotel Celebes Malino
Day 3 Tuesday 12-02-2002	08.00-until finished	Plenary Meeting between Muslims and Christians with Mediators and Observers	Hotel Celebes Malino

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Day 4 Wednesday 13-02-2002		Reserve time and Closure	
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MEETING AGENDA

Security:

- *End the conflict
- *Confiscation of weapons
- *Security Posts and Patrols with authorities

Social/Economic

- *Return of Refugees
- *Rehabilitation of Infrastructure and Housing
- *Rehabilitation of society and community unity

Legal:

- *Sanctions for Violations
- *Implementation of the law

Social Political:

- *Resolution of social and political matters

SUMMARY PROGRAM FOR PROPOSED MALUKU MEETING

Monday, 11 February 2002

Individual Meetings: *Muslim (10.00-12.00)
 *Christian (14.00-16.00)

Chair: Mediator

Aims: 1. To hear Muslim and Christian groups' wishes
 2. Jointly develop a unified view and proposal
 3. Reduce disinformation

Tuesday, 12 Februari 2002

Plenary Meeting

Chair: Mediator

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Program

- * Indonesia Raya - the national anthem
- * Lagu Sio Mama-a traditional Maluku folk song
- * A minute's silence for the victims of the Maluku conflict
- * A prayer for the success of the meeting
 - Muslim : MUI Maluku
 - Christian: GPN
- * Pengantar:
 - Menko Kesra
 - Menko Polkam
- * Welcome: Governor of South Sulawesi • Expectations: Governor of Maluku

- Brief Program:
 - The Maluku Conflict Problems
 - Views and Proposals
 - Commissions
 - Conclusion

COMMISSIONS

Security and Legal

- Topics:
 - Ending the Conflict
 - Socialization
 - Confiscation of Weapons
 - Joint Posts and Patrols
 - Village Level Security
 - Withdrawal of Certain Groups
 - Violation Sanctions
 - Implementation of the Law
 - Supervisory Team
- Members:
 - Maluku Police Chief (Chairman)
 - Deputy Maluku Police Chief
 - Pattimura Military Commander
 - Representative from TNI Headquarters Wakil Mabas TNI
 - Representative from Wantannas ?????

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-Deputy Maluku Governor

-Representatives from Muslim and Christian,
10 persons each.

Social Economic

Topic: - Socialization
 - Restoration of Functions
 - Rehabilitation of Infrastructure and Housing
 - Social Compensation
 - Social Problems
 - Rehabilitation of Morals, Education and Economy

Members:

-nGovernor of Maluku
- Deputy Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare
- Deputy Minister for Home Affairs
- Deputy Minister for Social Affairs
- Deputy Minister of Religion
- Deputy Minister of National Education
- MUI
- PGI ?
- KWI?
- Representatives of Muslim and Christian Groups –
10 persons each

EXPECTED MEETING OUTCOMES

- Agree to end the conflict.
- Legal process will be the basis of resolving violations
- Socialization of understanding and obedience will be agreed to
- Formation of a National and Provincial Team consisting of Area Leaders, MUI, PGI, KWI, Pattimura University, Police, TNI Headquarters and the Governor of Maluku.
- Restoration of functions

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No	Activity	Feb '02	March 02	April '02	May '02	Juny 02
1	Malino Meeting					
2	Sosialisation					
3	Surrender Weapons					
4	Village Level Agreement					
5	Joint Post/ Patrols					
6	Regional and National Review Teams					
7	Return of Refugees					
8	Infrastructure Rehabilitation					
9	Housing Rehabilitation					
10	Compensation for Victims					

This meeting outline and plan for the Malino peace talks and the task implementation above was drafted by JK and was brilliant. It highlighted his key role. He, as I experienced, started from upstream and did not cease until he got downstream. All of a sudden, this made me recall an Indonesian love song entitled "You started it, and you will finish it!"

MEETING ON NEUTRAL GROUND

From the very beginning JK was adamant that the peace talks should not take place either in

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Poso or Ambon but in a place he considered to be neutral. If the peace talks were held in the conflict area, people or groups, would attend the meeting feeling subjective. And there would be invariably interruptions which would delay meeting progress because communications between attendees and their supporters would be easy and this would certainly disturb meeting progress.

This location JK selected was to be Malino located in the highlands of South Sulawesi about 100 kilometers from Makassar. It is lush and cool. A number of talks had taken place there during Dutch colonial times and after Indonesia's independence. Both the cool climate and the attractive views contributed to rational thinking was JK's line of thought.

From a strategic point of view, in JK's mind was although the road from Makassar was readily accessible it was the only way in there. It was about an hour's drive. If there were NGO's or demonstrators who wished to interrupt the peace talks it could be easily checked being only one road into Malino.

Another point was at this meeting location there was nowhere to go and there were no other distractions. This was important for the meeting's continuity. Attendees would have to concentrate on the peace table from start to finish. In Malino, there were no theatres or shopping malls there was nothing, said Kalla. Furthermore, cell phones did not work which could hamper meeting progress.

JK's calculations were spot on. Both the Poso and Ambon meetings proceeded perfectly in Malino. Attendees from both sides fully concentrated on the business at peace table without any interruption.

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Certainly there were discussions in hotel bedrooms, restaurants and the meeting table from the beginning to when delegates returned to their respective villages.

Apart from there being no places of entertainment, the cold air made attendees prefer to stay indoors in the meeting complex. This was understandable as the climate in Poso and in Ambon from where the attendees originated was far far hotter. It was the exact opposite in Malino. The outcome was fantastic. The meeting as planned, apart from achieving its principal aim of peace, did not run over time on JK's original timetable.

Certainly, this overall approach of JK's was not without hiccoughs. When JK addressed one of the conflict groups in Ambon where he mentioned that the meeting would take place in Malino, suddenly one of them got up and yelled emotionally and red eyed, "Minister, sir! We do not agree. If you want to discuss this and are really interested in resolving this problem, we will only do so in our village, the place of the conflict. Why does it have to be so far? The costs will be great. It is a waste of the country's money."

Hearing this JK struck the table loudly pointing directly at his interlocutor. "Don't you talk about the problem of money. You know the money I have outlaid personally, quite a bit to bring you all to Malino, both there and back, is only 350 million rupiah. You torch one three-storied shop-house, it cost 450 million. How many hundreds of shop houses have you already burnt? How many churches and mosques? How many people's houses have been destroyed? How many

53 Approximately US\$35,000

54 Approximately US\$45,000

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people have been disabled, sick, wounded and killed. Count all of that! So don't you recklessly talk of costs. My response, we cannot have the meeting in the area of the conflict. Nobody will be objective. For certain at best they will be less impartial. All of you are going to Malino except you if you don't want to. Don't let me hear anymore of this," said JK in a loud and firm voice.

Witnessing JK's firm stance, the audience gave him an all round thumbs-up sign of approval. "We totally agree, Pak, to go to Malino to see your village for free," explained one cheekily.

"Excuse me Minister, our friend who rejected going to Malino, is a good fellow. He spoke like that because he thought he was being told to pay his own way and he hasn't any money. But he did not want to speak openly," stated one of the audience. Big noting! The atmosphere changed with thunderous applause.

After this heated meeting which ended on a happy note, JK summonsed me to a corner of the room. "Hamid, as a matter of principle and in the best interests of all, you cannot back-off one centimeter. Just then I had to be firm about the meeting location. Last month we completed the Poso talks satisfactorily in Malino. Now we have an excellent precedent which should be continued. The main thing now, is your duties, which are to edit all your notes from both sides. From now on you must examine the essence of what they all proposed, then summarize. This will in due course become the conclusions and the main points of this peace agreement. It is just the same as you did in Poso. For sure there will be other additions and subtractions in the upcoming Malino talks. What I have just said is simply a guideline for you when you mediate at the peace table," instructed JK.

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"This is not an order Pak but seems to have the quality more or less of a royal command. It is my duty as a field commander to obey fully. How could I be so brave as to take issue with Your Royal Highness, or even let alone refuse it?" I said in a relaxed and slightly insolent manner.

"That is your lot as a field commander, Hamid. A royal command requires no explanation let alone be refused. The main thing now is, do it!" replied JK forcefully.

"But if there are developments in the field for sure I will take command and act in accordance with the situation, Pak," I added.

"Now we are reform-minded and democratic. For sure my royal command can be flexible in accordance with our new climate of democracy. Rajas are also like that," replied JK jokingly.

LASKAR JIHAD (LJ) versus RMS⁵⁵

The peace agenda was further complicated by the attitudes of both sides as to the actual root of the problem. Their attitudes were not based really on fact but assumptions. Ironically, their convictions were extremely sensitive and actively fanned the coals of the conflict everywhere.

The Muslims believed that the source of the conflict was the RMS movement while the Christians believed it was the Laskar Jihad who triggered it. The Muslims thought the RMS, which was a separatist

⁵⁵ RMS refers to the Republic of Maluku Selatan, a group which wanted to break away from Jakarta in 1950s at the same time as parts of Sumatera and Sulawesi experienced other separatist movements.

group in the past, wanted to re-ignite their cause in Ambon as a force driven by the Christians.

The Christian assessment of the Laskar Jihad, which was lead by Ustad Jafar Umar Thalib, was a Muslim fundamentalist group which denied all other religions. Both assessments were baseless and highly sensitive and ironically did not take into account the true facts. There was not one leader or principal on either side who tried to establish the truth behind these two faulted assessments. Both intellectuals and historians as well seemed to remain silent rather than bring out the truth of the matter.

Not finished with the Laskar Jihad group after meetings with Umar Thalib or his lieutenants, then JK busied himself. What JK really wanted to know was when did Laskar Jihad become involved in this dispute in Maluku. "Knowing the date of LJ's involvement in the conflict will establish the truth or otherwise of whether LJ was the cause of the conflict. With certainty we will then find the truth," said Kalla. The result was incredible.

From consultations and from field data collected by Kalla it was clear that LJ arrived in Ambon one and a half years after the conflict erupted. This meant that LJ was not the trigger as had been previously alleged. LJ's presence in Ambon was a result of the conflict not the cause. This would pave the way for peace in Maluku, said Kalla. The problem was these suspicions could only be set right with hard field data. Once these suspicions were erased and clarified, only then could objectivity be achieved. Clarity and objectivity were the ammunition required to pacify people and was Kalla's driving principle.

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How could we side-line the issue of the RMS? Kalla instructed me to research the history of the RMS promptly and in detail. Not having an opportunity to look into this in much detail, JK suddenly call me in the middle of the night.

"Hamid, the history of the RMS has nothing at all to do with Christianity. I have turned up some interesting stuff, so first thing tomorrow drop by pick it up at my place," ordered JK.

Kalla was right. The history of the RMS has no link whatsoever with Christianity or even its politics. When the RMS was formed in the 1950s, there were four Muslim ministers one of them being Oemar Ohorella. And Selamat Riyadis, the military commander who fought against the RMS in the 1950s was a Catholic and was killed in Makassar. While many of H.V. Worang's 57 troops were Christian, many too fell to RMS forces. "All of these facts turn all assumptions of our conflict parties," Kalla informed both sides.

In one of the Malino meetings with the Muslim groups, one person who was usually associated with intellectuals, spoke fiercely alleging Christian involvement with the RMS. Without thinking long,

JK interrupted with a question, "Do you know who Oemar Ohorella is? You certainly do not know. He was a Muslim who was the midwife of the RMS," informed Kalla. Seeing Kalla's facial expression and raised voice, this attendee immediately sat down and made no further comment. The assembly fell quiet. Kalla took

56 Ignatius Selamat Riyadi became a national hero.

57 Hein Viktor Worang (1919-1982) later became Governor of Sulawesi Utara (1967-1978) and later again Inspector General of Development.

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over the discussion saying that the RMS problem was a political problem and had nothing to do with religion. "Consequently it is untrue to believe that the Maluku conflict is masterminded by the Christians. It is all wrong. I have studied this deeply," said Kalla.

An identical situation developed with the Christians. "Equally, you are confused in your thinking that the Laskar Jihad (LJ) are the masterminds behind this conflict here in Maluku. LJ came later only after the conflict was well and truly raging. Only then did LJ enter the fray. How can we get LJ out of Maluku? There is only one way and that is to end the conflict," stated JK to the Christians.

After this particular tense meeting, a priest who was attending approached me and whispered slowly to me, "Pak Jusuf sure thinks and moves fast. How come he knows the full background so quickly and thoroughly. Also he knows about the beginnings of the RMS, yes. It is really correct that the RMS involved Muslims," said this priest.

After our meeting with the Muslims I teased JK with a question. "Is it true that three Muslims founded the RMS? Would it make any difference if were more or less than these three?" I asked.

JK immediately countered, "Hamid, it really does not matter how many. What is important is the truth, that is Oemar Ohorella was a Muslim and he founded the RMS", he explained. "Perhaps, Oemar Ohorella had some sort of connection with your lecturer at the law faculty at the University Hasanuddin in Makassar who also has the same surname, Ohorella. He is also a Muslim, isn't he?" questioned JK.

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JK replies were all based on this accurate research which was ultimately very effective. Following discussion to and fro along with these facts, the issue of the RMS versus LJ gradually began to fade amongst the conflict parties and the public in general. However these two issues were to be included in the Malino Peace Agreement mainly to clarify this issue. Then the two sides could return to a peaceful co-existence without the burden of stereotyped and confusing perceptions.

The accusations and suspicions as to who was the actual source of the conflict had JK quite concerned because he wanted to adhere strictly to his pre planned agenda. For Kalla, if the issues of RMS and LJ were allowed to persist, it would continue to exacerbate the conflict making it almost impossible to extinguish; thereby allowing it to spread everywhere and escalate wildly.

For Kalla the source of the igniting spark was an integral part of the issue; not however the issue of the RMS which was easily politicized and likewise internationalized. The same went for LJ. Although both were identified as involved organizations, they both were linked to religion. Fortunately, JK saw this problem clearly and adroitly found a way out.

In this manner, when both sides met in Malino for the peace talks, the Laskar Jihada and the RMS were only brought up once. This only happened when it was desired to note this in the points of the Agreement. For both the Muslims and Christians factions they felt the Agreement was complete when they met with JK in Ambon prior to the plenary meeting agreeing to the Peace Declaration. Pastor Nathan, one of the

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subsequent signatories to the Peace Declaration and a principal from a religious group not involved in the conflict, strongly endorsed JK's logic and approach. It was nothing short of brilliant. It was an expert solution resolving the conflict.

"I was deeply moved by what JK said about the LJ and the RMS; that they were not the root cause of the conflict but were descendants of the conflict. LJ will automatically leave Ambon when the conflict is over," Pastor Nathan explained to me after the signing ceremony.

Returning to the issue of the Laskar Jihad, my friendship with Ustad Jafar Umar Thalib started to become useful. Our friendship was been close and we kept in touch over various matters. When some of his men were arrested he did not complain to me. He simply asked me that his men be treated justly in prison and asked no favours. I really appreciated the Ustad's stand.

When I was in Moscow, we continued to keep in touch by phone or SMS. His fierce face bore no relationship with his courteous manner and openness when listening to others. I am thankful for knowing him and for his friendship.

GOING OUT WITHOUT A SECURITY DETAIL

On Saturday, 26th January 2002 meetings in Ambon had just finished between the Muslims and the Christians were held separately with the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the Coordinating Minister for Peoples Welfare M. Jusuf Kalla, the National Chief of Police Dai Bachtiar along with a number of senior

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TNI and Police officers for example Lt Gen. Djamari Chaniago and Major Gen. Syafri Syamsuddin. This meeting was pretty heated with both sides criticizing the government. All of the speakers had a low opinion of our government especially regarding security. Both sides believed the government had done nothing to protect them and their focus was on the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (SBY) and also the national Chief of Police.

After the meeting the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (SBY) and his group left for Ternate in north Maluku, He was accompanied by the Muspidas minus Governor Latuconsina. JK remained in Ambon wanting continue meeting with both sides day and night. He required that each side send no more than 10 representatives for further discussions which would be held separately.

Unexpectedly, at the Governor's residence, JK asked for a car to take him to an area which was claimed to be controlled by both sides. Governor Latuconsina panicked hearing this and asked me to dissuade JK from going to this area. "Is it possible to delay this visit, Pak Hamid. I fear what could happen there. The road there is dangerous besides the location is as well. On that road there are daily shootings. How can I allow the Minister to go there. Please Hamid stop him from going there," pleaded Latuconsina emotionally.

It was impossible to change JK's mind and no one could stop him. He just wanted to go there. I had not passed on Latuconsina's plea as I already knew

58 Muspida is abbreviation for Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, the provincial council.

what JK wanted. Also, I knew very well JK's character well. It was difficult to change his mind once he had convinced himself he wanted to do something.

Panic erupted. Even the security detail had to fall in with JK's wishes. Except there were some conditions attached. JK had to be escorted by a security detail, a cautionary move. This was approved by Latuconsina. But this ran aground when JK heard of it. "There is no need for an escort and security team. Our country is safe," said JK.

The security detail were at their wits' end. They packed up their preparations for an escort and body guards. But quietly they had organized some snipers which would be strategically placed ahead prior to JK's departure.

Hearing this, JK even rejected this out of hand. "I had already said, I am the representative of the Indonesian Government which must guarantee the security and safety of every Ambonese here. I must set an example that I can travel anywhere without body guards and snipers and that it is safe to do so. How can you say that you can pacify Ambon before it feels safe. Body guards and security troops are a sign of peace in this town? They make people fearful and traumatize them. All of this continually places the community under pressure. We will go without any of them."

Finally two cars left without any escort. JK with Police Major General Simatupang, me, Dr Farid Husein and JK's adjutant in both cars. It was a bit tense at the Governor's residence that day. All eyes were on JK and the cars he wanted to use. JK's departure was accompanied by many worried feelings. Meanwhile

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all troops at the residence we ordered to be on full alert even though they were not accompanying JK.

Prior to leaving, JK asked his adjutant, "Yogi, are you armed? And how many bullets?"

Yogi, who was from the Police, immediately replied that "I have a pistol, Pak, and five bullets."

"Yes, that should be sufficient to quieten things down a bit if anything happens," replied JK.

Overhearing JK, Police Major General Simatupang added, "I have a pistol and ammunition too, Pak."

"What more do we want. We have more than enough to protect us," added JK confidently.

Once in the car, to be honest, I started to think about my own safety if anything happened. Dark thoughts drifted into my mind. All of them flooded my imagination about our safety on the road there. When we arrived at the mosque JK tried to tease me. "Hamid, don't be afraid. We have two guys with pistols. Well before they get around to shooting you, these two policemen will have shot their leaders. They are well trained to aim and shoot even though they are amateurs. Enough! Thanks to God, we will be safe," stated JK with conviction.

Once we got into this area, JK asked to go directly to the Bishop Mandagi's residence. The Bishop was greatly respected and held considerable authority and influence in the Christian community. On arrival we found that the Bishop was having his afternoon nap. The Bishop's staff were in a dither over our arrival. They ran hot and cold about waking him up but in the end JK forbade it, "Don't! I need to see the Bishop, so I will wait until he wakes. Don't wake him. Meanwhile I will chat with my friends here," instructed JK.

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Word of JK's arrival at the Bishop's place spread rapidly. Slowly several people approached JK displaying their pleasure at his visit and expressing their gratitude.

"Hey, we are blessed that Pak Minister visits us. Why didn't other officials come like Pak Minister," one of them said.

"Basically, I have come here because the Bishop is a friend of mine. I am here in Ambon to end this fighting. And I believe you all will protect me here?" said JK. "Pak Minister who would want to make trouble for you here? This is your place also. If you are troubled here, then there will never be at peace here," remarked one of the visitors.

"That is right. We all want peace," replied JK. In the midst of that discussion the Bishop appeared stooped and right away hugged JK. His eyes were still red after his nap. "I apologize for this Pak. Why wasn't I woken? I am embarrassed because you Pak Minister had to wait for me. Oh, Pak Minister I deeply apologize," said the Bishop regretfully.

"Not to matter. I did ask that you not be woken. Further, I have enjoyed chatting with my new found friends. I am here because of my friendship with you, Bishop and your friends and also to invite you all to speed up this peace process in Ambon. We all must strive together for peace, Bishop. I really feel calm here in your place. May this calm spread everywhere," said JK.

"Oh, Pak Minister, this place is your place and everyone's place. Many of our Muslim brothers have sought refuge here. Thank you for saying this is a calm

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place. We fully support your interest and efforts to create peace here. May I say that your visit here to this humble abode will be a small but important part of the overall peace process," replied the Bishop.

The discussion between the Bishop and JK was very relaxed and courteous. Naturally, JK asked for the Bishop's support from the Christian community to participate in this upcoming peace dialogue. JK's request was directly granted and the Bishop commented "The aim of religion is peace, Pak Minister. My job is to create peace which is identical to yours. Certainly, I will help and support you, Pak Minister," explained the Bishop. Those visitors were delighted to hear this exchange between the Minister and the Bishop. As we departed one by one they hugged JK and whispered their moral support to create peace in Maluku. "Pak Minister, all we want is peace," they said.

After leaving the Bishop's, JK asked to be driven to Al Taqwa Mosque, a Muslim community centre nearby. Already waiting there were a number of Muslim activists led by Kiai Haji Wahab. JK was welcomed with a hug and hundreds accompanied JK into the mosque to join in prayer. Obviously, word of JK's visit to the Bishop had spread to the mosque. They expressed their amazement that JK would venture into such a dangerous area. "This is because of God," explained JK.

Following prayers, JK was taken to a side room of the mosque to meet privately with selected Muslim leaders. The aim of this discussion was to invite them to support the Muslim community at large to come to the peace table to enter into a conclusive dialogue

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with the Christian community. JK began by outlining the meeting agenda and program. Not a soul objected. All agreed to JK's request and work program.

"If it is like that, the quicker the better, yes? Tonight I will wait for you all to come to the Governor's residence to discuss this further. I really wish for Ambon to be at peace and for the Muslim community to be able to trade, work in their offices, and come to the mosque from whatever direction without worry or fear," said JK.

"Amen...." they all welcomed. Then all of a sudden they all recited "God is great!....."

JK felt great relief. Now both these fighting communities had given a firm commitment to support the peace dialogue. Furthermore, during the visit to the Christian community nothing untoward had happened which had been a worry earlier on. JK was welcomed peacefully and with promises. Finish! One mission accomplished.

After midnight JK, Farid Husein and I had not yet gone to bed. I started ribbing JK with a question: "What did Pak use when visiting the Christians? It was all peaceable?"

"I applied intelligence and conviction, Hamid," replied JK.

"What do you mean?" I asked.

"Both forts are weary from fighting and now really want to live in peace and they all know I am here to make this peace happen. As they both want this, for certain they will not wish to harm me; they have high hopes of me. That's my estimate," replied JK. "For certain you were afraid, Hamid. I noticed you were very quiet. What was there to be afraid of?" said JK.

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"Bapak you can afford to be fearless because Bapak because you have everything plus children to carry on your name. I haven't any kids, so there is no guarantee of continuity of my name. Further Bapak is well off, and if anything did happen it is everything is secure for your family. I am a civil servant, a nobody, whose family would lose everything if anything happened to me," I replied to JK.

"All of this is in the hands of God. You have promised me that whatever I did in Ambon you would follow me and give me all the support I needed. That was your promise," challenged JK and went on, "Like this, 'Mid: Just then I insisted we went there to demonstrate to all in Ambon that it was completely safe. Even a Muslim Minister can go into a Christian area unhindered. It is a moral message. There were two reasons why I could be attacked. First, I am a Muslim and second I am a representative of our government. Already you have seen how our government is totally cornered here. All of this I am compelled to oppose and present a new image of Ambon as a quiet peaceful city. So I was not afraid of them," explained JK. "I went straight to the Muslim community afterwards to erase any suspicions that in any way I was favouring the Christians. Thanks to God, this meant that both communities welcomed us warmly. The men at the mosque already knew we had visited the Bishop beforehand. Obviously, both were pleased that we had visited both," continued JK.

"Pak, why didn't want an escort, guards and snipers?" I asked.

"If we did that they would think we were worried and afraid. Once we were characterized as being

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afraid it would then be claimed that our peace efforts were insincere. Sincerity cannot be a bed fellow other stratagems, including stratagems of loss and fear. As I have coached you in the past, before you make a move, we pray and surrender all to the Almighty. That is what I did just then. If I did not go there or go there with all kinds of security in tow, hey, this would have ended our credibility totally. It is certain that news of our visit and that we were not afraid of the anti-peace factions has already spread like wild-fire. This is our style of bringing peace to them," affirmed JK. "Hamid, you look tired. Go and get some sleep now. Tomorrow we will start again. I am always amazed with you. They say you like playing badminton but you also really like sleeping," remarked JK before heading off to bed.

ORIGINS OF THE SPARK

This horizontal conflict in both Poso and Ambon gave rise to many riddles and many analyses. For expert political analysts it was easy for them to state this was simply that they were clashes in both places between political interests, derived mainly from the Jakarta elite. Others countered, this was just a microcosm of current world politics where superpowers wanted to impose their will on other and others who opposed this sort of hegemony; and international terrorism was a favoured tool of both sides.

One of these political commentators claimed that these two conflicts arose because of the institutional separation of the armed forces (ABRI) and the Police.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ The Indonesian Police (POLRI) separated from the ²² Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI-Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) in April 1999 and placed under the President.

Consequently, the armed forces demonstrated that the Police were unable to keep the peace. Only the armed forces could do it. Others were more outspoken and critical. Both the Poso and Ambon conflicts were triggered by TNI personnel who were frustrated with the results of reformation⁶⁰ which had marginalized TNI's role in Indonesian politics. Even the academics had their say as well. One assessed the conflict in Poso and Ambon was just as Samuel Huntingdon predicted - a clash of civilizations. Huntingdon claimed that after the bipolar system of the Cold War clouded over and the USA emerged as the only superpower the world's future would be marked by a clash of civilizations. This could appear either as religious conflicts or as ethnic conflicts and so on.

There were those who claimed that the conflict in both places was a sign of government weakness and lack of state authority in implementing its role as peace keeper.

Facing these varied assessments, JK readily pointed out that it was improbable that TNI personnel ignited the conflicts as many of their personnel had been wounded or killed in these conflicts. The same went for the Police. That Police personnel were involved and not impartial was not logical because this was a SARA⁶¹-based conflict. SARA conflicts always caused subjectivity.

JK later felt that ignition point in both conflicts was not from any external factor but some domestic factor that happened in Poso and Ambon. Foreign

⁶⁰ Reformation refers to the period following the downfall of President Suharto in 1998.

⁶¹ SARA refers to an abbreviation for ²⁵ Suku, Agama, Ras dan Aliran - tribe, religion, race and descent

involvement only derived from the domestic problem. These domestic problems continued for a long time, but had not found a suitable outlet or explanation. For JK there were several more factors to consider.

Firstly, over the past ten years or so there had been a change in the demography in Poso. Previously, several areas there were dominated by Christians, Slowly and imperceptibly the demography changed with Muslims increasing displacing Christians. This was a direct result of the construction and opening of the Trans-Sulawesi Highway.⁶² The construction work mobilized many migrants from South and South East Sulawesi which were Muslim areas. The land around Poso was very fertile. Like all migrants, they persevered and worked hard to survive, and in ten years had become the middle class in the area. Because of this, their economic power was now greater than the original inhabitants.

Automatically, these migrants' children had better education. These were the main factors probably contributing in their rapid vertical mobility.

While this process of vertical mobility continued there was no conflict. Once the rewards of their efforts were gained and became apparent, only then did this change disturb others. This is the point where the conflict ignited.

Kalla's thesis was well supported by field data both in Poso and particularly so in Ambon where it was not a religious conflict at all. What became a central catch call in Poso at that time was "Kick Out the BBM - Bugis, Butonese and Makassarese". While in Ambon

⁶² The Trans Sulawesi Highway runs from Makassar in the south-west right through Central Sulawesi to Manado in the north-east a distance of almost 2,000 Km.

the trigger was more specific when a young Bugis bus conductor bickered with some locals.

It was clear that religion was simply a pall bearer, and a tool to strengthen each sides case against the other. Kalla comprehended fully that religion in this conflict situation was a very effective weapon to deploy. The problem was that people easily lost their self-control defending themselves both as individuals and as a group.

This issue of religion caused the conflict to escalate high-lighting differences. Religions certainly have their differences between one another. In one religion alone there are numerous differences in forms of worship. So the Poso and Ambon conflicts were not really religious conflicts at all.

In Ambon again, changing demography also played a crucial role. These newcomers from South and South East Sulawesi, after a decade or so became a significant middle class starting from the very bottom in the service industry or retailing. Gradually, over ten years or so their lot improved displacing locals.

With this demographic change Ambon itself naturally changed. Previously land holders, including clove plantations, were generally Christian owned. The only choice for Muslims was education and government service. As a result, a decade or more later, their investment in education began to show results. Those who left Ambon temporarily to seek higher education returned and took up positions in the provincial government.

At this time, in the era of President Suharto, one of his children Tommy Suharto dominated the

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economic sector in Indonesia. At that time the BPPC⁶³ was formed a monopoly which controlled the distribution and marketing of cloves throughout Indonesia. Predictably, our brothers and sisters in Maluku suffered financially. Prior to the formation of BPPC in 1991, the clove price stood at Rp 10,000⁶⁴ per kilogram and after the formation of BPPC the price collapsed to Rp 2,700 per kilogram. The Christian communities suffering was total after all these years in control of Maluku clove production.

From this perspective, the Christian community was structurally sidelined in Ambon society. These newcomers from the west suddenly had become the middle class, were Muslim, well educated and starting to occupy important positions in provincial government. Here was the ignition point in the Ambon conflict JK explained on many occasions.

A sociologist said to us about JK's thesis that the whole of the Indonesian social science community should bow their heads in shame for not getting it right. The problem was the Poso/Ambon conflict was always seen from the view point of practical politics and superficial observations. Not one of them had looked at the deeper structural aspects as JK had done.

On several occasions I ribbed JK with a questions like this. "Pak, what research institution did you use to find out these problems in Poso and Ambon; like you always bring up?"

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⁶³ Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh- The Clove Buffer Stock and Marketing Board - was formed in 1991

⁶⁴ A fall from about US\$5.00 to US\$1.35 per kilogram at the prevailing exchange rate of about Rp2,000= US\$1.

"Ah come off it, Hamid. You always think of the complicated and complex. It is not necessary to use difficult theories to find an answer. I just use common sense to come to these conclusions. I just use simple straight forward calculations starting from working out their incomes from clove sales price pre-BPPC and after," explained JK. "I only need to see and ask population numbers in each area. Then ask how many newcomers, when they came, how they lived from the time they came until now. That is all. Not really scientific eh? Don't forget, 'Mid, I have a number of Toyota agencies in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. And also do not forget I have many times crossed through these areas when I was a contractor on the Trans Sulawesi Highway. Remember?" said JK.

"Therefore, Pak, did not use a proven sociological methodology at all," I suggested. "Ah, that is your job at university. Now I challenge you. You do your proven scientific research. The result will be the same as mine. Poso and Ambon conflicts are caused by demographic changes. That is the core of the problems. I will pay you to show me research which contradicts my thesis, Hamid. Usually, we sponsor research to discover something. Now I come back at you. I, as the sponsor of this research, want you come up with material to counter the sponsor's thesis. Let's go. Give us your proposal," replied JK.

The second factor, especially in Poso was the system of recruitment of the provincial elite civil servants which underwent a simultaneous change with the political changes following President Suharto's resignation in 1998.

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Adopting this view, JK was convinced that prior to this, for those became regents or associates, the selection process took into account population composition and the balance between ethnicity and religion. Now this was difficult to achieve as it could be likened to the mechanism of a market with a liberal democratic system. In our political system now the winner takes all. "Lateka, who commanded the Black Bats, once stood for election as regent of Poso but lost," related JK.

The result of this open democratic system like this is that it is difficult to find a suitable role for the loser. JK openly discussed this line of thinking with a number of western ambassadors including the US ambassador. "This is the kind of democracy you have forced us to adopt in our country," said JK on one occasion.

In JK's mind an open electoral system was extremely suitable for a community which would accept an electoral win over a defeat. The problem we faced with this open system was in many places frequently electoral losers were not big hearted enough to accept defeat and congratulate the winner and offer their support.

The third factor, both in Poso and Ambon, an effective weapon successfully used in the violence was religion. Here religion was used as tool to deny the beliefs of those considered to be opponents. In a manipulative fashion, religion was used a vehicle to gain entrance to heaven. For anyone, especially those who primarily believed they would not enter heaven for past sins, this call encouraged them to join the fight as it

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promised entrance to heaven. This temptation of entering heaven fueled their spirit to murder one another.

Both sides unilaterally claimed to possess the only truth and denied the other. To strengthen their claim of holding the only truth both sides reacted irrationally, no longer caring if they acted in an arbitrary manner or murdered one another. Unilateral claims originated in confused and unclear issues of the past.

Along with these themes and offers of entrance to heaven, government policy at the start of the conflict was made difficult by Gus Dur,⁶⁵ then President of Indonesia. Not only was Gus Dur not serious about taking any action in this bloody conflict but he was inclined to let it be.

Basically, the problem was Gus Dur made a public statement that the Indonesian government would not become involved in the conflict or take any steps to end the conflict because the communities had their own ways and mechanisms to resolve the problem. As the Poso and Ambon problems were community problems, Gus Dur's stand was it was up to their respective communities to resolve their problems. For what reason would the government wish to become involved when the communities could attend to it themselves?

This statement and attitude of the President tied the hands of the security forces to a large extent. This ignition spark may have been quickly extinguished if the President had not said this or had that attitude.

⁶⁵ Gus Dur is the nick name for K.H. Wahid Abdurrachman, President from 1999 to 2001

As Gus Dur's statement was considered government policy by both sides, the starting gong was sounded for a war without the slightest fear of state intervention. Both sides then only focused on facing off and destroying one another. No one considered confronting the government at the same time.

It is not surprising that both the Poso and the Ambon conflicts had an agenda for external support. These groups fighting to destroy one another sought reinforcement from outside the province and the nation. This happened purely because the state clearly did not want to become involved in this conflict Ambon and Poso.

The absence of any state presence in this life and death struggle even gave the two groups no alternative but to open themselves up to outside help even at a minimal level just to defend themselves.

A similar logic and spirit drove these outsiders in their participation in the conflict. Seeing this lack of state presence in the conflict, compelled these outsiders to assist as if they did not their local group would be destroyed. So the outsiders motive was only to save and help their respective communities purely because the state could provide no guarantees.

This fact was confirmed by Agus Dwikarna, one of the leaders of the Laskar Jundullah who were deeply involved in the Poso conflict. "Yes, how was it possible that we would not come to Poso. Our Muslim brothers and sisters were under threat and nobody would protect them," related Agus on one occasion to me. The same was explained to me by Ustad Jafar Thalib, leader of the Laskar Jihad who were deeply involved in the Ambon conflict. "How was it possible

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that we were not involved if the state was unable to give any guarantees of protection to our Muslim brothers and sisters. We did all of this because the government failed in its function as guarantor of physical and spiritual security. This conflict is a matter of life or death, Bung⁶⁶ Hamid. So we have to be here to guarantee the safety of our Muslim brothers and sisters from arbitrary killing. I want to ask you Bung⁶⁶ Hamid is there any truth that the government gave any security guarantees in Ambon? The state was not anywhere to be found! Fortunately, Pak Jusuf Kalla wanted to represent the government and take any and all risks. Thank you!" explained Ustad Jafar Umar Thalib.

"Here, if Kalla, representing the government helps, we too will be consistent. We will withdraw on our own. All LJ networks and personnel we will order to go provided the government is serious about giving adequate security guarantees. We will fulfill this commitment," the Ustad added.

AN UNFORGETTABLE NIGHT

Our flight had just landed in Jakarta at 10.30 p.m. JK and I had just arrived from Ambon from our peace initiative there.

"Hamid, are you up to it? We have to go straight to work tonight. We cannot waste a moment because we have to do it all. We have to meet a group who do not fully support this peace efforts of ours one hundred percent," said JK.

"Who are we meeting and where?" I enquired.

⁶⁶ *Bung* in an Indonesian term for brother. It was extensively used by Sukarno in his fiery revolutionary speeches.

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"You will see in a while. Their place is over in Kemang," partially explained JK.

JK's driver, Machmud, drove the car at high speed on JK's instruction. We were concerned that the people we wished to meet may have already arrived and be waiting for us.

I was nervous wondering what sort of secret mission I was being asked to participate in. Shortly after landing, JK asked me to ring my wife and let her know I would not be coming straight home.

I was nervous and full of questions with JK asking me repeatedly to be calm. It is all up to The Almighty. JK even asked me to recite *dzikir*⁶⁷ in the car to calm my nerves. Honestly that night I suddenly became afraid doubting what we were about to face in the coming hours and minutes. My fear broke when JK addressed me.

"Mid, when we get there you just be quiet, yes? Don't speak unless I invite you to do so. God willing, all our good intentions will be blessed by God," JK said seriously. "Don't be nervous. It is nothing. Certainly it is a serious matter but it must be done behind closed doors. Consequently, I have only invited you for this mission tonight," said JK.

"Aye, aye, sir. Your crew is ready to take orders," I replied.

"Now that's a good crew member," reacted JK. We arrived in Kemang at about 11.30 p.m. The people we wished to meet were already there and waiting. On arrival we were greeted by Achmad Kalla, JK's younger brother. We then shook hands with four men wearing turbans and white robes. I was

⁶⁷ *Dzikir* is the repeated recital of affirmation of one's faith in Islam.

extremely nervous when I spotted two of them had something long behind their backs; instinctively I knew it was swords.

Following a short exchange of courtesies, JK invited them to sit. Of these four robed men, only two came in to talk with JK. The other two stood outside erect, at attention and on guard.

I sat on the left of JK and on my left sat Achmad Kalla and in front of us sat the two men in their following white robes.

"Excuse us we are exhausted travelling all day from Ambon. I am not physically tired but mentally tired. The problem is I have used up all possibilities to seek peace amongst them. I have asked you to join these peace talks," said JK.

"It is like this Pak, we must understand the aspirations of the Muslim community in the Ambon conflict. Bapak it is best you recognize there are many problems which need to be addressed before coming to the peace table. The peace meeting is the easiest part of all, Pak, but these problems will not be solved by just meetings," said one of the turbaned men.

Suddenly JK smacked the table. "Best not try to teach me about Muslim aspirations, yes! Islam always loves peace and the Muslim community in Ambon desperately wants peace. Don't find excuses of this or that. There is not one Muslim who does not want peace because with peace they can go to the mosque anytime they like. With peace Muslims can have good relationships with everyone. You know for Muslims good relationships have a very important meaning. In short, I do not want to know your excuses. Peace must be announced unconditionally," said JK firmly.

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I must admit I was a bit taken aback with JK's sudden outburst. These two turbaned gents changed their expressions smartly. Perhaps they did not expect such as response like that.

"Really, Pak, we need time for preparations. All of us will go there. The problem for us is that the grass roots must be taken care of. The Muslim community in Maluku is under considerable pressure, Pak. Who else can protect them, Pak?" replied one of them very carefully.

"By supporting this peace initiative of mine, this means that the Muslim community will be protected. I tell you do not worry about my commitment to Islam. You can ask and check my record in this area from my old man down to my kids. If you think the Maluku Muslims are under pressure, let us now go and find a way out of this for them. The only way is to create peace. That is the only way," continued JK.

Further JK came back saying only preparations needed were for war. "If you want peace, no preparations are needed. If you want peace, make peace. Why do you need this preparation and that preparation. What I want to hear from you is that the Muslim community in Ambon are sincere in their desire to live in peace?"

"If you put it like that, Pak, we really want the Ambon Muslim community to live in peace," replied one of the turbaned men.

"So what is holding you back? If your commitment is peace, then peace it is! Don't fool about saying grassroots this and grass roots that. I am fully conversant with conditions in Maluku. I have already

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established contact with all groups in Ambon and they are all ready to leave for Malino," replied JK.

"Excuse us Pak, this is not a normal problem. We went to Ambon because our brothers and sisters were being tyrannized. We want to protect them. This is our religious obligation," explained this turbaned man.

"The problem is simple. You took a simple action. Isn't making peace a religious obligation? Bung, making peace is a pre-eminent act of religious devotion in the eyes of God. If you want to protect Muslims then you must crusade for peace. Just don't look for excuses!" JK went on.

"It is getting on. It's after one. I am exhausted. Do you want to join the peace talks or not? It is up to you. With you or without you, I am going ahead with the peace talks. I respect your position if you do not wish to attend but do not dare try and interfere with the talks. Or you will have to face me! In short, take it or leave it. Hamid, let's go," said JK closing the discussion.

After such an emphatic comment, I thought JK was feeling a bit glum about this exchange when bidding goodbye. I had it wrong. JK shook hands with them smiling exuding warmth. Peace be with you, said JK, proceeding to his car. These four were the representatives of the Laskar Jihad who has arranged to meet JK!

Once in the car, I told JK I was taken aback when he struck the table in front of him.

"It merel a symbolic show of firmness, Hamid. The main thing is you make extensive notes of this. You, Hamid, are not just a witness to history but an actor in it. Your name will be recorded. Who

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knows in the future your kids may read your name in their school books as a peace maker. Terrific, eh? I have made a way for you to get in the history books," teased JK.

"Pak Ucup, in that meeting you were a bit fierce. I felt very nervous right throughout that bitter and tense meeting. You don't think there is any risk of a backlash? Pak, for certain it will be one night in my life I will never forget," I told JK.

"Like that eh? If you want to become a leader, you have to be ready to take risks, especially if it involves people. There are always risks and never back away from them or avoid them if you have to make decisions. Good leaders are those who bravely take risks. All risks are the price you pay for making a decision. And you have to be ready to pay! In this case it involves the lives of many people, Hamid. We must be prepared to face all these costs to create peace here. Importantly, making peace requires the utmost sincerity. Not for any other reason than that. God will not give you his blessing in the future," replied JK.

I did not notice the car driven by Machmud was on its way back to the Hotel Sahid in Jalan Sudirman, Central Jakarta. JK dropped me there to find a taxi to take me home to Pondok Kelapa, East Jakarta. "Take it easy, 'Mid, yes? Tomorrow we have to continue on with our work," said JK while handing me one million rupiah⁶⁸ for the taxi fare. I joked, "This is not for a taxi fare but to buy the taxi?" JK quick as a flash replied, "Yes, for peace, if necessary I will buy you a taxi company."

⁶⁸ About US\$100.

After getting into the taxi I was oblivious to my journey home. I slept comfortably until we got to my place at nearly three in the morning. After three hour's sleep, JK rang asking me to come to his office immediately to continue our peace endeavours.

One of my duties in Malino on the second day of the Maluku talks was to lobby the representatives of each of the parties to get them to accept beforehand the draft peace agreement.

That night I had to sleep in JK's bedroom. "Let me sleep in my own room, Pak. I am worried that I will disturb you during the night," I said evasively. "Hamid. This is an order from your commander.

As crew you cannot refuse. The document you have drawn up is very important and very sensitive. Thus, I do not want anyone disturb your concentration let alone you have an extremely important role. You must be guarded 24 hours a day. And as we do not sufficient security so you have to share mine. Now go to sleep inside. After midnight you have an important meeting with them," instructed JK.

"So I am taking charge, no? Bapak," I asked. "Yes. Just a swap. Now you act for me. Your role in very important. You will be tested this evening - success or failure. Convince both sides to accept unreservedly all the points in your agreement. But only 11 points, yes?" said JK.

Later I learned that JK gave me full authority to chair the meeting between the two fighting sides was not without good reason. For JK, if he chaired

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the meeting and there was a deadlock there was no further mechanism to correct such an event. If I chaired the meeting and there was a deadlock there was again hope that it could be appealed to JK.

The time had arrived: Five representatives for both the Muslim and Christian sides entered the meeting room, sat down facing one another. I sat at the head with Saleh Latuconsina, the Governor of Maluku, on my right. JK was sound asleep in his room.

I distributed the document around the table to all, giving them 10 minutes to read it. Latuconsina shook his head reading the agreement.

"Pak Hamid, how can this document contain all their wishes?" queried Latuconsina politely.

"This is JK's style: Simple and logical, Pak Gov," I replied.

After ten minutes, I broke into a smile and announced: "Gentlemen. Thank you for coming and thank you for your willingness to continue our peace dialogue. This document which is front of all of you, please give me your inputs. It is still a bit wordy. Let us try and chop it down to 11 points instead of 17 as it stands at the moment."

My hopes evaporated instantly. It was not the reaction I expected. Both sides returned to swinging their axes of anger, mutually accusing the other of wrongs. The past came up and seemed to be unending. Governor Latuconsina was attacked by both sides.

I was utterly amazed at Saleh Latuconsina's demeanour and patience while under attack. There was not a flicker of emotion on his face. He just nodded smiling. He responded politely saying, "If you feel I am in the wrong in this peace process, I accept it

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and acknowledge all of it. What is important above all it that you are willing and want to make peace. I am prepared to accept any risks provided you gentlemen move to peace as quickly as possible," he stated.

While both sides continued slanging at one another, Saleh whispered to me slowly, "Be patient, Pak Hamid. Ambonese are always like this. Loud voiced and always seem to be fighting. Just quieten them, Pak," advised Salleh.

I made no comment. I let them splurge their anger on one another. Suddenly the meeting room became even more rowdy and heated while in contrast the dawn air outside was very quiet and cold.

After an hour like this, I loudly interrupted: "Gentlemen, all of you, I have been charged by Jusuf Kalla to chair this meeting as his substitute. I have been further charged to present this document to you and not hear and witness you brawling, "I said firmly. After saying this, one of the attendees spoke without my permission. "There is no point in speaking about all these points. We need to resolve to core of the problem," he said fiercely.

Seeing our meeting was starting to run wild I banged the table. "Gentlemen, if you do not want peace, OK. I do not want to waste my time hear hearing your anger. I remind you we all agreed to come here to discuss, then agree to peace. We have all agreed to end the anger and stop delving into the past. If you gentlemen do not want to discuss this document, OK we will close this meeting now and you can go back to your villages. There is no point remaining quiet. At dawn I will be meeting with the

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press and I will announce you gentlemen do not want peace," I went on.

At this juncture the meeting became quiet immediately.

Seeing this Governor Latuconsina asked to speak. "Pak Hamid. Gentlemen, all of you. I think Pak Hamid's explanation is clear enough. We do not wish to talk about the past but want to strive for peace. The way to do this was for you to give Pak Hamid inputs on his draft document which has been circulated. That's all. Excuse us, Pak Hamid, my friends here are usually like this, going around in circles first but then come back to the point. Yes, it is like that, isn't it?" he enquired of the meeting.

Hearing this, one of the audience raised his hand wishing to speak. I asked his fellow attendees to focus only of the draft peace agreement in front of them.

This time discussion speeded up; no more slanging and no more reactions. All provided pertinent comment on the document.

After about an hour, both sides agreed to the draft peace agreement with only 13 points to be included. There were to be no further changes. I accepted this and advised that the meeting would continue in the morning before the plenary session -unanimous agreement.

Carefully I crept into JK's bedroom to sleep. He was sound asleep.

After morning prayers, JK woke me and asked to be briefed on the meeting. Rather proudly I said "Very successful, Pak. They all accepted the draft. Furthermore, they wanted only 13 points not the 17 anymore."

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"Yes, you were successful getting from points to 13. But failed getting to 11. You can be granted credit for this. All went well last night?" enquired JK.

I then set out in detail for JK an outline and the tenor of last night's meeting from my opening to the way they spoke. He smiled coyly but knowingly while I related the events.

Without waiting long, JK called for a meeting of all the delegates to last night's meeting to discuss the agreed peace agreement.

JK needed only half an hour. All the delegates agreed to the document but now with only 11 points. JK succe in cutting two points. Shaking hands over their agreement had started early that morning.

"How do you like it, Mid? Half an hour. All fixed! You were late last night. Now it is my turn to ask for your thanks for what I did this morning in such a short time," said JK joking.

That was the story behind the Maluku peace talks.

KALLA'S SHIRT FROM MALINO MARKET

The evening before the signing of the Maluku peace treaty in Malino everything was under control. Security was tight. The mass media's demand for news was incessant. All sort of visitors flooded into Malino, including JK's wife, children and grandchildren. They lodged at a private house distant from the meeting location.

A problem arose when JK asked his wife, "Ida, where is the shirt I was to wear tomorrow morning?" JK's wife remembered she had forgotten to bring this particular shirt.

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"Sorry, Pak. I totally forgot. Look I will contact Makassar so they can send it up. It will get here tonight," explained JK's wife.

"Don't bother. Go to the market here and see what you can find. They are sure to have something suitable. Yes, buy something from a Malino trader," said JK.

So rather late, JK's wife went to the local market to find a shirt for him to wear the following day for the signing ceremony which would end this three year conflict. Fortunately, one shop was still open.

"Here is your new shirt, Pak. I am nearly half dead searching for one in the market," exclaimed JK's wife handing over the shirt.

"Hey, this is a nice shirt. How much was it?" he asked.

"The main thing it is good eh? What more do you expect from Mama. The price was Rp27,500⁶⁹," his wife replied.

The tale of the shirt quickly got into the hands of the press. The next morning the press watched and wanted to know how come the shirt that JK was going to wear at this peace signing ceremony was purchased in the village market for only Rp 27,500.

Feeling he was obviously the focus of attention by the press, JK asked, "So you want to know about my shirt eh? This shirt was certainly bought in the local market. The quality is good. And it was inexpensive," related JK.

"Pak, is it nice on?" asked one of the journalists.

"Very nice. Our local garments are great. The cloth quality is good and the ready-made clothing is being

⁶⁹ About US\$3.00 at the time.

exported. It sure is comfortable. You lot better go to the market and buy some like mine," jested JK.

"So Pak, to pacify these people all it takes is a shirt worth Rp27,500,"taunted another journalist.

'Yes, my shirt only cost that much, but the price of peace is far far higher," replied JK.

JK SETS THE RULES OF ORDER

Prior to the meeting JK called me. "Hamid, for sure this Ambon peace meeting is going to be more difficult that the Poso one. The problem is, apart from substance, is one of personality. Both will continue to slang at one another with high emotion. You must moderate this meeting to ensure the meeting is conducted in an orderly manner. Both sides will have to submit to our rules of order," affirmed JK.

To arrange this JK gave me only one hour. "Hamid, arrange the rules of order for our meeting. "Hamid, meeting rules of order is just level one of HMI⁷⁰ basic training. Now you have to do this in an hour. No more! I want to know your skills whether you still remember your HMI lessons," checked JK.

OK, Pak. I will do it. Who would be brave enough to refuse you," I flicked back. "Sure that is the risk of being crew, Hamid. One day you will become a commander. Before that occurs, in the meantime you will have to learn and train to become a competent crew member," responded JK.

⁷⁰ HMI is an abbreviation for *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* the Muslim Students Confederation which apparently JK and Hamid belonged to at some stage

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As a loyal crewman, I followed JK's orders forthwith. Finding a quiet spot away from the hurly burly of all the peace meeting arrivals, I found a place to draft. The result was as follows:

MALINO MEETING
11-12 February 2001
Rules of Order

- Every meeting is a closed meeting except as decided by the meeting.
- This Malino Meeting will be attended only by a mediator, participants and observers.
- Each meeting will be chaired by Head of the Moderators Team except as decided by the meeting.
- The types of meeting will be Group Meetings, Commission Meetings and a Plenary Meeting.
- Resolutions will be taken by consensus.
- Each participant is entitled to attend all meetings except as decided by the meeting.
- The Mediators are the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare as Chairman, the Governor of South Sulawesi, the Governor of Maluku, the Chairman of the Maluku Provincial Council (DPRD), the Military Commander of Maluku, the Maluku Chief of Police and the Mayor of Ambon.
- The Participants are representatives from Muslim and Christian groups numbering 35 each.
- The Observers are representatives of government departments, religious organizations, community organizations along with qualified community leaders.
- Each and every participant has the right to speak along with other participants.
- Each and every observer is allowed make suggestions and attend all meetings.

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- For the orderly conduct of the meeting when any participant wishes to speak, they must have permission of the chair and is not allowed to interrupt other speakers.
- The chair has the right to caution and stop a speaker if he is being too lengthy or is attacking other participants or other parties.
- Each participants is required to respect other participants when presenting their opinions and each participant is required to present their case in a courteous manner, not provocative, nor offending others sensibilities nor their dignity.
- All participants or their associates who wish to leave the meeting when it is underway must seek permission of the chair.
- All participants and other attendees are required to be punctual.
- Each group will be headed by their delegation leader as determined by their respective delegations.
- All attendees are required to wear an identification tag which will be arranged by the organizing committee.
- Each attendee and their associates are required to observe these rules of order fully.

In less than an hour I had this done with no further corrections from JK. Problem solved? Now I was confused. JK then asked me to slowly contact all key figures. "Getting prior acceptance is your job so that they all know and understand that this meeting proceeds in an orderly manner. Remember the success of this meeting depends entirely on that bit of paper you are holding," said JK.

Without wasting a moment I started doing the rounds. Not one objected. There was not one query of these rules of order.

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"We come here in the framework of discussing peace, Pak Hamid. We will all follow *Daeng*⁷¹ Ucup's direction" said Thamrin Ely, one of the Muslim leaders.

Hendrikus, one of the Christian leaders said, "These rules of order are very important to ensure the smooth conduct of our meeting, Pak Hamid. We totally agree."

Just before midnight I had completed seeking prior agreement of the rules of order for the meeting; and cold air of Malino started to bite. I walked slowly towards my hotel room. JK was sitting outside his room on the verandah obviously waiting for me. I found it hard to consider that JK had not gone to bed as it was so late. He clearly wanted to know before he did so that all was under control.

"How did you go? Don't tell me they all rejected it - the rules of order," JK greeted me.

"Done. All accepted and support the rules of order and will discuss in the meeting tomorrow morning," I replied. "Now it seems that you have more than passed the basic level of HMI training for rules of order. You have passed the intermediate level by convincing them all," said JK.

"If that's the case, then please initial this draft, Pak," I asked JK.

"What for?" asked JK.

"So that this draft is approved by you, Bapak," I said.

"The rules of order are for them, not for me. Your thinking is wrong. You should be asking them all to initial the draft. Any rate the initialing is unnecessary.

⁷¹ *Daeng* is an honorific Bugis title. Ucup is of course a nickname for Jusuf.

What is important they have agreed to accept it and be bound by these rules of order so we do not run all over the place in the meeting tomorrow," said JK. "Now you have earned your right to a good night's sleep so you will be fresh in the morning," JK invited.

The next morning the meeting started with JK in the chair. Cleverly JK stated first up that seeing both sides had agreed to this meeting, then both sides would observe the rules of order for the meeting.

"You have the draft of the rules of order which have been agreed to last night so there is no further need to discuss these. What is important we start the meeting, opened JK.

After the meeting I asked JK why he did not discuss any further the rules of order. "Hamid, if we discussed them we would be wasting more time going through it word for word. What is important they all know they are bound by these rules of order. Remember at HMI they all raced and jostled to speak about the rules of order," explained JK.

This strategy of JK's worked well. He then went straight into the substance of the meeting which went off smoothly. He himself chaired all meetings that day from the start to the finish. Later I teased him saying, "Bapak, you yourself were the rules of order. Everything went smoothly because you chaired the meeting strictly and firmly more than my draft rules of order."

"Oh like that eh, you think? So I set the rules of order to have a disciplined and orderly meeting? I succeeded in bringing them all into line. It all went very smoothly?" reacted JK.

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ALL ON THE SAME BASIS

This highly well thought out strategy of finding points of agreement of JK's in resolving both the Poso and Ambon conflicts was again applied later in Aceh as an initial basis for moving forward. In both these peace initiatives JK never started from the aspect of their differences. "It was the differences that made them clash in the first place and then will be impossible to resolve. We must start from all aspects they agree upon first. That will be the basis for our coming meeting with them," claimed JK.

Particularly in the Ambon case, JK made two pages of notes which he classified as "confidential". These were handed to me to be used as guidelines to initiate the Ambon peace talks. (Refer notes below)

From these two pages it was clear that JK had started to assess the similarities of both sides. After arranging a series of separate meetings with both sides. JK took on board all these similarities: both wished to end the violent conflict by dialogue, both wished the law to be upheld and applied justly, both agreed that refugees be repatriated to their villages and both agreed to immediate rehabilitation of infrastructure and local economy as well resolving internal problems of TNI and the Police.

With these similarities JK was convinced he could end the conflict in Eastern Indonesia.

"These four aspects are the fundamental factors to resolve this conflict in Ambon. Statistically, perhaps the differences are greater than the similarities but the main point is that both want to end the conflict by dialogue. What more can we ask of them? We have the substance," said JK in one press conference.

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Especially, in the Ambon situation, both sides were in agreement that one of the problems in their conflict was the internal problems of both TNI and the Police and that this should be resolved internally by both TNI and the Police. When I asked JK about this he replied briefly, "In any and all religious conflicts all parties are not going to be impartial. Our job is to end the fighting so that there no further polarization. All of this will come together once the fighting stops," affirmed JK.

Armed with these similarities, JK then explored ways and means to put these matters in perspective for all the parties. Thus, when discussion touched upon differences JK brought them back to their similarities. It was a fantastic result. These differences were considered by both sides only to be a result of the conflict not the substance of the conflict. As a result, the Ambon conflict could be settled while many at the time worried incessantly it would never happen.

In these two pages, JK's stance is clear to create a complete recipe complete with spices and then cook and serve it for the homeland and its people.

CONFIDENTIAL
30th January 2002
MALUKU

ISSUES FOR MAKASSAR TALKS
SIMILARITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN
MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS

1. Both agree to end the conflict through dialogue

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2. The law must be upheld firmly and justly
3. Repatriation of refugees, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economy
4. Rehabilitate the economy and infrastructure
5. Resolve the internal problems of TNI and the Police

SPECIAL ISSUES

I. ISLAM

1. Discussions regarding the ⁵ concept of unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)
2. Examine in details the issue of RMS
3. Examine the 19th January 1999 Incident
4. Sincere resolution
5. Improve religious education and teachers
6. Laskar Jihad to submit to religion and health issues
7. Restore civil rights to refugees
8. Renovate Pattimura University
9. Passo Police School to be reactivated

II. CHRISTIAN

1. The state is unable to resolve the problem
2. The issue of RMS is only an alternative if the state is unable to resolve the conflict
3. Is there a conspiracy from the center?
4. Laskar Jihad who came to Ambon must be sent home
5. The islamization in several areas
6. TIM
7. The National Independent Investigation of 19th January 1999 Incident which triggered the violence and the role RMS, Laskar Jihad.

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8. Resolution based upon humanity, democracy, law and culture.
9. Tantui Barricks to be rebuilt.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION IN MAKASSAR

30th January 2002

AGREED ISSUES BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS

1. Agreed to end the conflict by dialogue.
2. The law to be upheld firmly and fairly
3. Return of refugees, rehabilitation of economy and infrastructure.
4. Resolve the internal issues between the military (TNI) and the police
5. Form a national independent enquiry to investigate fully FKM and RMS as well the 19th January 1999 incident.
6. Resolve all matters sincerely.
7. Improve religious education and teachers.
8. Restore civil rights to refugees.
9. Renovate the Pattimura University and apply justice in recruitment with quality.
10. Passo Police College to be re-activated.
11. Resolve the conflict based upon law, humanitarianism, democracy, and culture.
12. Tantui Barracks and other TNI and Police facilities to be restored.
13. Christian:
 - Islamization in several areasMuslim:
 - None and there will be none

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ISSUES NOT YET RESOLVED

- The presence of Laskar Jihad in Ambon ⁷
- The presence of The Maluku Sovereignty Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku-FKM) and The Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan - RMS)

AGREEMENT IN MALINO

It was afternoon in Malino. Delegates from both sides had arrived as well the mediators and observers. Farid Husein was busy sorting out accommodation for all. They were arranged in the same buildings, one group faced west and the other faced east. This was to prevent any possible intrigue or intimidation. As far as possible to prevent the latter JK had ordered the security to be on full alert around the meeting venue.

The press were there in force with their best reporters to get news straight from the prime source - JK. Be aware that this was a long awaited event which would define in a way our nation's genuineness and our nation's reputation whether it was able to resolve this conflict and restore peace. Here, the abilities and reputation of JK, representing the Indonesian Government were put on the line. One problem remained was there was nation-wide pessimism over his peace initiative.

Just after early evening prayers, Farid asked come to JK's room.

"Mid, are all your notes complete and in order since we have been back and forth from Ambon and Makassar?" JK enquired.

"All is under control, Pak," I replied.

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"This is because the problem here is more complex than Poso. Consequently, there will have to be more points of agreement than there were in Poso. Make your agreement no more than 11 to 13 points. Any more will just make difficulties for us and too many commitments from us. What is important that the substance of their demands is contained in the agreement," said JK. "Hamid, in the Poso document we called it a declaration. I want this document to be in a form where all parties are bound. The format and name is up to you. What is important is that all parties are bound, including the government. So it in fact it becomes a contract between three parties: The government, the Muslim group and the Christian group," continued JK.

"Why does the government have to be enjoined as a party to the contract, Pak?" I queried. "Our job is just to mediate this?"

"Yes, in substance that is correct. However the government must be a party to demonstrate clearly that the government seriously wants them to be at peace and fulfill all their aspirations. Shortly after declaring peace, there will be follow-on from that agreement - the implementation. For example, the rehabilitation of markets, mosques and churches. That part is the responsibility of the government. It involves trust building, Hamid. We also must be consistent binding ourselves in this agreement. It would be ridiculous if we had to force them into an agreement but did not want to be bound ourselves, explained JK. "Now, what is the difference between a declaration and an agreement, Hamid?" asked JK.

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I replied, "A declaration is like a statement with a commitment, Pak. An agreement is binding. Because of this difference, I will draft this peace agreement document in the form of a contract, not a declaration."

"Just like a law graduate. Always want to tie people up! The main thing is for you to demonstrate your skills. You have already been too long at school and it is time for you do some practice. Furthermore, you are just not a lawyer but you have a background in conflict resolution. It must be sincere, yes? This is not like work between a lawyer and his client paid for by the hour. You have been funded by the state for your education. Now the state demands a return from you."

"The same as Poso. For example, both sides agree to end the conflict, uphold the supremacy of law, repatriate refugees to their village of origin, the government to rehabilitate infrastructure and the economy, the problem of TNI and the Police, and so on. You will have to be specific when mentioning RMS, Pattimura University and the Laskar Jihad. You arrange and define their joint wishes to end this conflict and the violence are to be the first clauses. Do it as you like, but include these points as they are the points of their similarities and the nucleus of the problem," ordered JK.

"When you have done it show it to me before you try and get prior agreement with all the parties. Farid will arrange with whom you should meet from the various groups. Your task is to make the agreement and discuss it with their representatives as well as the observers. On this last group, Pak Syahrul Ujud will arrange with whom you should meet to discuss this draft," added JK.

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The Ambon peace agreement document I drafted it in JK's hotel room. I was not permitted to go anywhere. They were my orders from JK. A couple of hours later the document was done. The points numbered 17. It was impossible for me to reduce them down to 11 or 13 as JK demanded.

"How goes it? Done?" greeted JK me that night. "My commander's order is done, Pak. It was done several hours ago," I replied.

"You have just finished it. Not hours ago. I was not in my room but I was still monitoring you. You want to have your credit too quickly," was JK's riposte taking the document from me and reading it.

"Hey! You have no success yet. Why are there so many points in it?" asked JK.

"Before we start any discussion of substance, aren't the introduction and the closure pretty good, Pak?" I asked.

"Your introduction and closure pass cum laude, but you don't pass on the number of points," added JK.

"It is like this Pak and I will discuss it with all parties later on. Then I will convince them that the agreement is probably adequate with between 11 and 13 points only. The main thing is I convince them, Pak. Also, I am conscious of the fact that too many points will create future difficulties of implementation and will become a new problem in the future, Pak," I responded.

"OK. But what is important you understand the difficulties presented by too many points in the agreement. If you can, start tonight to discuss this.

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Start with the observers first. Pak Syahrul has their names and where you will meet them," continued JK.

Not to waste any more time JK ordered me to start immediately. Pak Syahrul was an Echelon I⁷² civil servant in the Minister of Social Welfare's (SBY) office and had everything arranged for me. All I had to do was bring my draft approved by JK. I discussed this draft with a number of community leaders within the observer group. All agreed. Amazingly there were no questions or even additions.

In my discussions with these leaders, I started my discussions with the background to each of the points in the draft peace agreement. The way it ran was I lead in from behind from the small meetings in Ambon to the larger meetings in Makassar, explaining the content of the draft was a collation from the previous series of meetings.

In these discussions with the observers I was greatly assisted by Governor Latuconsina who often added to what I had said. On many matters he was able to add greater detail than I could. In short, the draft peace agreement was happily accepted by the observer group.

To coordinate the overall process, the following morning JK directed his adjutant to fax the draft to the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (SBY). A response was not long coming. Major General Bambang Sutejo, the Coordinating Minister's deputy, handed me a fax from the Coordinating Minister responding to my draft commenting only on point 4, the unitary state of Indonesia and point 5 regarding the organization form and units in Maluku.

⁷² A senior civil servant.

I showed this to JK immediately who was already in the middle of the plenary session. "This is from the Coordinating Minister, Pak. He has made some minor comments," I said to JK.

"No problems. They are just semantics only," stated JK.

I advised Major General Bambang of JK's reaction. Bambang nodded approval while giving me the thumbs up.

The meeting proceeded. Each group spoke in an angry tone. JK chaired the meeting in a relaxed but firm fashion. He was not reluctant to cut speakers short who went on and on repeatedly or those who wandered all over the place. I was not permitted to go beyond the content of their addresses in my note taking.

That afternoon JK summonsed me again, "How is it, Hamid? All the speakers are saying the same thing. Which means there is nothing new. Everything you have noted down and placed in that draft contained all their aspirations. Just as I said. God willing none will slip. Now you can start to get prior approval to the draft from the parties. Start with their leaders. Farid has all of this organized for you. Meet with only 7 persons from each group," advised JK.

Immediately I started and for certain Farid had it all arranged. In these discussion again I was accompanied by Governor Latuconsina who was very helpful smoothing the way in these discussions.

That night I had exhausted all my energy convincing both sides to accept the draft. Beforehand I never suspected I would have so much difficulties in

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convincing them. Thanks to God, it was accepted by all. Here is the peace agreement set out below:

MALUKU AGREEMENT IN MALINO

The Maluku conflict which has run for three years has caused thousands of deaths and damaged property, tortured and caused difficulties the community endangered NKRI and darkened the future of the people of Ambon. Because of this, and with the blessings of the Almighty we the Muslim and Christian communities of Maluku with a free conscience and open and sincere heart in unity with our nation together with the government of the Republic of Indonesia agree to join in this agreement.

1. End all forms of conflict and violence.
2. Uphold the supremacy of law and justice, firmly and fairly, impartially with the full support of the community. To do this security agencies must behave professionally in implementing their duties.
3. Reject, oppose and act against all forms of separatism which threaten the integrity and sovereignty of NKRI amongst them RMS.
4. As part of NKRI the people of Maluku have the right to live, work and do business throughout Republic of Indonesia and conversely the people of the Republic of Indonesia have the right to live, work and do business in the province of Maluku in a lawful and just manner paying attention to local culture.
5. All armed organizations, units, groups or civilian military groups in Maluku without permission are forbidden and must surrender their weapons or be removed and dealt with under prevailing laws. For groups from outside who have been disturbing Maluku, they are required to leave.

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6. Form an independent national team to investigate thoroughly the 19 January 1999 incident, FKM, RMS, Laskar Jihad, forced religious conversion and other issues to uphold the law.
7. Return refugees to their place of origin along with all their civil rights in stages and in accordance with the situation and conditions.
8. The Government shall assist the community with the rehabilitation of mental, social, economic infrastructure, and public infrastructure such as facilities for education, health, religion along with housing so that the Maluku community can go forward and come out of its difficulties. Parallel to this, all forms of restrictions will be limited for the community so that the economy and society improves.
9. In an effort to ensure order and security throughout the province and for the community, the solidarity and resoluteness of both TNI and the Police must be in accordance with their respective functions and duties is absolutely essential. Parallel to this various TNI and Police facilities have to be rebuilt, re-equipped and restored to their original functions.
10. To protect the relationship and harmony between all religious faiths in Maluku, all efforts and proselytizing and religious publications must be highly respected and beautify local culture.
11. Support the rehabilitation of the Pattimura University with the principle of joint effort so that recruitment will be open, just, and fulfilling the conditions of quality.

This agreement is made in all sincerity and determination. to be implemented consistently and consequentially. For those who do not implement this agreement will be dealt with under prevailing legislation.

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Implementation of this agreement will be executed with an agenda and plan as follows:

Security and Upholding of the Law Commission (Attachment I) Social and Economic Commission (Attachment II)

The implementation of the agenda and plan above will be executed by the National Review Team and the Working Group in the province.

This agreement is made and signed in Malino on 12 February 2002

Intentionally references to the RMS and the Laskar Jihad were included in the document as they were still fighting one another even after the peace initiative had commenced. If they were not on the agenda, our discussions became loud and difficult. So as a compromise it was decided to include them in the draft.

Point 11 of the agreement was of particular interest the renovation of Pattimura University. This point was included because JK felt strongly that the University was a place where people of differing backgrounds could fraternize. If the University was not promptly renovated, there was no other place for this sort and level of fraternization. Also this University was the pride of all Maluku.

To prevent a recurrence of the conflict the final paragraph of the document stated that anyone who did not honour this agreement would be brought before the law. This idea came from JK. Repeatedly JK reminded me to ensure there were strict provisions

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for those who violated the agreement after signing the peace agreement. That was JK's line of thinking.

Thanks to God, on 12th February 2002 in Malino, 35 representatives of the Muslim community and 35 representatives of the Christian, 10 mediators and 20 observers unanimously yelled "Agreed!" when JK asked for their approval of the Maluku peace agreement. Bang, bang, bang JK's gavel struck the table as a sign that the Maluku conflict had ended and a new era of peace had commenced.

The signing of the peace agreement was started by Ustad H. A. Wahab Palpoke, the head of MUI Maluku from the Muslim group and from the Christians by Rev W. J. Hendriks, the head of GPM3. They were then followed by the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).

Now there were no more worries, no more prejudices. The children of Ambon now could sing again "Ambon Manise" and look forward to a far better future. Hopes were no longer drowning. JK had pioneered the way out of this conflict.

MOSQUES AND CHURCHES

Little more needs to be told but while chairing the meeting JK made a series of handwritten notes regarding what had to be done post-signing. In these notes, both from Ambon and Poso, JK was always consistent.

In his explanation in all his notes, JK gave priority to rehabilitation of mosques and churches. In Ambon I had occasion to ask him one quiet night, "Pak, people can pray anywhere. Rehabilitation of mosques

73 Gereja Protestan Maluku- The Maluku Protestant Churches

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could be lower down on priorities and not necessarily first," I enquired.

"Hamid, these people fighting in Poso and Ambon, their comforting friend is religion. Because of that, religious institutions which are named mosques and churches, have always been a symbol. It is a symbol of peace, a place where people can be peaceful, but it is also a symbol from which people also can create anger," answered JK.

"I was just sort of thinking practically, Pak," I rejoindered.

It is like this, once they have hugged one another in peace and promised peace to one another, and if they cross the road and see the rubble of their mosques and churches, their bitter memories will return. These torched mosques and churches will recreate the anger and the desire to fight again because their places of worship have been burnt and torn down by the others and that is the psychology. Because of this, we cannot have any rubble of mosques or churches remain. We must rebuild immediately. If it were humanly possible, we could these mosques and churches would be rebuilt by dawn prayers tomorrow," explained JK.

JK's next priority was the repatriation of refugees to their homes. "Isn't this going to be an enormous problem, Pak, because many are still traumatized? Wouldn't it be better if we did this once things settled down," I expressed to JK.

"Here, Hamid, you have not yet passed peace making," replied JK.

"Bapak, is inconsistent. Bapak has already given me a good marks because I formulated the Poso and

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Ambon peace documents, and negotiated with the quarreling parties. Now you say I fail!" I replied.

"You don't pass logic. You say that the matter of the refugees be done later because they may be still traumatized. The logic of that is back to front. They must be repatriated immediately so that they are not traumatized in the refugee camps. Think what it would be like if you were forced to stay on Buru Island.⁷⁴ You would be distressed for sure. Always pining to come back to Jakarta. By remaining a refugee, there is no certainty in the future. Their children cannot go to school. On the other hand if they are repatriated immediately, automatically these is certainty as they are no longer living in a temporary status," explained JK. "Pak, can I hold an opinion which differs from your Pak?" I asked JK.

"When have I ever forbidden you to have a different opinion from me. I am a reformist. What are your objections?" asked JK.

"It is like this Pak Ucup if the refugees are repatriated straight away, what guarantees do we have for their security. Isn't that a problem?" I posed. "Here, we turn the logic upside down. If they are in a refugee camp, their relatives who stayed behind will be worried and concerned that they are dead or have been kidnapped. So by far the better solution is to bring them home. On the matter of security, that is the duty of all of us," said JK.

"Furthermore, Hamid, if they come home, psychologically they will start to have the perception

⁷⁴ Buru Island was a notorious prison island where many thousands of alledged communist sympathizers were sent after the coup of 1965 without trial

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that there is already peace. That there are no more problems. Let everyone know and acknowledge that both Ambon and Poso are now in peace." added JK.

Next after the refugees, JK gave priority to the rehabilitation of schools and markets. There is a good reason for the schools. Let the children return to the classroom and prepare themselves for a better future.

But why the markets? That caused me some concern. "Pak, the markets do we only rehabilitate them when conditions are really secure. For the people, security first, Pak. Markets are a symbol of stability. People will only go to the market if they feel safe. Nobody will go there is there are feeling nervous that someone will wound them or even kill them. This time my logic is right, Pak. Don't reluctantly award me high marks tonight," I announced proudly.

"Precisely, tonight you passed well enough; but let us return to the matter of preparations. Again, your logic must be turned upside down. If the markets are again operational, this means people from all sorts of backgrounds, will come and interact one on one. The market becomes a neutral place to restore ruptured relationships. Hamid, there are only two places where we can have people meet without prior arrangements. The first being the market and the second wedding celebrations. If there are people in the market, it means other will feel it safe and go there. So, rehabilitate the markets first. Let people start to live normally," laughed JK loudly.

Clearly, JK's peace initiative was not without a logical and rational strategy behind it. Everything had been taken into account logically which for most others would not yet have been realized.

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With that experience, I often teased JK. "My daughter Virginia who is aged four wants to talk with you every time we speak on the phone. She loves the TV film "Out of the Box". Because of this, she is delighted with Bapak because Bapak thinks outside of the box," I said.

"Whatever! In the box or out of the box, up to you. For sure we have to adopt a optimistic and positive outlook. If we always think negatively, nothing will get done. And what is really important, if necessary you go back to the preparation stage and start the lessons again from zero. Like that, eh?" he replied.

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CHAPTER IV

HOW WE MADE PEACE

Recalling that the Poso and Ambon conflicts continued for three years with similar numbers of victims with unimaginable violence, and with a potential for the conflict to spread anywhere, it is difficult to think that both these conflicts could be stopped

The fact was that both conflicts could not be resolved by state violence but only peaceably. Both communities could agree to sit at the same table in the same room, in the same language achieve points of agreement that violence had to be put to one side and acknowledge peace was the best road and only road to follow.

Both communities agreed that the axes of war would no longer be swung threateningly. The goals of the conflict must be extinguished and buried. It was time to ring the death knell on mutual killing's lust. Hopes were that our children could look forward to a bright future was the basis of common thoughts.

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Only then the word peace could be engraved into an agreement between both sides. The government was no longer seen to be reluctant to achieve this pledge.

To do this was not simple. A number of tactics had to be arranged. It goes without saying a number of strategies were adopted and tried. Thanks to God, Poso was in peace and Ambon quiet. Why?

FIRSTLY, the Malino peace talks over Poso were started two days after the Muslim community had celebrated Hari Raya Idul Fitri where all Muslims were required to forgive all the errors and mistakes of others.

For the Christians, at the time of the meeting, it was at the time of Christians where all are required to create a feeling of peace and good will to his fellow mankind.

This conjunction of both religions' festivities provided a spiritual momentum for both sides to end the conflict. In one of the Christian leader's opening speeches in Malino he said. "There is a belief of ours that says whomsoever brings peace is a child of God. So we come to this meeting with this mission. To achieve this we seek the deepest forgiveness of our Muslim brothers and sisters who for a while have not been alongside us but today they are with us again."

On hearing this spiritual statement, a Muslim spokesman responded in kind, " We are required to forgive those who request forgiveness; and we are also required to forgive those who do not ask forgiveness, and at the same time we seek our Christian brothers' and sisters' forgiveness."

75 The celebrations at the end of Rammadhan, the Muslim fasting month.

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It clear that this factor of momentum played a significant role in making peace in Poso. This is the sharpness of JK's mind at play selecting the timing for Idul Fitri and Christmas.

A day before we left for Malino, JK said to me, "Hamid, I bet with you that both sides will in their opening remarks talk of the context of Idul Fitri and Christmas. Those two days require mutual forgiveness. Consequently, thanks to God, we will succeed in making peace because spiritually they are bound not to be angry towards others and are required to forgive one another for their errors and mistakes. Believe me, Hamid!"

So when the two spokesmen from the opposing sides mentioned this in their opening remarks, JK scratched my knee as I was seat right behind him. It was a sign that he was right in his prediction about seeking forgiveness.

Another influence on the Ambon peace talks was the success of the Poso peace talks. Additionally, the Ambon peace agreement was completed in Malino in only six weeks. The Poso peace brought a moral and concrete message to the Ambon talks that it could be accomplished peacefully as it had been done in the Poso conflict and ended at the peace table.

SECONDLY, the firm attitude now adopted by the government helped considerably in the peace process. The government through JK gave the conflict parties three options: First fight on until they destroyed one another completely with the government arming both sides; secondly fight the government as the government would not in any way tolerate further violence; or thirdly sit together to make peace.

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For both sides the choice offered by JK was difficult. The first two options were extremely limited: fight to the end or fight the government. Logically they were compelled to take the third option to sit at the peace table. This firm resolution by our government had been missing in the past.

These limited choices were laid for them not without JK's calculation. And these choices were not offered until there was a deep understanding of the overall situation and that it was certain that the majority on both sides were weary of fighting and had reached a point of total and utter frustration.

This ambience was fully comprehended by JK. As a trader, JK was fully conversant with mathematics, he estimated that it was not clear who would be the victors or the losers. Both were suffering badly and there was not one them who could readily seize the trophy cup of victory. What would be the situation if both sides had to fight the government?

JK was convinced neither wanted to face off with the government in any battle or police action. The main reason being there was no good reason, both ideologically or for any other reasons. Because there was no reasons, it followed there was no motivation to oppose our government. To challenge the government, both knew, was to dig their own graves.

Here, stated JK, because they were both exhausted fighting one another, they certainly did not want to fight the state, so there remained only one choice: Sit at the peace table and make peace. So the name of Malino became engraved on the pages of history as a place where peace was made between two

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communities which fought each other for more than several years.

JK's firm approach was meaningful and certainly helped convince both sides that our government was neutral standing in the middle of these two raging communities and helped to sideline the conviction that TNI and Police were supporting one or the other side.

State neutrality in conflicts like this which contained elements of racism was just one of the difficulties to be confronted. Luckily, in resolving the Poso and Ambon conflicts, neutrality was reflected in the manner in which JK managed to sideline this deliberately, carefully and slowly that fact that in religious conflicts nobody could be neutral. Everyone was taking sides.

Apart from this problem of state neutrality, was the imperative that government must act promptly in any conflict with any racial undertones. Racial conflicts are the coals which can quickly spread fire anywhere and are extremely difficult to extinguish. Superficially, the flames may no longer be apparent but underneath the coals may be still glowing and a single spark can re-ignite the whole issue again. In community conflicts in Indonesia, the philosophy that says the community itself has the internal mechanisms to resolve the conflict is both naïve and wrong. The state has no other choice but to move immediately to extinguish these fires.

On the matter of state neutrality in racial conflicts, Goenawan Mohamad, the noted journalist wrote, "The Maluku Peace Agreement signed in Malino, a place way out in the back blocks of South Sulawesi,

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reminded us that when religion becomes the identity of a group, when they kill one another because of this identity, we have to act together to prevent lives being totally obliterated and we need a government which is utterly impartial. In other words a government which adopts the position that it has no religious identity whatsoever" (Catatan Pinggir, Tempo Magazine, 10th March 2002)

THIRDLY, the text which forms any peace agreement should not be rhetorical but simply include substantive issues of the conflict to date. Any peace agreement must contain concrete matters which have been perceived or considered to be wrong and partial by both sides. JK's task was to make clear and concrete all and any matters causing any confusion. JK clarified all these matters which in the past had been viewed as vague.

To get to the substance of the agreement, JK repeatedly instructed me to note everything which explained the position of all parties. This was to ensure that not one aspiration was overlooked or omitted in the agreement. My notes were closely studied by JK who often asked me to contact those interviewed. Basically, JK wanted to confirm that what they had said was what they really wanted to say. "Hamid, it is not certain that what they will say in the forum is consistent with their thinking. Often forums can be a place for personal aggrandizement. So we have to check one-by-one on this. It can be different in the forum and quite different from what you were told outside the meeting," advised JK.

This was a tough order to check with each and everyone that what they had told me was true and

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again to confirm this. Thanks to God, after I had done all of this, I reported back to JK. Then he required me to set out my notes systematically.

This was JK's skill in resolving the conflict. Each and every point was carefully scrutinized right down to the smallest detail. He was not moved a millimeter by rhetoric or semantics but explored concrete and practical steps. He paid no attention whatsoever to pretty semantics but was drawn to substantive argument which could become an inspiration and a wish for everyone.

In this context JK did not hide behind contrary rhetoric. He cared greatly for what was said truthfully reflecting their real wishes.

"Much experience shows, Hamid, that generally pretty rhetorical language in peace agreements has no substance. So they fail in implementation. That is dangerous. When a peace agreement fails, it is almost impossible to re-initiate peace talks. As a result the parties no longer trust the peace making mechanism to solve the conflict," said JK to me on one occasion.

"According to me, Hamid, the most important thing is that they all feel at peace and safe. Consequently, they will have no objections to the state being involved. The problem of justice will certainly be one of their hopes. Justice is closely linked to upholding the law. This is one of their demands. This means the law must be upheld to deal with those who have broken it. The same holds for their property which has been destroyed. I am absolutely certain they imagine that their civil rights will be restored. So here once again they must rely upon the state to do so," explained JK.

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"Also, I am convinced Hamid, that both sides will demand guarantees that all outside parties have no further role and leave the conflict area. The problem is both sides are suspicious and the facts support this; they both have relied upon outside forces," continued JK.

For sure JK's assessment was correct, and having this knowledge made it easier to set out my notes and even easier to draft the peace agreement. When the negotiations with both sides got underway over the draft, there were no real hurdles at all to be jumped. It has been pre-approved.

FOURTHLY, it must be acknowledged that the success of both the Poso and Ambon peace talks was due to the positive and active role of the media at each meeting in Malino. Together the media the press, the radio and TV bombarded readers, listeners and viewers alike of the necessity to create an unconditional peace.

Here JK was smart. He contracted the Satellite News Gathering service from Telkom". His idea being to report meeting progress live back to the nation quickly from Malino. This coverage provided news to the nation as well as to the locals in the areas where the conflict still continued. "We want to make those who do not want peace to feel ashamed because the others already want to make peace," was the way JK saw the importance of the media presence in Malino.

"We must promptly broadcast the news to the public at large so that the public supports our endeavors," continued JK.

76 The national telecommunications company

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In using this technology JK did not want the media to pay for it. If they did pay this tariff, it would be about Rp5 million for 10 minutes which could be easily paid by the media themselves remarked Husien Abdullah, a reporter from RCTI.

Linked to this live coverage, JK tasked me to brief the press almost on a two hourly basis on meeting developments and progress as the discussion and debate was closed to outsiders. However, press photographs were only permitted prior to the start of the meeting.

In briefing the press JK placed no limits on me as to what I could say. He only advised me "Your statements can make peace but also they can cause violence. So be careful and don't give the impression that anything is being hidden from them."

I found the best way to accommodate JK's advice: At each briefing I outlined the similarities of their respective positions. I tried to avoid saying anything about them being at loggerheads. When questioned on differences, I replied that the discussion was loud and dynamic. Because of this dynamism, certainly there were differences, and these differences were being discussed and would ultimately settled. Apart from the press briefings, I held at JK's request special discussions with the television reporters. Later I realized that JK gave me the opportunity to be the sole source of information. "If you say something, then the press will know that it really originates from me," explained JK later on. Although given such a large degree of latitude, JK continued to monitor me closely, particularly when I

77 About US\$500.00

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appeared on TV. In the midst of his busy program JK paid attention to my dress and my unsmiling speech. "You have to have a big smile, so that people know we have peace," counseled JK.

With the press, JK was always considered to be very helpful. The press were very friendly towards JK knowing that JK was always readily contactable, and always had some news for them. His quotes were always original and not polished up to promote himself. His replies were invariably quote-worthy and gave no cause for misinterpretation.

This style, amongst other attributes of JK, simplified the peace making progress in Poso and Ambon. JK simply asked the press adopt a role speeding up our peace process. To do this JK regularly spoke with heads of news organizations in Jakarta advising them of progress and the initiatives in both places prior to the Malino talks. All of them made a commitment to JK that the Malino talks for Poso and Ambon would be successful outcomes.

FIFTHLY, was the meeting technique method used by JK was very apposite for peace making. Both in Poso and Ambon, prior to the formal Malino meetings, in Poso JK commenced meeting with elements of the various groups involved on both sides of the conflict. The same was done in Ambon. Here JK held meetings in the conflict area before inviting them to Malino. So JK knew the pulse of all involved well beforehand.

With this staged approach, the emotions on both sides had ebbed considerably by the time they all faced one another at the formal peace table in Malino.

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All their bitterness had drained away many days beforehand.

With this method, at the formal Malino meetings if any discussant spoke on the same theme and substance when they had met with JK earlier in either Poso or Ambon, so it was easy for JK to interrupt and say "No point in bringing that up again. I have already heard that from you before we came here."

In the Malino talks itself, this staged approach of JK's was applied. Each group in the separate meetings explained their list of rages and desires to JK.

"I did this so that they produced their list of rages before they faced their opponents. I let them go on as long it was only in front of me not when they faced their enemies," JK explained.

JK was correct. All of their complaints were out in the open now before meeting their enemies and when they did only a small residue, if any, remained. JK simply told them, "All your aspirations and desires about your enemies I have accepted and noted. I will speak directly and take charge. It is longer necessary to bring it up again," said JK.

SIXTHLY, parallel to these staged meetings JK was very skillful in forecasting the form of the meeting between the conflict parties. There were no unclear statements or groping for meanings. It was done facing one another and by direct and open communication. There were no brokers promoting those seeking to display their self-importance or alter things using courtesy as a subterfuge. Everything was transparent and the aspirations and hopes directed at the group which raised it.

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A risk in such an approach was always there. This meeting was held to seek a way and points to achieve peace but also could be the arena for a renewed conflict. It was possible that both sides could lose their self-control here with emotions overflowing clash again with one another yet again.

The fear that this could occur was remote as JK as a mediator was viewed as an authoritative figure by both sides. In many matters both sides, in both Poso and Ambon, left issues to JK to decide.

"Whatever you say Pak Jusuf, for peace we will accept what you say as we trust you implicitly and want you to resolve this for all of us," explained one Muslim spokesman from Ambon.

"Yes, we have come here Pak Minister as we are convinced our fate is in your hands. We will follow all your directions and wishes because we know from before Bapak is sincere in wanting to resolve this conflict," replied one of the Christian leaders.

The meeting proceeded without any new problems arising because of this staged approach set up prior to the main meeting in Malino. This was JK's well thought out design. His forecast calculations were very accurate in establishing the strategy for the meeting format. Even these staged meetings which were already mapped out and determined beforehand had to be done more than three times to establish firmly points of total agreement.

On one occasion, JK showed me his handwritten notes of a meeting timetable from the very beginning to this summit meeting. His calculations were very detailed with comprehensive clarification. For example, he foretold the first meeting would be a

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slanging match. This happened as all parties were consumed with burning coals for revenge which they wanted hurl at everyone. It was only in the second meeting that they wanted to hear the other side. They could not accept the aspirations of the other side because there was residual anger. In the third meeting the door opened wide accepting the other side's points and so on.

Later I used this as a guideline in our Aceh peace talks in 2005. All steps and stages were determined beforehand up to the actual signing of the Aceh peace treaty in Helsinki and followed exactly the same format set out by JK. We met as many as five times and signed this Aceh treaty on 15 August 2005. All of this was pre-ordained in JK's Poso and Ambon blue prints.

I only recently came to understand JK's determination to have a strict staging and timetable.

"It is not without good reason that I did it that way. We must start from an exploratory meeting to the signing without pausing long because emotions can flare up amongst them and we will not be able to respond to them. This means there are many new variables which will crop up in the middle of the talks and well may stall commitments already made. Because of this, we have staged speeches, we cannot review, or cancel the next meeting. Strike while the iron is hot," JK gave me this response often as an example.

SEVENTHLY, Poso is now peaceful and Ambon quiet because JK was able to move fast and mobilize the conflict parties. He simply met whom so ever were the key leaders of both sides starting from the lowest

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ranks to their highest leaders in their chains of command. Also, he held many informal meetings. As a result JK could maneuver anywhere he wished establishing multiple channels to resolve the conflict.

The ease with which JK moved was not removed from the seeds of his past which he had intentionally planted and continued to cultivate. Until now JK's residence in Makassar was a half-way-house for anyone wherever they originated from. As an activist in HMI and Gerakan 66 JK had lots of friends and contacts and many were now key figures - Muslims and Christians involved in the Poso and Ambon conflicts. In his school reports, from early days his house was always a meeting place for those involved in conflict, starting with student demonstrations, youth organizations and ethnic groups.

For example, Thamrin Ely, a PAN activist and one of the key leaders of the Muslim community in Ambon, once shared a room with JK at the KAMI dormitory in Makassar when they were student activists in 66. Until now Thamrin respected JK as his senior as the head of KAMI in Makassar. Thamrin to this day always greeted JK as Daeng Ucup.

Even Kiai Wahab, a charismatic Ambonese Muslim leader, admitted to me, that he often stayed at JK's parent's house in the past. His parent's home in Makassar was known as a refuge for student activists. Often after Friday midday prayers, JK's mother, Hajjah Athirah always had food prepared for everyone who dropped by. It was here that Kiai Wahab started to interact with JK's family.

78 Gerakan 66 was a student movement after the coup of 1965 which demonstrated against President Sukarno demanding his resignation.

79 PAN stands for Partai Amanat Nasional

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"I never doubted JK's sincerity in resolving this Ambon conflict because his father always cared about these sorts of things. I often ate at JK's house when I was in Ambon before. Even after I returned to Ambon, every time I went to Makassar I dropped by JK's parents' house," explained Kiai Wahab to me in one of the Malino meetings.

In the Christian community JK had many friends too. For example the Rev. Lambe was close to JK from years ago. JK's home was a place to drop by for Christians from Jakarta or from the eastern part of Indonesia. This kind of investment provided JK with great mobility in this situation.

Also, by chance, a number of the key figures in the Muslim community in Poso and Ambon originated from South Sulawesi and were naturally well acquainted with JK's family. Likewise some of the Christian leaders in Poso and Ambon originated from Tanah Toraja, north of Makassar. These contacts on both sides allowed JK to interact easily amongst them for they all felt that JK was one of them. This resulted in JK being granted a spiritual mandate from all sides because they all trusted JK from years past.

Apart from the above background, in both conflict areas were where JK operated his personal business and he usually had offices there. This meant that JK had trusted contacts whom he could ask information about developments in each area and who was the best person to talk to there.

Again having representative offices there in these conflict zones, JK had also made had made considerable charitable donations to both communities from early on to the present. Again this was like an investment

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which bore fruit when JK became mediator in both these conflicts.

Apart from the above, many Bugis-Makassar Mandar and Toraja people were spread throughout these conflict areas and were represented collectively by an organization, called KKSS80 which was a family friendship organization, well disciplined and structured with a clear chain of command; and as well was headquartered in Jakarta.

Through this organization JK was able to access people in order to resolve aspects of these conflicts. In fact some members of the KKSS were directly involved in the conflict in both areas of Poso and Ambon. Consequently, JK when he visited these areas invariably visited the KKSS offices.

EIGHTHLY, apart from JK's skill at mobilizing people and his flexibility in lobbying, he was not constrained by logistics problems. In both peace processes nothing was overlooked, nothing was delayed, nothing was grounded only because of costs. JK never waited for funds; making peace as planned preceded without waiting for funds.

In JK's mind, cash flow was not to delay the peace process. Any delays almost meant condoning death by violence. Peacemaking for JK was an ultimate merit. Consequently, JK often used his personal money happily to maintain momentum. There was no accounting, no calculation of debts.

Farid Husein, well trusted by JK was his de facto finance manager for all these transactions in Poso and Ambon and again later in Aceh. Farid always carried a

¹⁸
80 Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan (KKSS) the South Sulawesi Family Association

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brief case full of money ready to pay out. In this peace process if there is a woman who deserves recognition it is JK's wife, Mufidah, who never complained once about JK using his personal money.

When Farid or another person needed funds JK called for his wife while shaking his head. This meant arrange some funds dear. Never once did I see his wife ask what for. JK always said it was for humanitarian needs. I do not understand how the management of JK's finances operated between him and his wife. What was for certain was that in the Ambon, Poso and Aceh conflicts his treasurer was H. Mufidah Jusuf Kalla, his wife.

Even until today I do not know whether or not the government ever refunded JK. What is for sure was these total funds were significant.

In the course of the peace process, JK's private secretary, Sabrina, was also a source of funds. Usually if it was a large amount, Sabrina would hand JK a cheque for signature and return it to the person requesting the money. So it went on like that: Peacemaking for JK was not a matter of money. Humanitarianism was immeasurable and not negotiable.

Apart from the cash disbursements out of his private office other facilities were provided by JK. For example, accommodations costs for all delegates and observers on their way to Malino at the Hotel Sahid Makassar, which is owned by JK. All of this was to JK's personal account.

Also included were airline tickets to and from Poso and Ambon plus the observers from Jakarta. The largest by far outlay was for the rehabilitation. Often I witnessed JK instructing someone to get money from

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the treasurer of peace - his wife, or from his secretary. Increasingly, I never knew whether JK was repaid by the government or not.

On many occasions when we were together JK stressed to me to make peace a precondition was to have a clean and sincere heart with no desire to seek personal fortune or fame. "Don't expect any thanks peacemaking. God, the Great Listener and the Great Witness will see what you do. Peacemaking is an act of devotion and devotion is caused by internal conviction, JK counseled me.

Because of this deep moral principle of peacemaking I never queried the amount of money outlaid by JK; and I never knew the source of it.

What was certain, two days after the signing of the peace agreement in Malino, in Makassar Farid Husein gave me an envelope with Rp5 million. "This is from JK for your and your wife's airfares back to Jakarta. My wife was embarrassed but overjoyed receiving this from JK.

NINTHLY, JK's success in handling both the Poso and Ambon conflicts could not be separated from him unearthing the basic causes of the conflicts and upending this previously purported common enemy, for example the issue of the RMS versus the Laskar Jihad.

JK quickly recognized that in the Ambon conflict there was no link to the RMS which had been tied to the Christians or in the case of the Muslims that the Laskar Jihad were the ones who lit the fuse in Ambon. RMS was not a Christian organization as it was founded by three Muslims. Also, Laskar Jihad

81 Approximately US\$500.00

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could not be the trigger as they did not arrive in Ambon until a year and half after the conflict started. As JK said, Laskar Jihad was merely progeny of the conflict.

These confused and wrong-headed perceptions of entrance to heaven for both sides murdering each other was easily countered by JK. One cannot enter heaven, whatever your religion, Muslim or Christian, because both religions forbid murder. Instead they would enter hell. This clever counter of JK's upended one motivation for the conflict and was widely welcomed. Both sides now realized that one of their motivating factors in the conflict was confused and wrong. In due course this catch call was dropped.

JK's adroitness getting to the root of the problem must be given the thumbs up. For example, the theme of the conflict was often classified as a religious conflict in both places: Islam versus Christianity. JK quickly dismissed this pointing out it was caused by rapid demographic changes which altered existing traditional socio-economic structures while it also entailed to some extent recent political changes. These changes in social structure caused widespread friction which was easily ignited under the banner of religion. The problem was, JK explained, when religions clashed everyone became subjective.

JK's analytical skills did not stop just there. He was also very skilled at execution. He is not just an expert at formulating plans but simultaneously an expert at implementing plans. With this background, it is not surprising that even when JK had the opposing sides seated in the meeting, he would say this was an early step to reaching peace.

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Then the really hard work would begin with the field implementation of the peace agreement requiring concrete actions - who did what, who gave what and how much. Once again JK showed his practical agility changing from an architect to a foreman of works.

In a practical sense, it undeniable that JK had a very realistic view of things and was a competent manager. He thoroughly checked everything and solved all problems. Heads of regency departments were investigated and interrogated one by one regarding their assigned tasks and were required to explain as to why they had fallen short of targets. Every amount and price of building materials needed in renovation of schools, mosques and churches was checked and so forth.

TENTHLY, JK as a person¹⁹ was readily accepted by both sides in Poso and Ambon. Dr Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, then dean of the Psychology Faculty at the University of Indonesia, described JK in this context as a person who well understood psychology without formally studying the subject. In Sarlito's opinion, the steps adopted by JK were precisely the steps prescribed in sociology/psychology literature on peace resolution which stipulated two primary steps - good intent and meetings. And to do this it required a mediator - a person with good intent and with no hidden agenda.

Such a role, according to Sarlito, was played well and quickly by JK. His good intent "was proven by the fact that he was trusted by all parties to the conflicts for having good intent. Without such trust, it is not possible that he could invite conflict parties to sit down together," explained Sarlito.

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This trust, added Sarlito, must be followed by well planned direct action and requires patience and perseverance and clear thinking and must be distant from any political motivation. (Suara Pembaruan, 10th March 2002).

Sarlito's ideas were applicable and appropriate. Apart from the factors agreed to by both sides because of his ability and good intent, JK continuously observed meticulous details. He never stopped examining details even after the parties sat at the peace table and the agreement was signed. For JK the hardest part would be the implementation of all commitments undertaken in the agreement.

As a foreman of works, JK went to the field himself to check the prices of timber, nails, cement, sand etc. Afterwards, he was not averse to cross-checking prices between suppliers. "I was a contractor. So don't fool with me on prices," he said.

ELEVENTH, the full support of TNI and the Police in restoring peace in Poso and Ambon was a key factor in making peace. Although TNI and the Police were criticized and accused that their members were selling weapons and ammunition, their respective Jakarta commands were fully behind the peace talks. Poso and Ambon must be at peace with everyone's support.

The TNI commander at this time was Gen. Endriartono and the national Chief of Police Da'i Bachtiar were both fully committed to peace and this was no longer a concern. Both commanders were not reluctant to take action against their men if they did not support field peace efforts 100 percent; and they would not accept any deviation from their instruction from Jakarta.

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Military and Police support, was not separate from JK's ability to develop close personal relationships with these two men. He created good communications between them.

Later I discovered from a number of senior military and police officers that the military and the police gave full support to JK's planning and policies because JK had in the past assisted them in cabinet get increased budgetary allocations. Often I heard JK complain about many reports about lack of police discipline but JK countered saying we must increase their budget if we want a better police force. With little logistic support the police can do little. The same applied to the military.

Additional to JK's help getting increased budgetary allocations for the military and the police, JK defended them. This resulted in them fully supporting JK in Poso and Ambon. In both conflicts the spotlight was focused on them with many allegations such as they had sought to influence the conflict parties so that the conflict could never be settled. There were some who suggested that the military had intentionally stirred matters up to show up police incompetence after the police separated from the military in 1999. There was an even more extreme view that the military were stirring things up to be more involved in the civilian government because they no longer occupied civilian governments positions as in the past.⁸²

To these allegations and all their distorted perceptions, JK politely countered them. "It is odd that the TNI and the Police as institutions could

⁸² This refers to dwi-fungsi or dual function which was introduced by General Nasution in 1958 where army officers often held senior civilian positions and was continued under President Suharto.

intentionally play with fire in Poso and Ambon. It does not make sense as many of their number have been wounded or killed. Tell me where there is a commander of TNI or Chief of Police who wants his men wounded or killed," defended JK. Such a defense raised the morale of TNI and the Police knowing they were protected and supported; and in turn all of JK's efforts were strongly supported by them.

JK never acted entirely on his own initiative. Each and every step he took JK consulted others not only with senior TNI and Police in Jakarta. Even on the smallest matters JK was not averse to telephoning the Commander in Chief of TNI or the national Chief of Police. For JK, whatever needed to be done to achieve peace in Poso and Ambon, TNI and the Police should be fully informed and involved. One concrete thing which I regularly witnessed was if JK had field information from his own network he always cross-checked and informed TNI and the Police. He believed his work would not be valid if he did not involve these agencies.

When JK tasked me to draft the Poso peace declaration and the Ambon peace agreement, he endlessly reminded me during both talks to coordinate with both TNI and the Police representatives in the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security.

In parallel with the support from TNI and the Police, JK also had the support of the provincial and local governments as it was logical that they would suffer considerably more if the conflict did not end.

The main lesson from both the Poso and Ambon community conflicts is that the security apparatuses, TNI and the Police must be overseen to ensure the law and regulations are upheld and they do not support

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any side and remain completely neutral. From this point of view, when the Police and TNI dormitories were destroyed, as happened in Ambon, it would be best in future if they were not dispersed and billeted outside. When dispersed it provided a real temptation to become involved. Dispersal means losing their *esprit de corps*.

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Peace ala JK: Poso is Calm, Ambon is Peacefull

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